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Seldom's avatar

1- So glad Egypt stayed out of this alliance and refused to join.

2- Didn't Pakistan and Saudi Arabia say a similar defense alliance this past year? And what did Pakistan do when SA was attacked by Iran? Not much. Have a feeling these alliances are not worth the paper they're written on.

Andrew Korybko's avatar

1. It might still join, we'll see, but I'm surprised that it didn't join at this time when Turkiye did.

2. Yes, this move essentially expands last September's Pakistani-Saudi pact to include Turkiye.

3. I think that the timing is meant to deter Iran from its threat to destroy Gulf infrastructure in retaliation for Trump threatening to destroy Iran's.

Seldom's avatar

Andrew, your point about this alliance being formed to counter Iran's threat to Gulf countries is an excellent one and makes perfect sense. Obviously a US request/ demand.

Seldom's avatar

I think Egypt doesn't want the obligations that come with such an alliance, i.e., having to send its army for conflicts that have nothing to do with it even if it loses on the benefits, i.e., these countries rushing to its defense. I also think not being part of this alliance neutralizes you as a country, making you less of a threat to other countries and thus less likely to be dragged into wider conflicts (think Ireland and Switzerland in Europe).

Andrew Korybko's avatar

That's a good point, especially since it might entail the dispatch of troops to Yemen, and my understanding is that it ended in disaster the last time that Egypt did this decades ago during the Old Cold War.

Seldom's avatar

Indeed Andrew. That's exactly it. The Yemen war was Egypt's "Vietnam war". Always referred to in Egypt as a terrible mistake that cost Egypt a lot and something to be avoided in the future at all costs. And Egypt has dodged several bullets in the last two decades by avoiding getting dragged into wars like these (Saudi War against Yemen's Houthis, the current war in Iran, but even thr war in Syria that Morsi the Muslim Brotherhood puppet wanted to drag us into, the libya war etc....).

Thank you for the chance to pick your brain about all of this Andrew. Not aware of any other political analyst of your caliber and credentials that engages as much with their followers!

chycho's avatar

SA was not attacked by Iran, Iran attacked US basis in SA, and Iran was acting in self defense. The attacks came from SA.

Sanjay Mehta's avatar

Larry Johnson of Sonar21 published some slides today which claim that SA's refineries were badly damaged. I haven't had time to find or check his sources.

chycho's avatar

Yup, SA refineries were hit by Houthis in Yemen... and SA was so scared of attacking the Houthis that they blamed it on Iraq and attacked Iraq instead.

Daniel Gladstein's avatar

Türkiye's role reversal is a bit interesting, given that the AKP-led regime greatly expanded trade with Iran until 2011—the point at which its rapprochement with Syria's Assad also ended, thanks to the "Arab Spring". Afterward trade levels declined, but as late as 2011 both states signed a $30-billion trade deal (also note that Erdoğan was still trying to maintain ties to Assad):

https://web.archive.org/web/20110207081432/https://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/02/07/iran.turkey/index.html

The gradual volte-face in Türkiye–Iran relations since the "Arab Spring" reminds me of the degree to which Russia's ties to major EU states France and Germany—once so considerable—dwindled after EuroMaidan. In both cases neither development made economic or geopolitical sense, but was driven by ideological U.S. priorities within NATO.

The question is why Erdoğan decided to jettison burgeoning ties between Türkiye and Iran, just as he did Ankara's links to Assad, given that he once played a big role in fostering both (showing there was no inherent conflict of interest or preplanned intention to worsen relations without external prompting). Türkiye lost more than it gained by heeding the U.S.

umuntu's avatar

Indeed. Reminds of the situation most European states are in. Leaders acting against their countries interests. Makes me wonder what kind of compromat the US might have to use against Erdogan.

Daniel Gladstein's avatar

As I remarked, Erdoğan quite ably managed to defy or evade U.S. pressure over Iran for at least a full decade after his AKP was elected to power, while also deepening trade with Iran's then ally Syria, making his decision to reverse course all the stranger (given that he successfully resisted both Western and Russian rivals on other issues since the "Arab Spring").

umuntu's avatar

Maybe because TRIPP? It's an area where his long term interests of a greater Turkic alliance align with those of the US. So it needn't be forever, just as long as the US is useful until his aims are achieved?

Daniel Gladstein's avatar

I am talking about Erdoğan's change of heart on Iran and its ally Syria since 2011 (the "Arab Spring" revolt). As late as March 2011, at the time of the Syrian uprising, his government was quite slow to break ties with Assad, even going so far as to claim that Syrian officials were heeding Turkish advice on a more open political process and an end to martial law—a hint that a settlement was near:

https://web.archive.org/web/20201020062813/https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2011/03/29/erdogan-urges-assad-to-announce-reforms-soon

Within months, however, Erdoğan reversed course, condemning Assad's response to the insurgency as "savagery", apparently due to Western media reports aligned with the anti-Assad rebels (the fact that he put more trust in foreign journalists than his own intelligence services or the words of his "friend" Assad is bizarre, given that no mistrust existed between AKP-ruled Turkey and Syria until then):

https://web.archive.org/web/20180429155240/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8569383/Turkey-condemns-violence-as-Assads-helicopters-open-fire.html

As late as August, however, Turkey was still refusing U.S. pressure to sanction Syria, despite having jettisoned support for Assad, who was now addressing Turkish claims by saying his forces were squelching Islamist extremism (much of it backed by Turkey-based "Free Syrian Army" opposition nuclei at the time), although Erdoğan evidently refused to believe him:

https://web.archive.org/web/20151004012224/https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/10/world/middleeast/10syria.html

My question is, why did Erdoğan risk a highly productive relationship with Assad that had yielded great economic dividends until then? Why did he blindly believe Western rumors about Assad's crackdown on "peaceful" protests, rather than Turkish intelligence or the Syrian authorities he hitherto trusted (such as his newfound "friend" Assad)?

https://armenianweekly.com/2024/12/16/assad-naively-trusted-erdogan-until-he-got-stabbed-in-the-back/

^ The above shows just how close Erdoğan and Assad were just before 2011. Armenian sources close to former president Serzh Sargsyan, including an adviser, report that Assad so cherished Erdoğan's outreach to Damascus that Syrian media banned criticism of the Armenian Genocide. Assad even called him an "ally"!

Daniel Gladstein's avatar

I am talking about Erdoğan's change of heart on Iran and its ally Syria since 2011 (the "Arab Spring" revolt). As late as March 2011, at the time of the Syrian uprising, his government was quite slow to break ties with Assad, even going so far as to claim that Syrian officials were heeding Turkish advice on a more open political process and an end to martial law—a hint that a settlement was near:

https://web.archive.org/web/20201020062813/https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2011/03/29/erdogan-urges-assad-to-announce-reforms-soon

Within months, however, Erdoğan reversed course, condemning Assad's response to the insurgency as "savagery", apparently due to Western media reports aligned with the anti-Assad rebels (the fact that he put more trust in foreign journalists than his own intelligence services or the words of his "friend" Assad is bizarre, given that no mistrust existed between AKP-ruled Turkey and Syria until then):

https://web.archive.org/web/20180429155240/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8569383/Turkey-condemns-violence-as-Assads-helicopters-open-fire.html

As late as August, however, Turkey was still refusing U.S. pressure to sanction Syria, despite having jettisoned support for Assad, who was now addressing Turkish claims by saying his forces were squelching Islamist extremism (much of it backed by Turkey-based "Free Syrian Army" opposition nuclei at the time), although Erdoğan evidently refused to believe him:

https://web.archive.org/web/20151004012224/https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/10/world/middleeast/10syria.html

My question is, why did Erdoğan risk a highly productive relationship with Assad that had yielded great economic dividends until then? Why did he blindly believe Western rumors about Assad's crackdown on "peaceful" protests, rather than Turkish intelligence or the Syrian authorities he hitherto trusted (such as his newfound "friend" Assad)?

https://armenianweekly.com/2024/12/16/assad-naively-trusted-erdogan-until-he-got-stabbed-in-the-back/

^ The above shows just how close Erdoğan and Assad were just before 2011. Armenian sources close to former president Serzh Sargsyan, including an adviser, report that Assad so cherished Erdoğan's outreach to Damascus that Syrian media banned criticism of the Armenian Genocide. Assad even called him an "ally"!

Feral Finster's avatar

Why? Because the Americans demanded it, and they have many pressure points over Turkey and are not adverse to using them.

Daniel Gladstein's avatar

Furthermore, Erdoğan is well known for being an astute balancer vis-à-vis rival blocs such as the U.S./EU, the KSA/Qatar, and NATO/Russia, having a record of successfully defying West–East pressure on key issues post 2011, such as Russia sanctions, the Kurdish-led SDF, support for anti-Assad Syrian rebels, or S-400s.

So if Erdoğan wished to defy the West on Iran, he arguably could have done so, as his previous actions showed, making his about-face (like the end of his friendship with Assad) all the more puzzling. His behavior is similar to Aliyev's or Trump's on Russia, making little geopolitical sense while contradicting past intentions.

Feral Finster's avatar

Iran, yes. India,not so much. Israel, not at all.

The whole point is to drag Turkey and Pakistan into America's war on Iran.

Sanjay Mehta's avatar

Agree on India. Turkey has been supplying weapons to Pakistan, that will continue. Saudi has been bailing out Pakistan, that will continue.

When India hits Pakistan again, they will make noise for a few days as usual.

Feral Finster's avatar

The Americans will not permit India to distract Pakistan ehile Pakistan is doing America's dirty work.

chycho's avatar

Imho, the window to drag Turkey and Pakistan into this war closed a long time ago. If Turkey and Pakistan's leaders try and drag them into a war with Iran, they will have a civil war on their hands and their heads will soon been served on platters.

Feral Finster's avatar

Don't kid yourself. Humans are stupid and easily led herd animals.

Kouros's avatar

For whom is the threat greatest?

chycho's avatar

Agreed that it is a problem for India and Israel, but not Iran.

Sanath's avatar

It's a bigger issue for Israel than India. Saudis cannot cut off oil supplies to India given the huge demand they would give up on and Pakistan is already the senior military partner here with Turkey too far away to do anything to India. However Turkey can cut off black sea access to Israel/target it's bases effectively.

Bigger issue is for IMEC and India Israel connectivity. However Indian foreign policy was pro Iranian in the early 2000s before US pressure so there is precedent to switch back if a different government comes to power in India

chycho's avatar

Agreed that it is a way bigger problem for Israel than India, we'll see how the Zionists puppets in Turkey and Saudi Arabia use this agreement - maybe an Mossad false flag in the works.

Patrick_UK's avatar

It will NEVER work and they know it. Reasons are plentiful.

All are controlled or on the payroll of Israel or of the US and will follow orders.

Besides,their people dislike each other and Sunni Islam is not a very strong ideology to cement them nor to die for, and their leaders know this.

Walter DuBlanica's avatar

Alliances come and go. Hard to which alliance means to each country and the world. Some of these alliancs effect tha USA, others have no significant efffect. USA we are 10,000 miles away so it is hard to tell what each of these alliances has on AMERICA. Or how much we can doabout them.

LudwigF's avatar

I wonder how much of Türkiye’s foreign policy will survive the transition from Erdoğan, especially given the fragile state of the Turkish economy.