The Strategic Calculations Influencing Trump’s & Putin’s Upcoming Meetings With Xi
A US deal with China without one with Russia would be to Russia’s disadvantage and vice versa, but no US deal with either of them might disadvantage Russia in the short term but could harm the US in the long run if it leads to a de facto Sino-Russo alliance.
Trump’s upcoming trip to China later this week is aimed first and foremost at making progress on their long-negotiated trade deal, which he envisages institutionalizing advantages for the US while his counterpart Xi Jinping wants to institutionalize advantages for his own country. The US’ macroeconomic position has strengthened as a result of the bilateral trade deals that it clinched across the world last year while China’s has weakened due to the Third Gulf War reducing its energy imports by sea.
Even so, the lack of a resolution denied Trump the extra advantage that he sought to wield ahead of his meeting with Xi, namely obtaining control over Iran’s energy industry like he obtained control over Venezuela’s. He did show that the US can partially blockade the Strait of Hormuz, and its new military deal with Indonesia suggests plans for the same vis-à-vis Malacca, however, so Trump has more cards than critics claim even though he’s unlikely to coerce Xi into a lopsided deal like his supporters expect.
Likewise, the relative macroeconomic disadvantage that China suffered due to the Third Gulf War is balanced by the US’ failure to clinch a deal with Russia over Ukraine, which empowered Russia’s hardliner faction as explained here and raises the chances of a de facto Sino-Russo alliance. The last-mentioned observation isn’t speculation but confirmed by Valdai Club research director Fyodor Lukyanov with reference to what he learned from his think tank’s latest conference in Shanghai.
The face of Russia’s hardliners Sergey Karaganov signaled the same in an article that was republished by RT, with the sharing of it by Russia’s flagship global media outlet and their exclusive publication of Lukyanov’s article sending a message to the US and China. Respectively, this is that Russia might de facto ally with China if the US doesn’t coerce Ukraine and NATO into its demanded concessions for peace, while Russia is hinting to China that they could jointly oppose the US if neither cuts a deal with it.
On that topic, electoral considerations add more uncertainty to the mix about who might be the first to clinch a deal with whom and when, if any is reached at all. Putin might want to cut one before September’s next elections to help the ruling party maintain its majority amidst the scenario of it faring poorly due to the many challenges brought about by the conflict. After all, he said after the last ones in 2021 that maintaining its majority is essential for stable development, now more so than ever before.
As for Trump, he wants to cushion the blow that the Republicans are expected to receive in November, to which end he’s incentivized to clinch deals over Iran, Russia-Ukraine, and/or China, even if he has to compromise on sensitive issues that he never expected to. Comparatively speaking, Putin is under more pressure than Trump since the chance of a relatively fair deal being accepted by a Democrat-controlled House and/or Senate is much lower, thus all but guaranteeing that the conflict continues till 2029.
Importantly, Putin will travel to Beijing to meet with Xi shortly after Trump, so they’ll be able to candidly discuss their country’s corresponding calculations as the close friends that they are before deciding what to do. A US deal with China without one with Russia would be to Russia’s disadvantage and vice versa, but no US deal with either of them might disadvantage Russia in the short term but could harm the US in the long run if it leads to a de facto Sino-Russo alliance. Everything will be clearer after these meetings.
There can be different kinds of assessments of various advantages and disadvantages for all three parties. However, at the top level, the strategic situation has not changed: Russia and China are better off trusting each other more than trusting the US. Trump's tendency to make thinly veiled threats also makes him a subject of suspicion, especially in front of Russians and Chinese, who have historically seen too much treachery from domestic history or interactions with the West in the last 200 years.
If Trump and his advisors can grasp the reality of US military exhaustion, there is a better chance for deals. Unfortunately, I suspect Trump's personality is that he tends to boast more when he knows that he has a weaker hand. The Malacca Strait is not a real issue as long as China is willing to play soft. In some aspects, Xi and Trump are similar in that both like to make threats implicitly (the Chinese way) or explicitly (the US way). Xi took a hegemonic approach toward its neighbors, a total opposite of his predecessors. Without Xi's diplomatic blunders, Indonesia was on better terms with China in earlier years.
Another good one, Andrew. I would only add a couple of thoughts. I've read that China's oil reserves are enormous as China has planned for sucha situation as the Gulf War. Also, China continues to receive gas and oil from Russia. So, in the short term, I don't think China is too worried and holds more cards than Trump.
I can't imagine why Trump thinks he has the upper hand or is holding the cards with China.
Also, do you really see any sings of a Trump deal on Ukraine? I don't.
And then there is Iran where both China and Russia are heavily invested and against the US. It is more than dicey, its outright dangerous.
Then, there is the economic crisis looming in the US. Many are predicting an imminent collapse worse than the Great Depression. All of my friends in the US are talking about the economic HURT put on all Americans except the very wealthy. Russia and China certainly can see this so why should they feel constrained to sign bad deals when the empire is in rapid decline?