The Supreme Court Only Slightly Complicated Trump’s Tariff-Centric Foreign Policy

He already negotiated new trade deals with most of the world’s leading economies so his tariff-centric foreign policy has already been largely successful even if he’s ultimately unable to reach one with China in the event that he doesn’t regain the same coercive tariff powers that he earlier wielded.

The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that Trump’s tariffs under the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act were unconstitutional. Nevertheless, Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s lengthy dissenting opinion outlined the ways in which these tariffs would continue on different legal grounds, which inspired Trump to implement a 10% global tariff that he then raised to 15%. He also posted that his team “will determine and issue the new legally permissible Tariffs” “during the next short number of months”.

Up until now, he’s wielded these measures as financial weapons of mass economic destruction due to the damage that extreme tariffs could inflict on the prosperity of his targets over time because of their dependence on competitive access to the American market, which contextualizes the US’ trade deficits. Had they not negotiated new trade deals with the US, and most with the notable exception of China already have, then they’d have to radically reorient their exports to avoid that, which is no small task.

Some of these deals also come with strings attached, such as the Indo-US one reportedly obligating India to zero out its import of Russian oil, which India denied, but the fact that “January imports from Russia fell by 23.5% ​from December ​and by about a third compared to a year earlier” raises questions. Anyhow, regardless of the terms, all those that already negotiated new trade deals with the US did so due to their fears of the damage that Trump’s extreme tariffs threatened to inflict on their economies over time.

Therein lies the reason why the Supreme Court’s ruling complicates his foreign policy since he can no longer impose extreme tariffs for an indefinite period of time on whoever he wants right away at least for “the next short number of months” while his team determines how to apply Kavanaugh’s advice. These different legal grounds “come with strings attached, such as time limits”, which could reduce the power of these financial weapons of mass economic destruction and consequent pressure on his targets.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bennett believes that the new workarounds will result in “virtually unchanged tariff revenue in 2026” while a pro-Trump journalist speculated that he “could in theory just declare a new emergency and restart the 150 day cycle” of tariffs under Section 122 if Congress withholds approval. All of that remains to be seen, but for the time being, Trump no longer appears to have the power to arbitrarily impose whatever tariffs he wants on whoever he wants for whatever length of time.

This only slightly complicates his foreign policy, however, due to him having already negotiated new trade deals with most of the world’s leading economies. China remains the most notable exception as was earlier written, and without the abovementioned power for the time being at least till his team decides how best to proceed, it’ll be a bit more difficult to reach his envisaged one with China. He’ll travel there from 31 March-2 April and probably expected to sign a deal then but that’s now uncertain.

Most of the details might have already been agreed to and that could be why the trip was announced, but the remainder might be the most important and Xi might not bend to Trump’s demands if he no longer has the same tariff powers. Trump would therefore have to settle for less or postpone the deal till after his trip with the expectation of regaining these powers on different legal grounds. A deal with China is his main foreign policy goal, but even without it, he’s already achieved most of what he set out to do.