The Taliban, Not India Or The US, Likely Aided The BLA In Its Latest Spree Of Attacks
Neither Pakistan’s accusation against India nor the Alt-Media Community’s speculation about CIA involvement make sense.
The past year was pretty good for Pakistan. It convinced some of the international community that it downed several Indian jets during last spring’s clashes, entered into a rapid rapprochement with the US after going along with Trump’s contentious claim of mediating between it and India, and promoted its military services abroad via security and arms deals. The newfound confidence that its de facto military dictatorship exuded, however, just took a blow after the latest coordinated attacks in Balochistan.
The “Balochistan Liberation Army” (BLA), an ethno-separatist group that’s designated as terrorists by several states, carried out multiple suicide and gun attacks against administrative, military, police, and civilian targets over the weekend. The scope of these attacks all across the BLA’s namesake resource-rich region, which they claim is being plundered as a colony by Punjabi Pakistanis and their Chinese partners, speaks to their high level of organization and the state’s continued struggle to thwart their plans.
Balochistan’s port of Gwadar, which was also targeted, is the terminal point of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship project of China’s Belt & Road Initiative. Nearby is the port of Pasni, which “Major Non-NATO Ally” Pakistan is reportedly considering giving to the US to facilitate the export of minerals from Balochistan per last year’s deal, but it could also help the US access Central Asia if Af-Pak ties ever improve. Unrest in Balochistan therefore harms both Chinese and US interests.
Pakistan predictably blamed India for the latest spree of attacks, but it’s highly unlikely that India would jeopardize its incipient rapprochement with China and risk more of the US’ wrath than it’s already facing through Trump’s weaponized tariffs by attacking their aforesaid interests by proxy through the BLA. Even though the US has an interest in stopping CPEC, its restored alliance with Pakistan and Trump’s goal of returning US troops to Afghanistan’s Bagram Airbase with Islamabad’s support rule out CIA involvement.
These observations lend credence to suspicion that the Taliban aided the BLA, whether directly or via the “Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan” (TTP) terrorists that Islamabad has accused Kabul of patronizing and which have reportedly begun forming a nexus with Baloch separatists in recent years. Although the Taliban has no problems with China and seeks cordial ties with the US, backing anti-Pakistani groups like the TTP and the BLA might be seen by them as a means of compensating for their power asymmetry with Pakistan.
The harm that this policy could inflict to Chinese and US interests might be casually dismissed by the Taliban as collateral damage in their Hybrid War with Pakistan, which they’ve accused of backing ISIS-K terrorists, including those that orchestrated the Crocus terrorist attack in Russia. These tit-for-tat claims aside, the BLA has objectively proven itself to be a major threat to Pakistan through its latest coordinated attacks across Balochistan, which couldn’t have been possible without some level of popular support.
Looking forward, what just happened over the weekend bodes ill for Pakistan, which was riding high over the past year due to perceived success in the region and beyond only to suddenly be reminded of how fragile the security situation is in its largest and most resource-rich province. Another anti-terrorist operation might therefore be imminent, but any abuses against civilians like have happened before could backfire by fueling even more popular support for the BLA, thus further worsening the security situation.
Any hope of an end to instability in Baluchistan (and elsewhere regionally) can only be aided by an inclusive Pakistan–Afghanistan settlement, along with a sincere effort by both sides to cut the roots of extremism within their realms. Much of the tribal conflict, notably in Pashtun areas, goes back to the British division of the area, or Durand Line, but the tenacity of unrest—spanning long, varied periods—suggests factors deeper than ethnicity (i.e., nationality), poverty, or foreign meddling are at work. (Of course, matters have worsened since the 2022 coup strained Pakistan–Afghanistan ties.)
Really sharp counternarrative here. The power asymmetry angle between Taliban and Pakistan makes way more sense than the usual suspects when looking at whats needed for coordinated attacks like these. I hadn't considered how backing the BLA might function as strategic leverage for Kabul, kinda flips the script on who'sgot the agency in this dynamic.