Any hope of an end to instability in Baluchistan (and elsewhere regionally) can only be aided by an inclusive Pakistan–Afghanistan settlement, along with a sincere effort by both sides to cut the roots of extremism within their realms. Much of the tribal conflict, notably in Pashtun areas, goes back to the British division of the area, or Durand Line, but the tenacity of unrest—spanning long, varied periods—suggests factors deeper than ethnicity (i.e., nationality), poverty, or foreign meddling are at work. (Of course, matters have worsened since the 2022 coup strained Pakistan–Afghanistan ties.)
Really sharp counternarrative here. The power asymmetry angle between Taliban and Pakistan makes way more sense than the usual suspects when looking at whats needed for coordinated attacks like these. I hadn't considered how backing the BLA might function as strategic leverage for Kabul, kinda flips the script on who'sgot the agency in this dynamic.
Superb analysis on the Taliban angle here. The triangular dynamic betwene Pakistan, Taliban, and BLA makes more sense than the typical India blame-game especially when CPEC disruption hurts Chinese interests. In my experience tracking South Asian security, the TTP-BLA nexus is underreported but increasingly real as both groups see Pakistan as their primary enemy.
It's unclear what the terms are since Trump has claimed that India stopped buying Russian oil before but it wasn't true. In any case, my work always -- without exception -- presented India's purchase of Russian oil as a pragmatic, non-ideological move, driven both by market considerations and geostrategic balancing. I never, ever portrayed India as an "eternal friend" in that sense. A reliable friend, yes, but never did I present its purchase of Russian oil as some kind of favor to Russia.
Any hope of an end to instability in Baluchistan (and elsewhere regionally) can only be aided by an inclusive Pakistan–Afghanistan settlement, along with a sincere effort by both sides to cut the roots of extremism within their realms. Much of the tribal conflict, notably in Pashtun areas, goes back to the British division of the area, or Durand Line, but the tenacity of unrest—spanning long, varied periods—suggests factors deeper than ethnicity (i.e., nationality), poverty, or foreign meddling are at work. (Of course, matters have worsened since the 2022 coup strained Pakistan–Afghanistan ties.)
Really sharp counternarrative here. The power asymmetry angle between Taliban and Pakistan makes way more sense than the usual suspects when looking at whats needed for coordinated attacks like these. I hadn't considered how backing the BLA might function as strategic leverage for Kabul, kinda flips the script on who'sgot the agency in this dynamic.
Superb analysis on the Taliban angle here. The triangular dynamic betwene Pakistan, Taliban, and BLA makes more sense than the typical India blame-game especially when CPEC disruption hurts Chinese interests. In my experience tracking South Asian security, the TTP-BLA nexus is underreported but increasingly real as both groups see Pakistan as their primary enemy.
Andrew, out of topic.
It seems that eternal friends of Russia, I named your Indian friends, just made a deal with Trump in which they totally stop to buy russian oil?
True? Wrong?
If true, that proves what I always thought and said about the big fat Indian turkey.
It's unclear what the terms are since Trump has claimed that India stopped buying Russian oil before but it wasn't true. In any case, my work always -- without exception -- presented India's purchase of Russian oil as a pragmatic, non-ideological move, driven both by market considerations and geostrategic balancing. I never, ever portrayed India as an "eternal friend" in that sense. A reliable friend, yes, but never did I present its purchase of Russian oil as some kind of favor to Russia.