The US’ National Security Strategy Sends Mixed Signals To India

If the US’ attaches security strings to improving ties with India, particularly if it demands that India contain China in the South China Sea, then India will likely decline this proposal to avoid becoming the US’ proxy.

The worsening of Indo-US ties under Trump 2.0 has been one of the most unexpected foreign policy outcomes of his second presidency thus far, which this analysis here argues is due to him wanting to punish India for refusing to subordinate itself to the US. Pakistani-US ties have inversely strengthened despite being very troubled under Trump 1.0, so much so that there’s been talk about Pakistan giving the US a commercial port for re-establishing its regional presence, which could have dual military purposes.

This background explains why Trump 2.0’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) was such a surprise for South Asian observers. Pakistan is only mentioned once and just in the context of Trump’s contentious boast of brokering a ceasefire between it and India even though Pakistan has been the centerpiece of this second administration’s regional policy up till this point. India is mentioned three other times in the document, however, with the next one pertaining to the Quad.

In their words, “We must continue to improve commercial (and other) relations with India to encourage New Delhi to contribute to Indo-Pacific security, including through continued quadrilateral cooperation with Australia, Japan, and the United States (‘the Quad’).” They then proposed that “America should similarly enlist our European and Asian allies and partners, including India, to cement and improve our joint positions in the Western Hemisphere and, with regard to critical minerals, in Africa.”

In connection with that, “We should form coalitions that use our comparative advantages in finance and technology to build export markets with cooperating countries. America’s economic partners should no longer expect to earn income from the United States through overcapacity and structural imbalances but instead pursue growth through managed cooperation tied to strategic alignment and by receiving long-term U.S. investment.” This can be interpreted as an allusion to India’s allegedly “unfair” trade practices.

The final reference was about “keep[ing] [South China Sea] lanes open, free of ‘tolls,’ and not subject to arbitrary closure by one country. This will require not just further investment in our military—especially naval—capabilities, but also strong cooperation with every nation that stands to suffer, from India to Japan and beyond, if this problem is not addressed.” In other words, building upon the second Quad-related reference, the US wants India playing a more active military role in the South China Sea.

Putting it all together, the US’ NSS sends mixed signals to India. On the one hand, Pakistan’s conspicuous omission except in the context of Trump’s boast about brokering spring’s ceasefire should please India, provided that it believes that this presages a policy recalibration. On the other hand, this is apparently conditional on India ramping up cooperation with the Quad, cooperating with the US on African mineral deals, opening its markets to more US exports, and containing China in the South China Sea.

Joint projects in third countries are possible as is India’s lowering of tariffs on US imports, but the Quad’s role has been overshadowed by AUKUS (and its informal NATO-like expansion of AUKUS+), while the incipient Sino-Indo rapprochement makes India reluctant to contain China outside of South Asia. If the US’ attaches security strings to improving ties with India, particularly if it demands that India contain China in the South China Sea, then India will likely decline this proposal to avoid becoming the US’ proxy.