Three Arguments Tearing Apart Robert Kagan’s Claims About Trump, Ukraine, & Putin

The exact opposite of what Kagan posited is true: Russia can’t militarily control Ukraine indefinitely; a Russian-American brinksmanship scenario is terrifyingly realistic; and Putin is indeed interested in compromising but only under certain conditions.

Hugely influential neoconservative thinker Robert Kagan recently published a lengthy diatribe at The Atlantic fearmongering about Russia’s total and indefinite control of Ukraine, which he takes for granted if Trump doesn’t redouble aid to Ukraine. It’s premised on the presumptions that Russia can military control all of Ukraine indefinitely, there’s no realistic Russian-American brinksmanship scenario over that country, and Putin is unwilling to compromise. The following three arguments tear apart his claims:

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1. Russia Lacks The Means To Militarily Control Ukraine Indefinitely

Ukraine is a geographically enormous country that would require tremendous military resources for anyone to control indefinitely. On top of that, a large segment of its population now has military experience or at least basic arms training, weapons are now proliferating throughout its society with wild abandon, and the entire western part is known to be ultra-nationalist to the point of fascist. It would accordingly require much greater means than Russia has to militarily control Ukraine indefinitely.

Any attempt to do so, however, could expose Russia to an Afghan- and Iraqi-like insurgency that it’s ill-prepared to contain. Its forces would stand out in the ultra-nationalist western part of the country and therefore make easy targets for unconventional warfare (terrorism). These networks are deeply rooted and have existed for decades, lying dormant during most of the Soviet era but still never having been completely dismantled. Their fighters can also be easily supplied by neighboring NATO nations.

Ukraine could therefore turn into “Russia’s Vietnam” in much costlier ways than 1980s Afghanistan did both in terms of troops and treasure. Putin knows this and that’s why spring 2022’s draft peace treaty essentially sought to delegate Ukraine’s demilitarization and denazification to a castrated government. Russia can’t carry out these tasks on its own unilaterally without exposing itself to the aforesaid risks. It requires a compliant Ukrainian government without which neither is likely to ever be achieved in full.

2. Brinksmanship Is Possible If NATO Conventionally Intervenes After A Russian Breakthrough

Unlike what Kagan implied throughout his article, a Russian-American brinksmanship scenario is terrifyingly realistic given the possibility that NATO could conventionally intervene in Ukraine at least up till the Dnieper after a Russian breakthrough. For as averse as Trump is to risking World War III over Ukraine, he also doesn’t want to go down in history as a loser (at least for however long it takes for Ukraine to potentially bleed Russia enough till it withdraws per the above) who “gave Ukraine to Putin”.

This concern is made all the more poignant by how regularly he condemned Biden over the years for his administration’s debacle in Afghanistan, which would look a lot less bad in comparison to Trump letting Putin “take all of Ukraine” like Kagan fearmongers is in the cards if he doesn’t redouble aid to it. If Russian boots were planted on Poland’s southeastern border, then the US also would struggle to disengage from Europe like Trump reportedly wants as part of his planned “Pivot (back) to Asia”.

It therefore can’t be ruled out that he’d threaten and possibly even authorize a conventional NATO intervention in Ukraine at least up till the Dnieper to “strategically salvage” some of the country if Russia achieves a military breakthrough instead of “surrendering” Ukraine in its entirety. In that case, Putin would be the one thrown into the dilemma of risking World War III over that ultra-nationalist western half of Ukraine, which he might decline doing and instead agree to a grand deal for ending the conflict.

3. Putin Is Indeed Interested In Compromising So Long As It’s A Practical Means To An End

Contrary to the Western elite’s perceptions, Putin is indeed interested in compromising, but this has to entail the fulfillment of at least most Russian goals in Ukraine. The top ones concern the restoration of its constitutionally neutral status, demilitarization, denazification, and recognition (even informal) of the new ground realities (i.e. four more former Ukrainian regions joining Russia). There are other objectives of importance to Russia too but these are the primary ones that Putin must absolutely achieve.

He's staked his reputation on at least their superficial fulfillment, which gives him some flexibility over the details that might ultimately be agreed to, especially with regard to denazification. Moreover, the new ground realities also cut both ways in the sense of Ukraine having integrated more closely than ever into NATO since the special operation began, not to mention Finland and Sweden joining NATO. He might therefore have to ultimately accept a less-than-ideal endgame in Ukraine and Europe more broadly.

Although Putin recently began to climb the escalation ladder, this wasn’t meant to signal that he plans to continue the conflict till Russian boots are planted on Poland’s southeastern border, but to “escalate to de-escalate” so as to get the US to concede to some of his main goals. He also knows that Trump doesn’t want to risk World War III over the historically Russian-controlled eastern half of Ukraine so the two dozen compromises suggested at the end of this analysis here might be more feasible than many think.

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As can be seen, the exact opposite of what Kagan posited is true: Russia can’t militarily control Ukraine indefinitely; a Russian-American brinksmanship scenario is terrifyingly realistic; and Putin is indeed interested in compromising but only under certain conditions. His falsehoods had to be fact-checked since he’s an influential figure whose words shape American elite discourse. His intended audience should therefore know that they’re being misled into supporting more aid to Ukraine on false premises.