Trenin Continues His Trend Of Breaking Russian Political Taboos

He seems to be holding back from more direct critiques, perhaps to avoid fueling propaganda campaigns centered on Russia’s objective shortcomings, which is why reading between the lines is essential.

New President of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) Dmitri Trenin pioneered the trend of breaking Russian political taboos in early April after issuing a clarion call for correcting foreign policy misperceptions. RIAC Director General Ivan Timofeev followed his lead shortly thereafter by calling for far-reaching modernization reforms, which preceded Vasily Kashin openly discussing their country’s “existing (military) limitations” in the special operation. Trenin has now returned to break more taboos.

In his piece about “Peace in Times of War”, he wrote that “What is needed is victory—and that remains entirely achievable, provided that important decisions are taken both at home and on the battlefield”, which alludes to certain decisions that he implies haven’t yet been made for some reason. He then forecast that “This confrontation (with the West) will be a prolonged one and it will require something we have long lacked: long-term goal-setting and a carefully planned strategy for achieving those goals.”

Trenin then advised that “Our principal objective should be to build the Russian ‘civilizational state’ that we have proclaimed but have yet to define. What we need, it seems, is a project aimed at shaping a society grounded in civic solidarity and on foundational core values shared by all: faith, freedom, family, and justice. In this context, the country’s economic and political system would also have to undergo profound renewal.” The innuendo is that far-reaching reforms are needed just like Timofeev suggested.

According to Trenin, “Such a project cannot be left to the elites alone. In fact, the elites themselves are in need of renewal—not only in generational terms, but also for new mechanisms of reproduction and new relations with the majority of society. Meritocracy is unquestionably essential, but it is clearly not enough. The ideological and value-based nature of the elite’s activities, and their commitment to service, are just as important as competence and professionalism.” Such a critique of Russian elites is very rare.

Trenin added, “This new internal character of Russian society and the state will also shape the country’s position on the world stage. It could enable the country, among other things, to become a stronger ‘pole’…However, the most important thing for Russia itself is to avoid the prospect of being forced to align with major geoeconomic and geopolitical powers: the Euro-Atlantic bloc and China.” Alluding to the scenario of Russia becoming China’s junior partner is also very rare and thus similarly taboo.

He concluded by warning about the existential stakes of Russia’s prolonged confrontation with the West, extolling some of Russia’s close partners, and reaffirming his call for Russia to transform itself. Trenin therefore ends on an optimistic note, but caution and concern nevertheless pervade his piece. He seems to be holding back from more direct critiques, perhaps to avoid fueling propaganda campaigns centered on Russia’s objective shortcomings, which is why reading between the lines is essential.

Trenin believes that building Russia’s civilization-state, which requires significant domestic reforms, is paramount. As he wrote, “Only an idea that truly becomes national in character will be capable of transforming Russia. Then it may be said that the Special Military Operation—with its immense trials, extraordinary strain, and irreparable losses and sacrifices—became not merely a turning point in the country’s history, but a prologue to a profound transformation of both the state and the people.”