They’re duking it out in Mali, Libya, and Sudan right now.
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Borisenko drew renewed attention to last summer’s claims that Ukraine is responsible for terrorism all across Africa in his relevant remarks from late July. According to him, Ukrainian drone instructors train armed groups in Mali, Libya, and Sudan. The first is one of Russia’s top allies on the continent, the second’s de facto independent eastern half provides an air bridge to the latter via Niger, and the third still plans to host a long-delayed Russian naval base.
“Trump’s Neo-Reagan Doctrine Is Rolling Back Russian Influence Across The World”, and Africa is a priority theater for the US since it’s where Russia made its most impressive strategic gains in recent years. “Russia’s Newfound Appeal To African Countries Is Actually Quite Easy To Explain” since it helps its partners with “Democratic Security”, which refers to the wide range of counter-Hybrid Warfare tactics and strategies for defending a targeted state’s national model of democracy from external threats.
The Central African Republic was the testing ground for this policy, which was then exported to Mali, Libya’s de facto independent eastern half, and Sudan (the last-mentioned after Russia reportedly pivoted from supporting the rebels to supporting the government). Mali’s importance is that it’s the core of the Sahelian Alliance, which removed French influence from the region, while Libya gives Russia a foothold in the Southern Mediterranean and Sudan gives it the same in the Red Sea.
Russia’s position in all three has come under threat with the latest Malian Crisis in which Ukraine and France are remixing the Syrian template, US-driven but newly Pakistani-fronted diplomacy for resolving the Libyan Civil War in the West’s favor, and the “Islamic NATO’s” predominant influence in Sudan. Ukraine’s corresponding role is to help carry out regime change and weaken Russia’s other two partners so much that they accept the quid pro quo of dumping Moscow in exchange for Kiev dumping the rebels.
To be sure, the challenge that Western-backed Ukraine poses to Russia’s African interests is serious, but it’s not yet critical. The Malian government still stands, General Khalifa Haftar and his influential son officially remain close Russian partners, and the same goes for General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. That said, an intensification of the Malian Crisis can’t be ruled out, while Russia’s close partners in Eastern Libya and Sudan could hypothetically pivot to the West at Russia’s expense like Egypt’s Sadat once did.
The respective solutions are to continue bolstering the Malian Armed Forces’ military capabilities within the realistic limits that Russia can afford due to the ongoing special operation and find ways to make itself invaluable to its other two African partners that they don’t dump it like the West wants. The form that the second-mentioned proposal takes remains to be seen but it could be a combination of “Democratic Security” aid, energy infrastructure modernization, and comprehensive training programs.
To wrap it all up, Borisenko wasn’t exaggerating when he assessed that Ukraine has opened up a “second front” against Russia in Africa, but this is still relatively better than the “second front” that it was earlier reportedly plotting to open up in Georgia, Belarus, and/or Transnistria. Those could still be activated, however, but everything seems manageable for the time being. The threats to Russia’s interests in Africa are more serious, but they haven’t spiraled out of control, and its setbacks there are still recoverable.
It seems Zelensky is making a major effort to make himself an indisposable and irreplaceable global player. He is a gambler by nature, a gambler who already lost half of the Ukraine population. A lot of people there must be entertaining negative thoughts about him.
This has long been obvious. What does Russia propose to do about it?