Wagner’s Withdrawal From Mali Might Reshape The Conflict’s Military-Political Dynamics

The recent friction in Russian-Algerian ties over this conflict might be alleviated while Mali could consider offering the Tuaregs broad autonomy in exchange for joining forces against radical Islamists.

Wagner announced that it’s withdrawing from Mali after completing their mission to train the national forces and restore the government’s control over all regional capitals. This analysis here from early 2023 elaborates on their goals. The Africa Corps, which is under the control of the Russian Defense Ministry, will still remain there though. This development is expected to reshape the conflict’s military-political dynamics, which have increasingly taken on the contours of another Western-Russian proxy war.

France has been accused of backing terrorist groups in the region, both radical Islamists and Tuareg separatists, while Ukraine boasted about arming and training the latter after their ambush of Wagner last summer. On the topic of the Tuaregs, whose involvement in the conflict was touched upon more here after the aforesaid incident, the Russian-backed Malian Armed Forces’ (FAM) attacks against them have riled neighboring Algeria. This has in turn placed Russia in a dilemma due to its close ties with both.

Wagner played more of a frontline role in the conflict while the Africa Corps focuses more on training so the first’s withdrawal might help alleviate the recent friction in Russian-Algerian ties over this issue while the second’s continued stay could ensure that the FAM’s competence doesn’t decline. If Malian-Algerian ties relatively normalize in the coming months as a result of this move, then it could reduce the chances that Algeria will (continue?) allow(ing) France and Ukraine to support the Tuaregs from its territory.

As Algeria sees it, so-called “moderate” Tuareg separatists should be co-opted in order to prevent the conflict from spreading across the border into its own Tuareg-populated areas, to which end military, logistical, intelligence, and other forms of support are extended to them to force Mali into a peace deal. Mali pulled out of the 2015 Algiers Agreement in early 2024 after accusing the Tuaregs of not complying with their part but Algeria believes that Mali’s Russian-backed campaign forced the Tuaregs to respond.

This perspective explains (but doesn’t “excuse”) Algeria’s suspected collusion with France and Ukraine against Mali and Wagner along the Tuareg-controlled border region. In connection with this, it’s relevant that Wagner declared victory after helping the FAM regain control over all regional capitals, but terrorist-designated Tuareg separatists still remain active elsewhere. If the Africa Corps remains focused mostly on training, not on replacing Wagner’s frontline role, then Mali might consider a political solution.

In that event, Russia could mediate between Algeria, Mali, and the Tuaregs, potentially reaching a Syrian-like agreement whereby “moderate rebels” (Tuareg separatists in this case) are encouraged to join forces with the FAM against radical Islamists in exchange for broad constitutionally enshrined autonomy. So long as Mali learns the lessons from last year’s Syrian debacle, five of which were highlighted here at the time, then it can avoid that country’s fate and hopefully succeed where that other Russian partner failed.

If the military-political dynamics worsen, such as if Algeria is misled by France (with whom relations have always been complicated but which could improve if Algiers does Paris’ bidding in Mali) into supporting a renewed Tuareg offensive, then no one should doubt that Russia will have Mali’s back. The FAM have proven themselves much more competent than the Syrian Arab Army in all respects so Mali is much less likely to follow Syria’s path if Algeria plays the role of Turkiye in this latest Western-Russian proxy war.