What Are The Odds Of Russia Agreeing To A Three-Tiered Ceasefire Enforcement Plan In Ukraine?
It’s suppositionally possible that the Financial Times’ report becomes reality, but to be absolutely clear, this is pure guesswork and it’s much more likely that Russia won’t agree to that.
The US signaled its support for NATO troops in Ukraine last month after Trump’s Special Envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner praised the principle of security guarantees for the first time right after France and the UK committed to deploying troops there in the event of a ceasefire. This sequence was analyzed in detail here. A recent report from the Financial Times published right before the second round of the trilateral Russian-Ukrainian-US talks indicates that all three are very serious about this principle.
According to their sources, they and Ukraine agreed to a three-tiered ceasefire enforcement plan. The first 24 hours after any alleged Russian violation would involve a Ukrainian military response, the next 24 hours would introduce forces from the “coalition of the willing”, while the final 24 hours would then involve American forces if Russia doesn’t back down. A minor border incident, perhaps even sparked by a Ukrainian false flag, could therefore easily spiral into World War III in just 72 hours.
That dark scenario is especially likely if NATO troops deploy to Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire like NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte declared would indeed happen in a speech that he made at the Rada coincidentally on the same day as the Financial Times’ report. In his words, “Some European allies have announced that they will deploy troops to Ukraine after a deal is reached. Troops on the ground, jets in the air, ships on the Black Sea. The United States will be the backstop.”
Russia has repeatedly warned that it would target foreign forces that deploy to Ukraine, and it’s also repeated practically just as many times its opposition to a ceasefire, instead proposing a comprehensive end to the conflict that resolves the root causes and results in the restoration of Ukraine’s neutrality. Agreeing to the reported three-tiered ceasefire enforcement plan, especially if that involves the deployment of NATO troops to Ukraine, would therefore represent a very significant policy shift.
To be clear, no Russian official has said anything that can even remotely be spun as implying that the Kremlin is considering any of this, so it remains solely in the realm of speculation. Nevertheless, it can’t be ruled out either, and it’s hypothetically possible that Russia could be convinced to agree to this. To continue with the thought exercise, incentives could include Ukraine withdrawing from Donbass, Russia and the US clinching a resource-centric strategic partnership, and rapidly phased sanctions relief, et al.
Such a trade-off could conjecturally be rationalized by Russia as the military, financial, and opportunity costs of continuing to pursue the maximalist goals declared at the onset of the special operation now outweighing the benefits of mutual compromises. The abovementioned quid pro quo would result in Russia peacefully obtaining control over the most emotive territory that it claims, giving NATO’s US leader stakes in Russia’s security and prosperity, and gradually returning its oil to the global market.
Russia’s strategic arms – hypersonic Oreshniks, nuclear submarines, Poseidon underwater drones for unleashing devastating tsunamis, etc. – could also deter the West from escalating after any Ukrainian false flag incident and thus ensure its security despite the three-tiered plan and NATO troops in Ukraine. It’s therefore suppositionally possible that the Financial Times’ report becomes reality, but to be absolutely clear, this is pure guesswork and it’s much more likely that Russia won’t agree to that.
Sharp analysis on the escalation ladder embedded in the three-tier plan. The 72-hour window to WWIII is probably the point, not a bug, since it creates pressure for Russia to accept intrusive monitoring. The hypthetical trade-offs mentioned make sense if we assume Russia prioritizes strategic partnerships over territorial maximalism, but that assumption contradicts nearly everything Moscow's said publicly for two years.
I agree, of course, that Russia agreeing to this proposal is unlikely; on the other hand, all wars eventually end, and the peace that follows them is invariably structured by just such compromises. The only alternatives are continuing to fight a war forever along a front that either moves one way or the other, or else escalating to the nuclear threshold and beyond. In any case, Russia has demonstrated credible deterrence to further NATO expansion along its eastern flank. Obviously NATO (in all but name) troops on the immediate other side of the LoC would be hard medicine to swallow; on the other hand, the steady encroachment essentially from 1990 to 2022 would have been emphatically kyboshed, and this would be a major achievement. Moreover, in the absence of further expansion, whither NATO? Mightn't it in time be replaced by a common European Defence Force and a more hemispheric approach?