What Benefits Do Belarus & Poland Expect To Receive From Their “Snowdrop Diplomacy”?

Each of their expectations are realistic and can even be paired as part of a three-phase sequence if the political will exists on both sides as strongly suggested by them commencing “snowdrop diplomacy” in the first place.

The Belarusian-Polish rapprochement is known as “snowdrop diplomacy” due to Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski quipping shortly after meeting his Belarusian counterpart that “a snowdrop can bloom if the weather is favorable” and the Belarusian Foreign Ministry running with the metaphor in post on X. Sikorski also revealed that “meetings are also taking place with other ministries and at other levels.” This surprised most observers since Poland hitherto practiced a hardline policy towards Belarus.

Poland and Belarus would only realistically agree to enter into a rapprochement with each other with the credible expectation of tangible benefits. From the Polish side, Warsaw likely wants Minsk to put a complete end to its alleged weaponization of civilizationally dissimilar migrants, reduce its military presence near their border, and request a reduction in Russia’s military presence in the country. These are all reasonable from the standpoint of Polish national interests if they’re objectively analyzed.

From the Belarusian side, Minsk likely wants Warsaw to put a complete end to its patronage of the so-called “Belarusian opposition” that orchestrated summer 2020’s failed Color Revolution, also reduce its military presence near their border, and veto the extension of EU sanctions at the end of next February. Just like the tangible benefits that Poland likely expects from their “snowdrop diplomacy”, these are also reasonable from the standpoint of Belarusian national interests if they’re objectively analyzed.

Each of their expectations are realistic and can even be paired as part of a three-phase sequence if the political will exists on both sides as strongly suggested by them commencing “snowdrop diplomacy” in the first place. To explain, Belarus’ alleged weaponization of civilizationally dissimilar migrants is arguably a response to Polish backing of the “opposition” and their failed Color Revolution in summer 2020, so it follows that Belarus would end this alleged policy once Polish backing of the “opposition” ends.

If they agree to such a deal, perhaps at the request of the US that counts itself as Poland’s top ally and Belarus’ newest partner due to their own rapprochement, then the mutual goodwill that this would create could make it easier for them to agree to mutual military de-escalations. If that too is successful, which Poland wants to alleviate fears of Belarus (and Russia) invading the “Suwałki Corridor/Gap” and Belarus wants to alleviate fears of a Polish invasion, then the last step would be much more likely.

Poland might then at least make its agreement on extending the EU’s sanctions on Belarus conditional on some of them, likely agreed upon in advance with Belarus, being lifted so long as Belarus gets Russia to reduce its military presence in the country. About that, Belarus would still remain under Russia’s nuclear umbrella and its tactical nukes would still remain in the country, but the partial withdrawal of Russian forces (and possible redeployment some distance away from the Polish border) is realistic.

The EU won’t consider extending its sanctions against Belarus for another five months, so that’s enough time for Belarus and Poland to negotiate the three-phase sequence that was proposed in this analysis. That’s also coincidentally around the time that snowdrops blossom in those two countries. If successful, then “snowdrop diplomacy” can veritably lead to a thaw in the New Cold War, but it requires Poland to have the political will for each of these increasingly significant mutual compromises with Belarus.