He seemingly realized that the West sought to systematically deindustrialize and demilitarize Russia through Ukraine’s new drone campaign and consequently concluded that it’s an existential threat.
It was assessed that “Zelensky’s 40-Day Influence Operation Backfired Badly In Kharkov & Odessa” after Russia ramped up its strikes against the first’s gas stations and the second’s ports as partial “blockades” to mildly outmatch Ukraine’s attempted drone-enforced “blockade” of Crimea. This was surprising since the rare escalations that Putin had hitherto authorized only concerned the two test uses of the Oreshniks in Ukraine and an occasional uptick in strikes against military-related infrastructure.
Be that as it may, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warned the West in May that Russia would begin carrying out “systemic strikes” against Ukraine, which Putin approved over the summer for reshaping the Ukrainian Conflict’s dynamics as explained here in July amidst Zelensky’s influence operation. Whether by coincidence or because of it, this came after reports that the US depleted much of its air defense and tactical missile stockpiles during the Third Gulf War, thus indirectly weakening Ukraine as well.
Its resultant lack of air defenses opened it up to much more effective Russian strikes than at any time since the conflict began, while the US’ dearth of tactical missiles greatly reduces the chance that Ukraine obtains any more of them for further escalating against Russia like some now demand from the US. As Putin was dwelling on these observations and their implications for Russia’s pursuit of victory, Zelensky’s influence operation was beginning to inflict tangible damage to Russia’s strategic infrastructure.
The spree of strikes against oil facilities and civilian logistics centers followed Trump’s decision in June to “escalate to de-escalate” with Russia via a Ukrainian-fronted “war of attrition” backed by the US and surprisingly also France through their assistance in planning drone routes and even picking targets. All three took for granted that Putin would remain so cautious about inadvertently sparking World War III that he’d eschew consistently “escalating to de-escalate” with Ukraine in retaliation no matter what.
For whatever opinion one might have about Putin’s restraint up till this point, and some have considered it excessive to the point of turning Russia into the new “Christ of Nations” with everything that scenario would entail as regards his country’s de facto martyrdom, he’s not a low-IQ individual. What’s meant by this is that he realized that the West sought to systematically deindustrialize and demilitarize Russia through the abovementioned campaign and consequently concluded that it’s an existential threat.
He therefore couldn’t in good conscience remain as restrained as before since passively allowing the US-led West’s new Ukrainian-fronted “war of attrition” to proceed unimpeded would ultimately mean the end of Russia’s sovereignty that he authorized the special operation to safeguard in the first place. To be sure, Putin is only mildly “escalating to de-escalate” with Ukraine within certain limits due to his innate caution about inadvertently sparking World War III, but it’s still a notable change in his calculations.
The optics of Russia pounding Ukraine while the US plays it cool with Iran (despite still talking tough) due to reportedly depleting practically all of its tactical ballistic missiles also serves to reinforce perceptions of Russia’s continued military strength vis-à-vis the US. The aforesaid would be cemented if Putin ever radically “escalates to de-escalate”, but given how cautious he is, Zelensky would likely have to radically escalate first, though Trump might not help after seeing how Putin just reacted to this latest escalation.
My fear is that Putin would deescalate again given how bloody cautious he is. That if Ukraine decides to stop attacking civilian and energy infrastructure inside Russia, that Russia would stop attacking similar targets inside Ukraine and would stop its blockade of Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea. This conflict needs to end ASAP and escalating to deescalate is something Russia needs to keep doing to bring an end to this bloody conflict. But knowing Putin, I am not holding my breath and can see this conflict taking another 15 years due to his unwillingness to escalate.
None of this is really a sign of proactive behavior on Russia's part, given that it—like China—did very little to help Iran degrade U.S. defenses during the recent war. In effect Russia left the depletion of U.S. matériel largely to chance and external actors. This hardly bodes well for a decisive Russian win in Ukraine, much less a postwar NATO–Russia reset.
On the other hand, one can similarly judge Western efforts to degrade Russia till now. Up until late 2024 the West was still a bit reluctant to give Kiev all-out support for strikes on critical infrastructure inside Russia, as shown by the unwillingness of some states to provide long-range missile, back an enlarged drone war, or encourage Ukrainian cross-border raids.
That changed with Biden agreeing to send ATACMs and approve the Kursk invasion, followed by Trump scuttling a "new détente" last summer (notably by ratcheting up U.S. aid to Kiev after Anchorage rather than pushing Zelensky to make a deal with Putin as promised). All this can be traced to NATO's belated sense that it has less to fear than it first thought, due to Russian restraint.