What’s Responsible For The Upcoming Putin-Trump Summit?

One of them must have offered more concessions to the other.

Kremlin aide Yury Ushakov confirmed on Thursday that Putin and Trump could meet as soon as next week following Special Envoy Steve Witkoff’s “highly productive” three-hour-long meeting with his boss. A venue has already been agreed upon too. This comes a day before the expiry of Trump’s shortened deadline to Putin. It’s still unclear whether Trump will impose more sanctions on Russia and up to 100% tariffs on its trading partners, however, but he just doubled India’s tariffs to 50% on the same day.

In any case, the question on everyone’s mind is what’s responsible for the upcoming Putin-Trump summit, namely which of them offered the most concessions to the other and why. Coming right before the expiry of Trump’s deadline to Putin, some observers believe that the latter is therefore capitulating, but it’s also possible that the “TACO” (“Trump Always Chickens Out”) theory will be proven. There are several arguments for and against each of these two schools of thought.

This analysis here from early March enumerated the five reasons why Putin might agree to a ceasefire and the five reasons why he might not. As for why he might: Russia wants to avert disproportionate dependence on China; it also wants to beat China to the chase with the “New Détente”; the “New Détente” could geopolitically revolutionize the world; additional (and even secret) terms might be attached to the ceasefire; and Putin might really believe that Trump is serious about further escalating.

At the same time, he might still hold firm in his opposition to a ceasefire unless his terms from June 2024 are first met because: Russia wants to liberate all occupied territories; the front lines might soon collapse to Russia’s benefit; Russia wants to scare away Western peacekeepers from deploying to Ukraine; some of the Russian public don’t want a ceasefire; and Putin might really believe that Trump is bluffing about further escalating per the “TACO” theory.

This segues into the reasons why Trump might offer the most concessions to Putin. Briefly, this could be because he: soberly assessed the resultant escalation risk and wisely decided against it; accordingly shook off the pernicious influence of the warmongers around him like Lindsey Graham; is finally willing to coerce Zelensky into Putin’s demanded concessions for peace; expects that he’ll succeed and neither his new EU vassals nor the UK will sabotage this; and hopes to win the Nobel Peace Prize as a result.

On the other hand, he might still hold firm in his opposition to coercing Zelensky into Putin’s demanded concessions for peace because he: believes that any further escalation would be manageable; is still under the influence of warmongers like Lindsey Graham; believes that he can coerce concessions from Putin; expects that his new EU vassals and the UK will contribute to his potential escalation plans; and hopes that he’ll win the Nobel Peace Prize if he gets Putin to agree to a totally lopsided deal.

Everyone will soon discover whether it was Putin or Trump who miscalculated by not ending the conflict earlier, but they shouldn’t forget that while “China Might Not Want Russia To Lose, It Might Not Want Russia To Win Either”. As such, China might try to beat Russia to the chase in clinching a “New Détente” with the US, which could decelerate or even offset Trump’s “Pivot (back) to (East) Asia”. All that’s known for sure is that the coming week will reveal a lot about the factors that drive those three’s policies.