What’s Russia’s Best Move Amidst The German-Polish Zero-Sum Rivalry?

US support for Poland slashes the chances that Germany will fulfill its vision of federalizing the EU, so the Kremlin should prioritize the management of Russian-Polish tensions instead of the restoration of strategic ties with Germany, but the latter should still continue to be pursued for balancing purposes.

“The AfD’s Co-Leader Declared That Poland Could Become A Threat To Germany”, but also, “Germany Poses A Significant Non-Military Threat To Polish Sovereignty”. The crux of the matter is that Poland and Germany have zero-sum visions of the EU’s future: Poland opposes its federalization so as to preserve what remains of its members’ sovereignty, while Germany supports its federalization precisely to remove that remaining sovereignty, lord over them all, and thus become a superpower without firing a shot.

The fulfillment of Poland’s plans would therefore shatter Germany’s and vice-versa. This serious internal contradiction within the EU is being exploited by the US to “keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” as NATO’s first Secretary General described the bloc’s raison d’etre. To that end, Trump 2.0 backs Poland’s vision of the EU, also wagering that it’ll create a formidable geostrategic wedge between Germany and Russia in Central Europe via the Polish-led “Three Seas Initiative” (3SI).

The 3SI is Poland’s vehicle not only for rallying the regional states behind its leadership in collectively opposing Germany’s plans to federalize the EU, but also for reviving its long-lost Great Power status. Accordingly, it stands to reason that Russia would naturally employ indirect means for complicating the fulfillment of Poland’s US-backed vision and its associated 3SI vehicle, the latter of which will also facilitate the “military Schengen” aimed at speeding up the transfer of troops and equipment eastward.

Another point is that Russia’s ties with the EU would be easier to manage if the bloc was federalized under German hegemony because it would then practically only have to deal with Berlin instead of 27 separate countries. It’s perhaps partially with this end goal in mind that Germany became Russia’s top partner in the EU over the past decades. Nevertheless, this vision is much more difficult to implement nowadays due to populist trends and Poland’s US-backed rise, so Russia’s interests might shift.

To be sure, Russia will never support Poland or its plans, but it might be unable to stop them. In that case, the management of Russian-Polish tensions would become a priority, which could be greatly aided by a mutual de-escalation deal between Poland and Belarus as part of a grand Russian-US deal. Toning down anti-Polish rhetoric, especially that which is pushed by its global information ecosystem, can help reduce Poles’ threat perception of Russia and thus question the perceived urgency of containing it.

In parallel with this, attempts to restore the “golden age” of Russian-German relations should continue unabated for balancing purposes and exacerbating mutual German-Polish distrust, with the goal being to keep Poland outside of Germany’s “sphere of influence” to prevent the merger of their military forces. They’re competing to build the largest military in Europe, and from Russia’s strategic perspective, it’s better for them to remain separate with minimal coordination than to unite into a de facto single force.

The aforesaid is the most realistic best-case scenario for Russia since it would avert the possibility of a Barbarossa-like threat once again emerging in the west while enabling Russia to more effectively manage tensions with Poland via bilateral dialogue with the latter’s American patron. British and/or Ukrainian false flags could still provoke a Russian-Polish crisis and thus a Russian-US one, however, but this too could be averted if Russian-US ties remain stable, Russia tips the US off, and the US then stops them.