This thought exercise shouldn’t be innocently misinterpreted or maliciously spun as implying that Russia’s interests wouldn’t be advanced by returning Odessa Region.
I think a more ominous factor for Russia than Odessa is the wider role Ukrainian strikes on Russian shipping in the Black Sea, along with ongoing violence in general, is turning the Bosphorus into a regional bottleneck, as Deputy PM Marat Khusnullin recently indicated, to the point senior Russian officials are openly talking about rerouting Black Sea trade away from the Turkish Straits.
That in itself is a major win for Kiev and its Western backers; by merely maintaining instability they hinder a major Russian trade link to the "global South". I think this is the bigger strategic dilemma for Moscow as Zelensky's forty-day "campaign" expands—especially now that Türkiye is expediting U.S. ATACMs shipments as part of the "Islamic NATO 3.0":
Russia will probably increase shipping through Murmansk, Vladivostok or Vostochniy. Also, via Caspian sea to Iran. On the other hand, without Black Sea ports, Ukraine is landlocked. In the next step, Russia will probably cut off the rail connections in W Ukraine.
The U.S. has been targeting both overland routes (such as the bridge near the Turkmenistan border) and Caspian shipping (whether by Israeli or Ukrainian strikes), disrupting north–south trade.
Moreover, Russia and Iran distrust each other too much over Israel, while U.S. pressure means that Moscow will likely be excluded from access to Iran—just as China is being denied oil by the Hormuz blockade.
As noted above, Türkiye is now cooperating more actively with the U.S. and Ukraine vis-à-vis the "Sunni NATO" (Pakistan–Saudi Arabia–Qatar), including by turning the Black Sea–Caspian region into a war zone.
Türkiye is a free agent. Saudis are actually scared about Turks occupying Saudi Arabia. Same playbook as Iraq occupying Quwait in 1989.
No, the point I am making is - USA making things difficult for Russia, means Russia will do the same for the USA in terms of the Hormuz straits. That's tit for tat 101.
I don’t discount that a constitutional loophole might be relied upon to allow Putin to legally end the conflict without first obtaining full control over the entirety of the disputed territory:
At the moment, the left bank of Kherson Oblast (East) is in Russia. The right bank is in Ukraine (West). What with Dnieper flowing from North to South.
I don’t see any plausible pathway at present for that to happen since Ukraine will use lethal force to stop them, failing which it might resort to Western mercenaries or even conventional forces in the worst-case scenario.
One of the possible outcomes is the federalization and fragmentation of Ukraine after the war. If Europe stops allocating money to support the economy, then a scenario in which Ukraine becomes a battlefield for bandit groups with military experience is quite real. And in this scenario, it is possible for some regions to join Russia.
Despite my comments on an earlier post, I think you are largely correct that the official plan is to not take Odessa. Circumstances regarding materiel supplies may force a reconsideration but Russia would have to expect extremely high casualties and I don't think they will do that unless absolutely necessary. A demilitarized and denazified Ukraine would be sufficient. However, what if taking everything up to the Left Bank of the Dnieper doesn't result in surrender and weapons are still being shipped from NATO? What then?
Andrew mentioned that Putin fears an attempt to take Odessa could involve "possibly colossal loss of Russian lives". I hope this question doesn't sound too obvious - but, why? Right now it would, since it would necessary involve airborne troops and marine landings. But what if it occurs after Kherson is retaken, and the RA has a secure foothold on the left bank of the Dnieper and supply lines? Is there anything particular to Odessa that would necessitate higher levels of casualties than say an attempt to storm Sumy or Kharkiv (both of which appear to be on the drawing board right now)?
And if the RA does manage to take Sumy and Kharkiv, why would they stop and not attempt to take Chenihiv and even Kiev, assuming no surrender by the Ukrainian regime is in the cards? Is it imaginable that Russia takes all of Donetsk and "Novorossiya" as centered on Zaporozhye and Kherson, rubs its hands together, and goes home with a giant "Mission Accomplished" flag hanging in Red Square (given that even then, Zelensky and his minions aren't going to surrender or agree to anything)?
One thing I don't see is anybody contemplating how Russia achieves the rest of Putin's initial objectives for the SMO, after the territorial ones are achieved, given the complete unlikeliness of Kiev surrendering or coming to terms. How does Russia unilaterally "denazify" Ukraine? How does it keep Ukraine out of western military alliances, short of marching on Kiev? Is Ukraine retaining a half-million man strong, NATO-equipped army really "demilitarization"?
I think trying to take Odessa is dangerous for other reasons. If it were to happen, whatever's left of Ukraine after / if Hungary and Poland spoon back their share of the country would be utterly dependent on Poland and remain a fermenting chamber of insurgencies and conspiracies against Russia forever. If they keep Odessa, they have a chance at a somewhat independent future within their own control. They can create a fascist nationalist paradise replete with beaches, and everyone'll be happy.
If the war is resolved by negotiation soon, then Odessa won't be touched. The longer it drags on and the closer Russian forces get to Odessa, the more likely it will be taken as compensation...
"Since Russia can’t directly ensure Odessa Region’s continued demilitarization, it’ll require trusted non-Western peacekeepers to do this, which it might soon propose". This form of demilitarisation is equal to a cease-fire with no guarantees to Russia about its future hold. Odessa is a prime target for NATO and/or The EU's version of the same in which Ukraine will be a member. Russia's long-term security will only be achieved by a total victory on the battlefield followed by a settlement with Russia that satisfies the security of the latter. Starkly reducing Ukraine's economic power base (land-locked) will also dent its future ability to build towards future revenge action. With a defeated army, Ukraine's ability to hold on in Odessa seems to me highly overrated.
I'm curious why Russia hasn't started attacking gas stations and critical transport infrastructure between Kiev and Poland.
That's the main path that anyone coming and going (without traveling to Kiev by plane) has to use.
Not only would it greatly increase the logistical challenges of getting Western aid from west to east, but it also would serve as a powerful reminder to Kiev that getting out when the time comes may not be easy or even possible. A slow steady FUD on the general mood.
With the right leverage, Russia might be able to swap Kiev for Odessa without Odessa being razed to the ground on the retreat.
Given Vladimir Putin's proven military record, the idea of Russia taking Odessa is about as real as Russia landing the world's first astronauts on Jupiter.
Regardless, the topic of Odessa is interesting. And as usual, our good host Andrew is the last man standing who dares to name Russia's good options versus Russia's not-so-good options.
My own view says that Odessa is a very nice place (I can tell from personal experience), but that history has made it impossible for Odessa to reunite with Russia. Odessa is a write-off. Russia should not bother to take anything that is located west of the Dnjepr.
Unfortunately the leadership of the US believes their sphere of influence is everything, and Russia can have the left overs.
The U.S. is still stuck in the belief they won the Cold War and the U.S. is the world’s sole remaining super power. And Russia is just a giant gas station.
USA in fact did win the Cold War. But that was 36 years ago. Now, Russia recovered militarily, and China is a gigantic industrial adversary. In the mean time, they lost Russia over Iraq, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, before the Euro-Maidan in Ukraine.
USA capitulating to Iran would be a much more problematic than getting a grand bargain with Russia. But this is a fringe view in the USA. This is why we see people like Robert Kagan advocating for capitulating to Iran rather than the acquiescing to the Russian option.
I think a more ominous factor for Russia than Odessa is the wider role Ukrainian strikes on Russian shipping in the Black Sea, along with ongoing violence in general, is turning the Bosphorus into a regional bottleneck, as Deputy PM Marat Khusnullin recently indicated, to the point senior Russian officials are openly talking about rerouting Black Sea trade away from the Turkish Straits.
That in itself is a major win for Kiev and its Western backers; by merely maintaining instability they hinder a major Russian trade link to the "global South". I think this is the bigger strategic dilemma for Moscow as Zelensky's forty-day "campaign" expands—especially now that Türkiye is expediting U.S. ATACMs shipments as part of the "Islamic NATO 3.0":
https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-buys-70-atacms-missiles-other-us-weapons-from-turkey-in-major-defense-package/
Russia will probably increase shipping through Murmansk, Vladivostok or Vostochniy. Also, via Caspian sea to Iran. On the other hand, without Black Sea ports, Ukraine is landlocked. In the next step, Russia will probably cut off the rail connections in W Ukraine.
The U.S. has been targeting both overland routes (such as the bridge near the Turkmenistan border) and Caspian shipping (whether by Israeli or Ukrainian strikes), disrupting north–south trade.
Moreover, Russia and Iran distrust each other too much over Israel, while U.S. pressure means that Moscow will likely be excluded from access to Iran—just as China is being denied oil by the Hormuz blockade.
As noted above, Türkiye is now cooperating more actively with the U.S. and Ukraine vis-à-vis the "Sunni NATO" (Pakistan–Saudi Arabia–Qatar), including by turning the Black Sea–Caspian region into a war zone.
Türkiye is a free agent. Saudis are actually scared about Turks occupying Saudi Arabia. Same playbook as Iraq occupying Quwait in 1989.
No, the point I am making is - USA making things difficult for Russia, means Russia will do the same for the USA in terms of the Hormuz straits. That's tit for tat 101.
The risk of heavy casualties for Odessa is very serious; but it would also concern the right bank part of Kherson, which is part of Russia now.
How do you see the future in this part of Kherson oblast which by the way includes its main city ?
I don’t discount that a constitutional loophole might be relied upon to allow Putin to legally end the conflict without first obtaining full control over the entirety of the disputed territory:
https://korybko.substack.com/p/can-putin-legally-stop-the-conflict
At the moment, the left bank of Kherson Oblast (East) is in Russia. The right bank is in Ukraine (West). What with Dnieper flowing from North to South.
The right bank in Kherson oblast is also in Russia since Russia incorporated the 4 oblasts in its Federation…
How about Odessians themselves choosing to join Russia rather than staying with Ukraine?
I don’t see any plausible pathway at present for that to happen since Ukraine will use lethal force to stop them, failing which it might resort to Western mercenaries or even conventional forces in the worst-case scenario.
Ukraine won’t have any choice in the matter.
Odessa is a done deal. NWIH Russia leaves Ukraine anything but permanently land locked. Plus it solves the Transnistria problem.
And that will eventually lead to what’s left of Ukraine being parceled out to Poland, Romania, etc.
Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign state will be far more short lived than Israel.
But wouldn't that in some way replicate what was done in Donbas since 2014?
Nobody cares what they want, unless it happens to coincide with what the rulers want.
One of the possible outcomes is the federalization and fragmentation of Ukraine after the war. If Europe stops allocating money to support the economy, then a scenario in which Ukraine becomes a battlefield for bandit groups with military experience is quite real. And in this scenario, it is possible for some regions to join Russia.
Peace-keeping by a non-hostile 3rd side never works.
Nobody would accept such a proposition, and anyone who did would immediately betray Russia.
Despite my comments on an earlier post, I think you are largely correct that the official plan is to not take Odessa. Circumstances regarding materiel supplies may force a reconsideration but Russia would have to expect extremely high casualties and I don't think they will do that unless absolutely necessary. A demilitarized and denazified Ukraine would be sufficient. However, what if taking everything up to the Left Bank of the Dnieper doesn't result in surrender and weapons are still being shipped from NATO? What then?
Andrew mentioned that Putin fears an attempt to take Odessa could involve "possibly colossal loss of Russian lives". I hope this question doesn't sound too obvious - but, why? Right now it would, since it would necessary involve airborne troops and marine landings. But what if it occurs after Kherson is retaken, and the RA has a secure foothold on the left bank of the Dnieper and supply lines? Is there anything particular to Odessa that would necessitate higher levels of casualties than say an attempt to storm Sumy or Kharkiv (both of which appear to be on the drawing board right now)?
And if the RA does manage to take Sumy and Kharkiv, why would they stop and not attempt to take Chenihiv and even Kiev, assuming no surrender by the Ukrainian regime is in the cards? Is it imaginable that Russia takes all of Donetsk and "Novorossiya" as centered on Zaporozhye and Kherson, rubs its hands together, and goes home with a giant "Mission Accomplished" flag hanging in Red Square (given that even then, Zelensky and his minions aren't going to surrender or agree to anything)?
One thing I don't see is anybody contemplating how Russia achieves the rest of Putin's initial objectives for the SMO, after the territorial ones are achieved, given the complete unlikeliness of Kiev surrendering or coming to terms. How does Russia unilaterally "denazify" Ukraine? How does it keep Ukraine out of western military alliances, short of marching on Kiev? Is Ukraine retaining a half-million man strong, NATO-equipped army really "demilitarization"?
I think trying to take Odessa is dangerous for other reasons. If it were to happen, whatever's left of Ukraine after / if Hungary and Poland spoon back their share of the country would be utterly dependent on Poland and remain a fermenting chamber of insurgencies and conspiracies against Russia forever. If they keep Odessa, they have a chance at a somewhat independent future within their own control. They can create a fascist nationalist paradise replete with beaches, and everyone'll be happy.
If the war is resolved by negotiation soon, then Odessa won't be touched. The longer it drags on and the closer Russian forces get to Odessa, the more likely it will be taken as compensation...
"Since Russia can’t directly ensure Odessa Region’s continued demilitarization, it’ll require trusted non-Western peacekeepers to do this, which it might soon propose". This form of demilitarisation is equal to a cease-fire with no guarantees to Russia about its future hold. Odessa is a prime target for NATO and/or The EU's version of the same in which Ukraine will be a member. Russia's long-term security will only be achieved by a total victory on the battlefield followed by a settlement with Russia that satisfies the security of the latter. Starkly reducing Ukraine's economic power base (land-locked) will also dent its future ability to build towards future revenge action. With a defeated army, Ukraine's ability to hold on in Odessa seems to me highly overrated.
I'm curious why Russia hasn't started attacking gas stations and critical transport infrastructure between Kiev and Poland.
That's the main path that anyone coming and going (without traveling to Kiev by plane) has to use.
Not only would it greatly increase the logistical challenges of getting Western aid from west to east, but it also would serve as a powerful reminder to Kiev that getting out when the time comes may not be easy or even possible. A slow steady FUD on the general mood.
With the right leverage, Russia might be able to swap Kiev for Odessa without Odessa being razed to the ground on the retreat.
Given Vladimir Putin's proven military record, the idea of Russia taking Odessa is about as real as Russia landing the world's first astronauts on Jupiter.
Regardless, the topic of Odessa is interesting. And as usual, our good host Andrew is the last man standing who dares to name Russia's good options versus Russia's not-so-good options.
My own view says that Odessa is a very nice place (I can tell from personal experience), but that history has made it impossible for Odessa to reunite with Russia. Odessa is a write-off. Russia should not bother to take anything that is located west of the Dnjepr.
It depends on Ukraine.
If the war goes on long enough Russia will take Odessa.
It's not about the length of war, it is about Russia and USA defining their spheres of interest, and the other side accepting it. IE grand bargain.
Unfortunately the leadership of the US believes their sphere of influence is everything, and Russia can have the left overs.
The U.S. is still stuck in the belief they won the Cold War and the U.S. is the world’s sole remaining super power. And Russia is just a giant gas station.
The amount of hubris is amazing.
USA in fact did win the Cold War. But that was 36 years ago. Now, Russia recovered militarily, and China is a gigantic industrial adversary. In the mean time, they lost Russia over Iraq, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, before the Euro-Maidan in Ukraine.
USA capitulating to Iran would be a much more problematic than getting a grand bargain with Russia. But this is a fringe view in the USA. This is why we see people like Robert Kagan advocating for capitulating to Iran rather than the acquiescing to the Russian option.
Any link to Kagans writings that informed this comment re Kagan, Barnabus.
It's just a personal view that I have. Kagan is not original, it is a majority view if you read across the mainstream media.
As I avoid msm like the plague it is interesting to read hard-line neocons and see if they flip flopped or still toeing their line.
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/robert-kagan-iran/
Thanks Ray.