Why Might Ethiopia One Day Decide To Support Sudan’s “Rapid Support Forces”?

There’s no proof that this has happened, only speculative reports that might be fake news spread by its rivals, but it would be understandable amidst the rapidly changing regional security environment.

Elfadil Ibrahim published an intriguing piece at Arab Weekly about “Why Ethiopia is betting on Sudan’s RSF”. Leaving aside that the premise is unproven, he makes some compelling arguments about why Ethiopia might pivot from neutrality in the Sudanese Conflict to supporting Mohammad Hamdan Dagalo’s (Hemedti’s) “Rapid Support Forces” (RSF) over General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s “Sudanese Armed Forces” (SAF). They’re all centered on the rapidly changing regional security environment.

Ibrahim wrote about how General Khalifa Haftar’s “Libyan National Army” (LNA) is being pressured into cutting off reported UAE arms shipments to the RSF, Eritrea has reportedly allied with the SAF, and Saudi Arabia is reportedly financing the SAF’s $1.5 billion arms deal with Pakistan. He didn’t mention it, but all of this is tied to the Saudi-centric “Islamic NATO”, which might expand from its alliance with Pakistan to include Turkiye in one vector and Egypt and Somalia in the other, both of which are allied with Eritrea.

What they all have in common is countering Emirati influence in Africa. The UAE is partnered with the LNA and Somaliland, whose redeclaration of independence was recently recognized by Israel, and is reportedly the RSF’s top patron. The UAE earlier abandoned its “Southern Transitional Council” (STC) allies in South Yemen after an ultimatum from the Saudis. This preceded a swift Saudi-backed campaign that deposed the STC and emboldened the Saudis to set their sights on the RSF and Somaliland next.

The aforesaid campaign saw the Saudis providing air support to al-Islah, the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood with whom the Kingdom has long been at odds, thus heralding a significant shift in its foreign policy from politically accepting the group in Yemen (a shift in itself) to militarily backing it. Siding with the SAF over the RSF aligns the Saudis with the Brotherhood’s allies in Sudan while siding with Somalia over Somaliland could dangerously create space for Al Shabaab to further expand.

All of this heralds the Saudis’ return to backing radical Islamist forces abroad to varying degrees despite its continued conflict with them at home. The indirect Al Shabaab dimension is concerning for Ethiopia from an anti-terrorist perspective while the direct Somaliland one could cut this landlocked giant off from its only current alternative to continued dependence on the port of Djibouti. On the Sudanese front, the SAF’s possible Saudi-backed victory could result in a militarized Egyptian-Eritrean client state.

Although Ethiopian-Saudi ties are pretty solid, the Saudi-centric “Islamic NATO” might still be responsible for catalyzing the worst-case scenario from Ethiopia’s national security perspective if it helps the SAF defeat the RSF while helping Somalia reconquer Somaliland like how the Saudis reconquered South Yemen. In that event, Egypt would be in a prime position to orchestrate a three-front invasion of Ethiopia from allied Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan in an audacious attempt to deal a deathblow to its historical rival.

With a view towards preemptively averting this, it would therefore be understandable if Ethiopia began to provide secret military support to the RSF and Somaliland, whether unilaterally or in coordination with the UAE and/or Israel (all of which share similar security concerns vis-à-vis the “Islamic NATO”). To be clear, there’s no proof that this has happened, but Ibrahim’s article helps observers understand why it might occur amidst Ethiopia’s impending security dilemma with the Saudi-centric “Islamic NATO”.