Why’d Erdogan Decide To Expand Turkiye’s Sphere Of Influence Eastwards?

Assad’s downfall set into motion a fast-moving sequence of events that now threatens Russian influence in the South Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, and Central Asia; i.e. its entire southern periphery.

The latest developments in the South Caucasus are connected to the expansion of Turkiye’s sphere of influence eastwards towards the Caspian Sea and thenceforth Central Asia. The unrest in Armenia is driven by the opposition’s concerns that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is prepared to turn the country into a joint Azeri-Turkish protectorate. That could occur if he reaches a deal with them like some have reported to open the “Zangezur Corridor” without allowing it to come under Russian control like agreed.

The Moscow-mediated Armenian-Azerbaijani ceasefire of November 2020 mandates the creation of a Russian-controlled corridor across Armenia’s southern Syunik Province, which Baku calls the Zangezur Corridor, for connecting both parts of Azerbaijan. Russian control would prevent Turkiye from streamlining its military logistics to Central Asia via these means for replacing Russia’s influence there with its own as part of a grand strategic powerplay that autonomously aligns with the West’s agenda.

The second development is directly connected with the first and relates to the newfound trouble in Russian-Azerbaijani relations. President Ilham Aliyev evidently believes that his country has a brighter future as part of a Turkish-led regional order instead of continuing to multi-align between it and Russia. He likely arrived at this conclusion due to the earlier cited reports about the Zangezur Corridor, which could have led to his policy recalibration that then emboldened him to bully Russia for regional prestige.

The catalyst for these developments is the credible possibility that the Zangezur Corridor might open up without coming under Russian control like agreed, which itself was brought about to a large degree by Assad’s downfall and the US’ subsequently changed policy towards the broader region in the aftermath. Turkish influence briefly surged in Syria before spooking Israel, which prompted Trump to bring previously terrorist-designated Ahmad al-Sharaa (Jolani) in from the cold to help manage their tensions.

He met him, encouraged him to join the Abraham Accords with Israel (which the latest reports suggest that Sharaa is considering), and removed the US’ sanctions on Syria. This sequence of events will greatly limit Turkish influence in Syria, but it’s balanced out by the PKK’s disbandment and the possible consolation prize that Trump could have given his friend Erdogan. That might involve him ceding the US’ previously envisaged joint US-French protectorate in Armenia to Turkiye and Azerbaijan instead.

It wouldn’t just be a goodwill gesture on Trump’s part but a pragmatic move since the US’ efforts to turn Armenia into a bastion for dividing-and-ruling the region required subordinating or overthrowing the Georgian government, which repelled several rounds of Color Revolution unrest to this end. This Biden-era failure derailed the US and France’s military logistics to Armenia, hence why it’s better to jettison this deadweight, which can now turbocharge Turkiye’s rise as a Eurasian Great Power at Russia’s expense.

These calculations and associated policy changes, which stem from the black swan event of Assad’s downfall, account for the latest developments in the South Caucasus. Nevertheless, Aliyev didn’t have to abandon Azerbaijan’s Russian-Turkish balancing act nor bully Russia as he clearly ordered his officials to do by raiding Sputnik’s office and beating up other detained Russians. These emotional, short-sighted, and totally unexpected moves inadvertently risk Azerbaijan becoming Turkiye’s junior partner with time.