Each naively assumed that Ukraine would restrain the anti-Polish manifestation of its national form of Nazism out of gratitude to Poland for donating its entire stockpile for use against Russia and the other forms of aid that it provided with no strings attached to advance their grand geopolitical goals.
"Ukraine has been glorifying those groups since shortly after early 2014’s “EuroMaidan” coup"
It started much earlier. It was well visible after 2004 Orange Revolution and institutionalized at the state level in January 2010 when outgoing President Viktor Yushchenko officially bestowed the title of "Hero of Ukraine" upon Bandera. It dramatically accelerated in 2014.
Poland has a troubling history of short-term thinking. Perhaps they have a more emotional nature (a sort of pseudo-Italian personality due to the catholic influence) than is common among Northern Europeans...and it drives some of the rashness.
I think there's a lot they could learn from the Czech, but of course that's not going to happen.
(It's an interesting hypothetical to wonder if Italy would exit if it were sandwiched between Germany and Russia for the last 500 years. I would guess no.)
"Each naively assumed that Ukraine would restrain the anti-Polish manifestation of its national form of Nazism out of gratitude to Poland for donating its entire stockpile for use against Russia and the other forms of aid that it provided with no strings attached to advance their grand geopolitical goals."
No. The Americans and their european catamites demanded it. End of discussion.
I would say that the Polish conservatives / nationalists were driven by both hatred of Russians AND desire to ingratiate with Washington (rather than Brussels or Berlin). There seems to be a common dilemma for smaller or middle-sized powers: align with economic centers or security centers (providers).
G. Saad recently wrote his second book on the absurdity of infantile thinking in politics. Unfortunately,it's pointless-are the idiots shooting themselves in the foot out of gratitude?
The Polish hatred of Russians started after Poland invaded Moscow about the year 1200 and were defeated. When some one shows that they are stronger then you end up hatind them.. The Problem is Polands, not Russias.
The leader of the newly reconstituted government of Poland in the post WW 1 period was certainly fascist adjacent; witness the non aggression pact with Hitler’s Germany.
While the enemy of my enemy is (not necessarily) my friend, like most in the West, it did make perfect sense to the Poles to help fight and kill Russians, to the last Ukrainian if necessary.
What I can't fathom is why so many Poles (including Andrew?) still seem to be happy to step into the Ukrainians' shoes:
No, Don, what I'm doing is realistically analyzing Poland's foreign policy options in the current context and sharing proposals for what it should do to advance its national interests as the establishment considers them to be.
I don't do "wishful thinking" so you're never going to see me rant like many of my "peers" do about how Poland needs to leave NATO, etc., because it simply isn't going to happen. Just go elsewhere if that's the content that you seek. You won't find it here.
And really, Don, think about it: you're suggest that I'm somehow anti-Russian despite living in Moscow and having dedicated the last 1/3 of my life, 13 years, to Russia.
I could list my many contributions to the cause but I don't need to prove myself to you. You're straddling the line of personally attacking me with your innuendo. Stop.
I don't know how you could turn our debate on what is in Poland's national interest into my implicating whether you are anti-Russia - a damaged Poland (by wasting treasures and opportunities on being anti-Russia e.g.) could be good for Russia if one believes they are always going to be enemies, and I haven't the faintest idea whether (you think) they are always going to be enemies, or can become friends in due course.
As far as I can see, the only possible implication of my arguments on you personally is you are anti-Poland despite having Polish descent - but that can't be helped, can it, as long as you write about Poland and you accept debate on what you write?
Suggesting that I'm "happy to step into the Ukrainians' shoes" in the context of the ongoing SMO, with me as an American-Pole of partial "Ukrainian" descent living in Moscow, definitely implies that I'm anti-Russian.
I'm neither anti-Russian nor anti-Polish; to the contrary, I'm a proud Russophilic Polish nationalist, though I acknowledge that there are very, very few Poles like me. Anyhow, it's fine, I'm not interested in continuing this.
This is a serious question for clarification. When you wrote this paragraph:
'The urgent national security tasks before Poland are thus threefold: 1) modernize its embarrassingly underdeveloped military-industrial complex with a focus on new military trends like drone warfare; 2) do whatever it must, especially permanently hosting US forces and ideally its nuclear weapons too, to become the US’ top European ally; and 3) successfully position itself as Central Europe’s main “cordon sanitaire” state strategically linking the “Viking Bloc” and the “Organization of Turkic States”.'
how do readers know whether those three 'urgent national security tasks before Poland' are what Poland 'should do to advance its national interests as the establishment considers them to be', or your opinion of what Poland should do?
Unless indicated otherwise, isn't what you write generally your personal opinion?
It's clear from the context that this is my assessment of what Poland should do to advance its national interests as they're understood.
As for my personal opinion, which I rarely share since my articles constitute my analyses and not personal opinions, it would be best for everyone overall if Russia's two interconencted proposals from December 2021 were implemented:
Since that's not politically realistically, beating a dead horse would just amount to parroting low-IQ Kremlin talking points, which annoys me to no end when top "Non-Russian Pro-Russian" influencers do it.
I'd rather share realistic proposals for what Poland could do than rant about why it should comply with Russia's requests. Some Polish experts and even officials follow my work so there's a possibility that they might consider some of what I proposed.
Think I am no less confused - to paraphrase what you say in case I misunderstood, you essentially do not write what you feel X (in this case Poland) should do, but what you feel X should do under real world constraints?
I get that, including agreeing with you that those Russian wishes are pies in the sky, under the circumstance currently. So no argument from me there.
But in the huge valley between Russia's stated 'wishes' and your three 'urgent national security tasks before Poland', there are numerous possible options, why shouldn't there be a valid debate on what you recommend (under real world constraints), e.g. point 2, i.e. 'do whatever it must, especially permanently hosting US forces and ideally its nuclear weapons too, to become the US’ top European ally'?
Isn't hosting nuclear weapons that Poland has no control, yet makes it a prime target for any first strike, no better than putting Poles into the Ukrainians' shoes? Isn't this a lesson the GCC countries have just learnt?
Why isn't my point a reasoned argument 'under real world constraints', and it being a point of reasonable debate?
"Ukraine has been glorifying those groups since shortly after early 2014’s “EuroMaidan” coup"
It started much earlier. It was well visible after 2004 Orange Revolution and institutionalized at the state level in January 2010 when outgoing President Viktor Yushchenko officially bestowed the title of "Hero of Ukraine" upon Bandera. It dramatically accelerated in 2014.
Poland has a troubling history of short-term thinking. Perhaps they have a more emotional nature (a sort of pseudo-Italian personality due to the catholic influence) than is common among Northern Europeans...and it drives some of the rashness.
I think there's a lot they could learn from the Czech, but of course that's not going to happen.
(It's an interesting hypothetical to wonder if Italy would exit if it were sandwiched between Germany and Russia for the last 500 years. I would guess no.)
"Each naively assumed that Ukraine would restrain the anti-Polish manifestation of its national form of Nazism out of gratitude to Poland for donating its entire stockpile for use against Russia and the other forms of aid that it provided with no strings attached to advance their grand geopolitical goals."
No. The Americans and their european catamites demanded it. End of discussion.
I would say that the Polish conservatives / nationalists were driven by both hatred of Russians AND desire to ingratiate with Washington (rather than Brussels or Berlin). There seems to be a common dilemma for smaller or middle-sized powers: align with economic centers or security centers (providers).
G. Saad recently wrote his second book on the absurdity of infantile thinking in politics. Unfortunately,it's pointless-are the idiots shooting themselves in the foot out of gratitude?
The Polish hatred of Russians started after Poland invaded Moscow about the year 1200 and were defeated. When some one shows that they are stronger then you end up hatind them.. The Problem is Polands, not Russias.
The invasion was around 1607, not 1200. Was due to the collapse of the Boris Godunov's regime...
The leader of the newly reconstituted government of Poland in the post WW 1 period was certainly fascist adjacent; witness the non aggression pact with Hitler’s Germany.
While the enemy of my enemy is (not necessarily) my friend, like most in the West, it did make perfect sense to the Poles to help fight and kill Russians, to the last Ukrainian if necessary.
What I can't fathom is why so many Poles (including Andrew?) still seem to be happy to step into the Ukrainians' shoes:
https://korybko.substack.com/p/poland-finally-realizes-the-geostrategic/comment/289268674
No, Don, what I'm doing is realistically analyzing Poland's foreign policy options in the current context and sharing proposals for what it should do to advance its national interests as the establishment considers them to be.
I don't do "wishful thinking" so you're never going to see me rant like many of my "peers" do about how Poland needs to leave NATO, etc., because it simply isn't going to happen. Just go elsewhere if that's the content that you seek. You won't find it here.
And really, Don, think about it: you're suggest that I'm somehow anti-Russian despite living in Moscow and having dedicated the last 1/3 of my life, 13 years, to Russia.
I could list my many contributions to the cause but I don't need to prove myself to you. You're straddling the line of personally attacking me with your innuendo. Stop.
I don't know how you could turn our debate on what is in Poland's national interest into my implicating whether you are anti-Russia - a damaged Poland (by wasting treasures and opportunities on being anti-Russia e.g.) could be good for Russia if one believes they are always going to be enemies, and I haven't the faintest idea whether (you think) they are always going to be enemies, or can become friends in due course.
As far as I can see, the only possible implication of my arguments on you personally is you are anti-Poland despite having Polish descent - but that can't be helped, can it, as long as you write about Poland and you accept debate on what you write?
Think you owe me an apology.
Suggesting that I'm "happy to step into the Ukrainians' shoes" in the context of the ongoing SMO, with me as an American-Pole of partial "Ukrainian" descent living in Moscow, definitely implies that I'm anti-Russian.
I'm neither anti-Russian nor anti-Polish; to the contrary, I'm a proud Russophilic Polish nationalist, though I acknowledge that there are very, very few Poles like me. Anyhow, it's fine, I'm not interested in continuing this.
This is a serious question for clarification. When you wrote this paragraph:
'The urgent national security tasks before Poland are thus threefold: 1) modernize its embarrassingly underdeveloped military-industrial complex with a focus on new military trends like drone warfare; 2) do whatever it must, especially permanently hosting US forces and ideally its nuclear weapons too, to become the US’ top European ally; and 3) successfully position itself as Central Europe’s main “cordon sanitaire” state strategically linking the “Viking Bloc” and the “Organization of Turkic States”.'
how do readers know whether those three 'urgent national security tasks before Poland' are what Poland 'should do to advance its national interests as the establishment considers them to be', or your opinion of what Poland should do?
Unless indicated otherwise, isn't what you write generally your personal opinion?
It's clear from the context that this is my assessment of what Poland should do to advance its national interests as they're understood.
As for my personal opinion, which I rarely share since my articles constitute my analyses and not personal opinions, it would be best for everyone overall if Russia's two interconencted proposals from December 2021 were implemented:
https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=en
https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790818/?lang=en
Since that's not politically realistically, beating a dead horse would just amount to parroting low-IQ Kremlin talking points, which annoys me to no end when top "Non-Russian Pro-Russian" influencers do it.
I'd rather share realistic proposals for what Poland could do than rant about why it should comply with Russia's requests. Some Polish experts and even officials follow my work so there's a possibility that they might consider some of what I proposed.
Think I am no less confused - to paraphrase what you say in case I misunderstood, you essentially do not write what you feel X (in this case Poland) should do, but what you feel X should do under real world constraints?
I get that, including agreeing with you that those Russian wishes are pies in the sky, under the circumstance currently. So no argument from me there.
But in the huge valley between Russia's stated 'wishes' and your three 'urgent national security tasks before Poland', there are numerous possible options, why shouldn't there be a valid debate on what you recommend (under real world constraints), e.g. point 2, i.e. 'do whatever it must, especially permanently hosting US forces and ideally its nuclear weapons too, to become the US’ top European ally'?
Isn't hosting nuclear weapons that Poland has no control, yet makes it a prime target for any first strike, no better than putting Poles into the Ukrainians' shoes? Isn't this a lesson the GCC countries have just learnt?
Why isn't my point a reasoned argument 'under real world constraints', and it being a point of reasonable debate?