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Richard Thomas's avatar

Yes, all of the above and Odessa and the entire Ukrainian Black Sea coast. Then watch the Poles, Hungarians and Romanians bicker over the Ukrainian "Rump".

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Andrew Korybko's avatar

That's very unlikely for the reasons that I explained here, which cites my previous work on this scenario:

https://korybko.substack.com/p/ukraines-western-borders-are-unlikely

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Jack's avatar

Then Russia will continue to be threatened ... In perpetuity

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Kurvingrad's avatar

Unlikely, perhaps.

Should it? Yes.

Unless they plan to make those areas a special zone or something separate from Western regions after UA signs an unconditional defeat.

WW1 experience should be a good reference as to what happens when an enemy is not defeated. Unless finished now it will cost far more later to rid Ukraine of UkroNazi, primarily in Russian lives.

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Jack's avatar

So what happens to Russia’s mission of demilitarization and denazification? It fails

Succumbing to a Minsk3 by being pragmatic will upset the army and betray those who gave the ultimate sacrifice.

Russia will not rid itself of dangers

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Richard Thomas's avatar

It's effectively already happening. The Kiev regime won't last too much longer and the "rump State" remaining will be of no consequences and a burden to Europe. Ukraine has no significant 'Rare Earths', so I don't know what Trump is after, but we have to thank him anyway...Four!

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Ash 1952's avatar

Russia wants all Russian speaking regions.

Zelenskyy should have signed peace treaties in turkey 2 years ago and avoided the war and retained ukrain former territories.

But now that Russia has sacrificed so many of their men , they would want all Russian speaking regions and stricter conditions on security.

This is a massive slap on NATO who thought they would cripple Russia with all types of sanctions and bring Russia to its knees begging for peace. But situation is other way around now

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Duane McPherson's avatar

The overarching cause of the war is America's desire to hobble Russia economically and trigger a regime change from within (i.e., color revolution) to replace the current government with one that is submissive to Western neoliberal economic exploitation, including the break-up of Russia into numerous small countries that are more easily manipulated.

The question for me is, has that primary desire changed or diminished? And thus far I do not see evidence for any change. The US is running out of weapons to supply to Ukraine, other than those that are likely to trigger a severe reprisal and possible World War 3. (Actually, I believe WW3 is already happening; it's just not happening the way WW2 did. It's not hot yet.)

The USA is a global empire on the cusp of rapid decline. Should the US dollar lose its power as the world's reserve currency, financial traffic would no longer have to go through US banks and the US would lose its weapon of financial sanctions. And if other markets in the world are big enough to absorb the quantity of goods now exported to the US, the entire economy of the US would be in big trouble.

I therefore expect the US empire managers to throw the whole kitchen sink of economic sanctions at Russia, along with the washing machine and the bathtub.

The US may drop Ukraine if it feels the investment there is no longer worthwhile, which is clearly the case. But it will only do so to begin another front of aggression. China, of course, is the main target for US aggression now.

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Kennewick Man's avatar

"The question for me is, has that primary desire changed or diminished?"

The present US/NATO act is only a seriously enlarged and reinvented revision of the "Nasty little war" (a brilliant book by Anna Reid) on the invasion of 1918-1922. Half the players are the same, Japan is not there. This planet was shrinking a lot in the last century. It is becoming obvious that Russia will not back down. That means insecurity and confrontations on the long run and almost zero chance for nuclear disarmament. We can thank the psychopathic leaderships of the US/NATO states for this. A Populist takeover is the only proper answer for what they did here.

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Kurvingrad's avatar

New front in the direction of Kiev may actually save total numbers of killed people once Kiev surrenders.

Voting in pre maidan putsch period is a good indication of people's sentiment.

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Andrew Korybko's avatar

There's no indication from Russian, Ukrainian, or Western sources that Russia is amassing troops in Belarus for another offensive on Kiev sometime soon.

To your second point, a lot can change in the 15 years since Ukraine's last pre-Maidan elections, A look at the US' electoral map, for example, proves this.

There's no reliable way of knowing what public sentiment truly is in Ukraine at this moment in time, it's all just speculation -- however informed or ill-informed -- one way or another.

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barnabus's avatar

Crossing Dnieper from East to West will be difficult. So going down South from Belorus, West of Dnieper will probably be the strategy to reach Odessa and Nikolayev. But that only makes sense after most of the military objectives East of Dnieper have been reached. So I don't expect it any time soon.

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barnabus's avatar

From May 2022 to October 2022, Russia has changed its course and has gone over to fight a war of attrition. There has been no change in that policy till Nov 2024, when Trump was elected. Since then, Ukrainian attrition rates have been gradually declining, according to Russian MoD, from approx 2k/day then to currently around 1k/day. Obviously, Russian forces can pick up the old rate again if this is politically wished.

To achieve high Ukrainian attrition rates while minimizing Russian losses, Russians need a certain density of firepower, EW, drones, aviation etc. So slugging it over over a very extended line is not the best attrition strategy. And no, attacking Kiev is useless so late in the game as the government can easily decamp to Lvov.

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Julian Hudson's avatar

Putin has been too cautious. He shouldn't fear escalate to deescalate from Trump.

Trump is tied down in the Middle East, making preparations to fight China and America's munitions stockpile is dangerously low.

Trump is starting to lose support from the people who voted him in because they see him following the same war making policies as Biden. This isn't what he promised them when he campaigned. Trump is behaving just like Zelensky did. Zelensky also ran on a peace platform that quickly turned to a war platform.

Putin isn't the one playing for time. Trump is the one who's bargaining in bad faith. Trump is the who has set a time to end this war because he wants to move on to other more important enemies. He doesn't have any respect for Russia.

Putin needs to take all of Ukraine and install a government that is friendly to Russia. Ukraine must re-enact its original Constitution, de-Nazify it's government and society.

Russia must take all the land that was given to Ukraine and that means Odessa.

The plans being made by the West that the U.S./U.K. would own and operate Ukraines ports, rails, nuclear power plants etc. cannot come to fruition. The West must have no presence in Ukraine. Ukraine cannot be a state.

Russia is only reclaiming what was once its territory but was taken from it at a time when the central government was weak.

It is time for Putin to be bold. Stop talking with the Trump government. That's the only way to not have to revisit this issue again. And if Russia does it at least won't be at such a disadvantageous position.

Living with a free Ukraine on Russia's border will be like sleeping with a dagger pointed at Russia's heart.

The U.S. does plan to come back and deal with Russia after it's knocked off the others. There is nothing of permanence that Trump is going to offer Putin. Trump can't.

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Danf's avatar

Unless the Russians solve the drone problem definitively, expanding the objectives to include 4 additional oblasts would mean planning for another round of mobilization and fighting until 2028 or later.

The Russians have adapted to drones and the general inability to surprise, concentrate and maneuver large forces in a coordinated way. But that adaptation has been accomplished by reducing offensive operations to localized affairs conducted at the speed of foot born infantry.

This means that the AFU will always have time and space to shift forces without interference and contain Russian attacks.

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Bruce Ballai's avatar

I wonder how much the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation can take the political interplay of the negotiations into account with respect to their strategy. When boxers go to their corners between rounds, their trainers give them all sorts of advice. You can't hear a thing when your head is ringing, your heart is pounding, and you are gripped with adrenaline. Some command decisions come from far behind the lines, and some come from the forward edge of the battle arena, where things are more heated.

Let's all just hope the negotiators are the most calm, strategic, and nimble of all those involved. ☮

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anders sorensen's avatar

In order to get a permanent peace and security guarantees, Russia needs a bridgehead on the other side of dnerp river and pass the forest belt in northern Ukraine(Kharkov). So expect Russia also grabbing Odessa, Dnerpropetrovsk and Kharkov. But how, now peace is near? What will happen to Ukraine, when peace comes around? It'll be chaos, which needs new authorities, and the only one around is Russia.

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Kennewick Man's avatar

Thinking in terms of ultimate and final solutions from a Russian view: Cutting off incoming arms supplies to Ukraine would be the highest priority. What Russia can do depends on the presently fluid state of military balance and future levels of hardware supplies from U.S./NATO. There are two large scale opportunities there in case if serious disparities develop between opposing forces. The Odessa option with the present balance of power is a difficult one but in case of success it would be far more beneficial for Russia than bogging down the armies for small incremental gains in the east against already established Ukraine defenses.

Option one is an approx. 130 mile push from Kherson to the Moldovan border and that would include the taking of Odessa. This would cut off all deliveries to Ukraine by the Black Sea and land transportation from the Black Sea toward the frontlines. It would also deprive Ukraine from exports by the sea routes. Ukraine would become landlocked and economically even more dependent on the West.

Option two would be possible only in case of a major collapse of the UAF. A drive to close the Moldova, Romania, Polish borders. This seems to be completely out of range under the present circumstances.

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Δημήτριος Παπανίκανδρος's avatar

They could, they should and they must!

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Regis Tremblay's avatar

It is very clear that no progress has been made on solving...stopping the war in Ukraine. Trump continues to support Ukraine with intel and weapons...yes, the assault on Ukraine continues unabated! Russia's options? The complete fulfillment of the goals of the SMO, no territorial concessions, and the root causes solved, i.e. NATO retreats back to 1991 borders.

Russia only has one option: the complete conquest of all of Ukraine....Odessa, across the Dnieper, all the way to Kiev. It will be left to Russia to determine Ukraine's future. It is obvious from the "phone call" that the EU has been sidelined as has Zelinsky! What this means in reality is that Russia continues towards the total, complete, and final conquest of Ukraine, the EU, NATO, leaving Trump the off ramp he needs. What is really needed is a Eurasian security agreement that can only be accomplished with Europe and Russia defining what that will mean.

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Nakayama's avatar

IMHO a "compromised" military solution is to go into Sumy, make threats to Kiev (induce Ukraine to withdraw from Kharkov), but cut south to Poltava, Kremenchuk, then into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, to Krivi Rog then go straight to Odessa. Letting the USA into the plan a little bit is OK as the leak to Ukraine will not matter much by now or in 30 days. As Andrew pointed out, as long as Russian leaders keep the US leaders reasonably informed, the escalation can be managed. The only effective counter measure the West has now is the US ground force officially inside Ukraine with full air force support. And even this one may not be enough to hold the ground for long. General Patton was wrong to say that he had enough force to drive to Berlin. Zhukov did not say it, but if he was allowed to drive to Paris, I think he had a fair chance to do it.

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Ohio Barbarian's avatar

IOW...you don't know what Putin is going to do, perhaps because Putin himself doesn't know yet. I imagine he made some counterproposals that aren't being discussed publicly, and will have to wait and see what the American and Ukrainian responses are. Negotiations are funny that way.

I do like the idea of NHL/KHL exhibition ice hockey games, though. I wonder whose idea that was?

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Adam's avatar

Huh. But what about Kherson city + Nikolaev & Odessa regions? Difficult to do, but seems much more interesting. What is your cost/benefit analysis for that vs Sumy + Kharkov + Dniepropetrovsk regions?

Also, perhaps leaving Sumy, Kharkov, and Dniepropetrovsk inside the hypothetical post-war Ukraine would be useful, for the same reason as pushing Donetsk-Lugansk into the post-coup Ukraine was, in 2015-2021? That is: making sure the West-owned Ukraine still has a significant pro-Russian portion of the population. Could be also combined with demands for federalization.

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Andrew Korybko's avatar

Hey Adam, to your questions:

1. As I explained, expanding the ground campaign to new regions might be meant to help Russia achieve its goal of capturing the entirety of the regions that it claims as its own, so entering Zaporozhye from the Dniepropetrovsk direction could possibly facilitate an eventual move later on against Kherson city and the other lands that Russia claims west of the river.

2. A ground campaign in Odessa is out of the question for now and it doesn't seem like Russia will launch an amphibious operation there either after not even signaling such an attempt any time over the past 1,100+ days.

3. I also explained that Russia might only expand its ground campaign for the purpose of coercing Ukraine into agreeing to peace on its terms, not to make new territorial claims for incorporating those other regions -- whether in part or in whole -- into Russia.

4. I'm also unsure how pro-Russian the populations of those three regions that I mentioned are, it's not possible to obtain accurate information right now and both sides make opposite claims.

5. While Russia pushed for federalization from 2014-2022, it hasn't to the best of my knowledge seriously revived that scenario anytime since the SMO began, and right now it also seems to be out of the question.

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David Stewart's avatar

Didn't Lavrov mention federalisation again last week?

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Andrew Korybko's avatar

As far as I'm aware, this was his only reference to it last week:

"Federalization was very seriously discussed between myself, John Kerry, Catherine Ashton who was the EU foreign policy boss at that time and the guy whom Kiev delegated. It was in April 2014, and we seriously discussed. Nobody mentioned Crimea. It was a done deal already."

https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2002637/

Nothing indicates that Russia is actively pursuing this goal.

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