Will The US-Mediated Congolese-Rwandan Peace Deal Hold?

The US’ interest in enforcing compliance is driven by its pursuit of the Eastern DRC’s critical minerals.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda recently signed a US-mediated peace deal in DC that can be read in full here at the State Department’s site and was summarized here at RT. It aims to resolve their long-running conflict over the DRC-backed “Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda” (FDLR) and the Rwandan-backed “March 23 Movement” (M23) that exploded in January after M23 captured Goma, the capital of the DRC’s North Kivu Province. Here are three background briefings:

* 28 January: “Analyzing Russia’s Response To The Latest Congolese Crisis”

* 29 January: “What Explains Russia’s Swift Policy Recalibration Towards The Latest Congolese Crisis?”

* 24 April: “A Cost-Benefit Analysis Of The Proposed Congolese-US Minerals-Security Deal”

To oversimplify, the DRC and Rwanda respectively consider M23 and FDLR to be existential threats and are also engaged in a struggle over the lawless Eastern DRC’s large-scale illegal mining industry, which China reportedly plays a major role in via ownership and exports through Rwanda. The DRC therefore sought US diplomatic intervention and security guarantees in exchange for privileged mining rights with the innuendo that Chinese companies might then be replaced by US ones as a reward.

The US-mediated deal accordingly includes: a commitment by the conflicting parties to end support for armed groups; a related commitment to support the UN’s mission in the DRC (MONUSCO); the creation of a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) with the US and Qatar as observers; the creation of a Joint Oversight Committee (JOC) for dispute resolution comprised of them, the US, Qatar, and the AU; and bilateral and regional economic integration. There are other details, but these are the main ones.

The bilateral integration clause specifically mentions the potential involvement of the US government and investors in formalizing mineral supply chains through forthcoming deals while also containing a clause about independent economic oversight of bilateral and regional projects with an implied US role. This’ll give the US stakes in ensuring that both parties respect the deal and cooperate within the JCSM, absent which the JOC could request a ramping up of MONUSCO’s activities against their armed proxies.

The first part about ending support for armed groups will clearly be the most difficult to achieve, but the conflicting parties stand to gain by formalizing the lawless Eastern DRC’s large-scale illegal mining industry, which could come about through the US’ direct state and commercial involvement therein. The trade-off though is that the DRC and Rwanda would thus likely allow the US to replace the role of Chinese companies in this trade even at the possible expense of their ties with the People’s Republic.

If this comes to pass, then the past quarter-century of regional instability might finally end to the benefit of the Eastern DRC’s locals, but the US’ legal seizure of China’s illegal mining operations there could lead to the DRC being pressured to replace China’s legal ones in the Southeast, albeit via legally dubious moves. In that case, then the US would gain a strategic edge in the global tech race through its control over these critical minerals, which it might weaponize against China and worsen Great Power tensions.