Would The Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul Railway Be Good Or Bad For Russia?

The supplementary economic benefits and perceived acceleration of multipolar trends might appeal to Russia, but the latent military-strategic threats to its interests arguably outweigh them.

The “New Rules” telegram channel, which his associated with Sputnik’s former podcast of the same name, posted in late September about plans to revive the Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul railway. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian proposed during his trip to Islamabad in early August that partially fulfilled trilateral agreements between them and Turkiye should be reprioritized. All three then agreed during an Economic Cooperation Organization meeting in Islamabad last month to do precisely that.

“New Rules” praised this megaproject’s “enormous upside”, “strategic brilliance”, and “pragmatic basis”, all of which are accurate with respect to those three’s interests but debatable when it comes to Russia’s. To be sure, closer rail connectivity between Pakistan, Iran, and Turkiye can pioneer de facto branch corridors of the North-South Transport Corridor for expanding Russia’s overland trade with all three, which would align with multipolar trends in general and especially Eurasian self-sufficiency in particular.

On the flipside, however, the regional balance of influence is dramatically shifting as of late and could presage forthcoming formidable challenges for Russia along its southern periphery. Iran’s weakening at Israel and the US’ hands appears in hindsight to have emboldened Russia’s neighboring wayward ally Armenia to agree to American mediation with Azerbaijan that ultimately led to the TRIPP Corridor. This will turbocharge the expansion of NATO-backed Turkish influence into Central Asia at Russia’s expense.

About Turkiye, it just entered into a rapprochement with the US after President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with Trump in late September, during which time they agreed to deals on a range of issues from nuclear power to civilian aircraft. This followed Pakistan’s own rapprochement with the US, which has seen its military chief (who’s the de facto national leader) visit the US three times this year (meeting Trump twice) and then Trump him hosting Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in late September too.

The combined effect of these complementary rapprochements is the US is reviving its Old Cold War-era alliances for containing Russia along its southern periphery. Even though Turkiye and Pakistan retain cordial ties with Russia and haven’t complied with US demands to sanction it, their overall relations with the US are much stronger than with Russia. Closer US ties with Turkiye and Pakistan (who are allies with one another) also serve to place more pressure upon Iran to “bandwagon” as their “junior partner”.

Pezeshkian proudly declared that “I am Turkish” due his Azeri ethic identity so he’s already presumably predisposed to this arrangement to the consternation of comparatively more hardline members of his country’s military, intelligence, and religious institutions who favor “balancing” this emerging Turkic Bloc. Although Pakistan isn’t a member of the Turkish-led “Organization of Turkic States”, it can be considered a partial Turkic country for ethno-historical reasons and due to its alliances with Turkiye and Azerbaijan.

Accordingly, the strengthening of economic ties between this bloc’s Turkish and Pakistani military leaders upon the revival of their trans-Iranian railway will turbocharge this NATO-backed alliance (since Pakistan is a “Major Non-NATO Ally”), which could intensify challenges along Russia’s southern periphery. For this reason, while the supplementary economic benefits and perceived acceleration of multipolar trends might appeal to Russia, the latent military-strategic threats to its interests arguably outweigh them.