Zelensky’s 40-Day Influence Operation Backfired Badly In Kharkov & Odessa
Ukraine’s drone-enforced “blockade” of Crimea prompted Russia to impose its own type of “blockades” on Kharkov and Odessa, the resultant damage of which is incomparably greater than that which Ukraine inflicted on Russia, which amounts to Putin consistently “escalating to de-escalate” for the first time.
Zelensky announced the start of a 40-day influence operation in late June aimed at coercing Russia into accepting a ceasefire without preconditions. This saw Ukraine ramp up its drone strikes against Russia’s strategic infrastructure with support from the US and France as part of Trump 2.0’s “war of attrition” against Russia per his new policy of “escalating to de-escalate”. Energy facilities, civilian logistics centers, and Russian shipping were attacked, which also tightened Kiev’s drone-enforced “blockade” of Crimea.
These efforts failed to bring about Zelensky’s desired political-military goal despite inflicting undeniable damage on Russian interests. They also backfired badly in Kharkov and Odessa. Regarding the first, Russia destroyed at least 80 gas stations in this frontline region to the detriment of its armed forces’ military logistics, while the second saw Russian strikes shut down Ukraine’s largest port in furtherance of the same goal. This damage is incomparably greater than that which Ukraine inflicted on Russia so far.
There are also significant second-order consequences that observers should be aware of. Beginning with Kharkov, Russia’s gas station bombing campaign in response to Ukraine’s ramped-up bombing campaign against Russia’s oil refineries has made life difficult for the residents of the country’s second-largest city, thus partially replicating what Ukraine is doing to Crimea. The innuendo is that Russia could impose an even harsher “blockade” on Kharkov if Ukraine’s drone-enforced “blockade” on Crimea isn’t soon lifted.
As for Odessa, the shutdown of its port and other Black Sea ones through which 89% of Ukraine’s agricultural exports pass risks keeping 30 million tons of grain and oilseeds off the global market at an estimated cost of $1.5-3 billion to Ukraine per Reuters. Their report also noted how alternative routes can only handle a little more than half of these ports’ monthly export capacity and therefore possibly lead to a spike in global food prices. Left unmentioned is the potential for Polish-like farmers’ protests.
The immediate and secondary consequences of what was just described are the direct result of Putin mildly “escalating to de-escalate” through Russia’s new “systematic strike” campaign in response to Trump initiating this latest cycle as part of his new Ukrainian-fronted “war of attrition”. This represents a significant development since Putin hitherto eschewed such consistent retaliatory escalations in an attempt to prevent such cycles as the aforesaid from spiraling out of control. He’s no longer as cautious.
This change in his country’s approach is arguably due to the undeniable damage that Zelensky’s 40-day influence campaign inflicted on Russian interests, which shouldn’t be exaggerated, but it’s also dishonest to downplay. After all, Putin had remained very restrained till then due to his concerns about inadvertently sparking World War III, so he reasonably would have only changed his approach in a bid to restore deterrence via mildly outmatched retaliation if Ukraine was indeed damaging Russian interests.
It can thus be predicted that Russia’s “systematic strike” campaign will continue so long as Ukraine’s Western-backed “war of attrition” does, and Ukraine’s continued drone-enforced “blockade” of Crimea will result in Russia continuing its own “blockades” on Kharkov and Odessa. Any significant escalation by Ukraine, such as if it’s allowed to use Starlink of Starshield over all of Russia, will therefore also prompt Russia to escalate. This new dynamic is directly due to Zelensky’s failed 40-day influence campaign.
The fact that Russia has used stand-off strikes—rather than a naval blockade—to disable Odessa strongly implies that it could have done so years earlier, at or before the onset of the SMO; after all, Kiev was weaker then.
Yet Moscow waited to do so until circumstances had worsened and were more likely to invite retaliation by Kiev or its backers, who had time to hone their logistics. Its hesitancy clearly emboldened Kiev to try its forty-day campaign.
This shows that Russian deterrence failed.
To be completely honest, we shouldn't speak of an operation decided by Zelensky and supported by the West—with the USA and France in the lead—but of an operation planned and ordered by the West and executed by Zelensky. In the meantime, Putin is ending up not tackling the problem at its root and is encouraging the Westerners to become ever more audacious. As long as it's the Ukrainians who pay, the Westerners couldn't care less.