Analyzing Belarus’ Claim Of Recently Thwarting Drone Attacks From Lithuania

As it stands, the US isn’t too interested in escalating the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine for domestic electoral reasons, but some actors feel differently. These are anti-Russian policymaking hawks, regional countries like Lithuania and Poland, and their non-state partners like foreign-based anti-government Belarusian extremists.

Belarusian KGB chief Ivan Tertel revealed during a speech at the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly on Thursday that his service and “colleagues from other security structures” recently thwarted a plan from Lithuanian-based anti-government extremists to launch drone strikes against the capital of Minsk and other critical sites. He didn’t share any other details, but his claim aligns with the spirit of what Belarus had previously warned about. Here are some background briefings about that from the past year:

* 25 May 2023: “NATO Might Consider Belarus To Be ‘Low-Hanging Fruit’ During Kiev’s Upcoming Counteroffensive”

* 1 June 2023: “The Union State Expects That The NATO-Russian Proxy War Will Expand”

* 14 June 2023: “Lukashenko Strongly Hinted That He Expects Belgorod-Like Proxy Incursions Against Belarus”

* 14 December 2023: “Belarus Is Bracing For Belgorod-Like Terrorist Incursions From Poland”

* 19 February 2024: “The Western-Backed Foreign-Based Belarusian Opposition Is Plotting Territorial Revisions”

* 21 February 2024: “Is The West Plotting A False Flag Provocation In Poland To Blame On Russia & Belarus?”

These fears have been around since the start of Ukraine’s failed counteroffensive last summer, but they haven’t yet materialized likely due to the security services’ preventive actions. As it stands, the US isn’t too interested in escalating the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine for domestic electoral reasons, but some actors feel differently. These are anti-Russian policymaking hawks, regional countries like Lithuania and Poland, and their non-state partners like foreign-based anti-government Belarusian extremists.  

The first two have ideological interests in this scenario, the second also want to increase their prestige in NATO through their role as “frontline states”, while the second have ideological but also personal reasons for wanting to overthrow their government. These interests converge in keeping alive the risk of the last-mentioned carrying out drone strikes against Russia’s CSTO ally Belarus from NATO territory with its neighbors’ approval for escalation purposes with a wink from the US’ anti-Russian hawks.

Escalation ladders can always be difficult to control, which is why it’s best to not begin climbing them, especially if non-state actors are the ones to begin doing so. What’s essentially happening is that those three aforementioned players, which can collectively be described as interest groups for lack of a better term, are attempting to subvert the US’ comparatively more cautious policy by provoking a standoff with Russia via drone strikes against Belarus. A major escalation could therefore happen by miscalculation.

The whole point is to prompt a kinetic reaction that could then be spun as “an unprovoked attack against NATO” in order to pressure the US into escalating on the basis of Article 5. Of course, there’s also the possibility that a “beautiful theatrical production” could take place along the lines of what a Duma member believes happened with Iran’s retaliation against Israel, but that can’t be taken for granted. After all, the US would be pressured to respond if Russia or Belarus retaliates against NATO in any way.

At the same time, Russia might advise Belarus not to retaliate if drone attacks from Lithuania don’t cause much damage, similar in spirit to how Iran chose not to retaliate after Israel’s weak response to its attack. Belarus might not listen, however, since it’s still a sovereign country with independent control of its armed forces. President Alexander Lukashenko could think that the foreign-based anti-government extremists discredited his authority and that he can only “save face” by responding in some way.

The best-case scenario is that the US reins in its rogue hawkish factions, regional allies, and their non-state partners, but precedent suggests that it won’t. For that reason, the very real risk of a major conflict by miscalculation will remain so long as those non-state partners continue to retain possession of long-range munitions like drones with the approval of Belarus’ neighbors and a wink from the US’ hawks. That being the case, everyone should brace themselves for some unpleasant surprises in the coming future.