Assessed within the larger context of Brazil’s “balancing” act between China and the US, Lula’s peace rhetoric is easily influenced by US pressure since it plays no role whatsoever in his envisaged multi-alignment between those two. Accordingly, he regards it as expandable in the event that backtracking on his words might relieve some of the US’ public pressure, especially if it dangles the future prospects of their proposed global influence network as a means of getting him to scale back his rhetoric.
Lula Was Influenced By US Pressure
Those in the Alt-Media Community (AMC) whose wishful thinking made them overlook the five most important details from Lavrov’s latest trip to Brazil and thus wrongly conclude that Lula is politically aligned with Russia against the US over Ukraine must have been shocked by what he said right after Lavrov left. In his meeting with Romanian President Iohannis, Lula said the following according to the Brazilian Presidency’s official website per Google Translate (boldened emphasis added):
“I listened with great interest to President Iohannis’ considerations on the War in Ukraine, a country with which Romania shares more than 600 km of borders. While my government condemns the violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity, we defend a negotiated political solution. I spoke of our concern with the effects of the war that go beyond the European continent and the global consequences of that conflict, in terms of food and energy security, especially in the poorest regions of the planet.”
This followed Pentagon spokesman Kirby’s condemnation of Lula’s superficially Russian-friendly remarks in recent days where he accused the Brazilian leader of allegedly “parroting Russian and Chinese propaganda without at all looking at the facts.” The US is upset that he’s not marching in full lockstep with it on this issue despite his official political alignment with it as proven by Lula’s condemnation of Russia in his joint statement with Biden and Brazil’s vote in support of an anti-Russian UNGA Resolution.
Neither Lula’s Nor The US’ Rhetoric Is Really That Big Of A Deal
Instead of appreciating the fact that Lula changed his party’s policy towards the conflict to one of voting in support of such resolutions instead of abstaining from them like his former successor Rousseff did in March 2014, the US is annoyed that he places partial blame on the West for the last year’s events. His peace rhetoric aligns with Russia’s soft power interests by showing that it isn’t “isolated” or solely at fault, ergo its reported approval of his remarks and thus explaining why the US decided to lash out.
Lula is extremely sensitive to pressure from the US, however, which influenced him to badmouth Russia right after Lavrov left Brazil in an attempt to reassure it that he remains politically reliable and won’t consider reverting back to Rousseff’s policy of abstaining from anti-Russian UNGA Resolutions. The US demands maximum obedience from its partners, which it always mistreats as vassals, and Lula is no exception in this respect no matter whatever he might naively think.
His reported proposal to launch a global influence network in joint partnership with the US Democrats, which he told members of that party about during his meeting with them in DC back in February according to Politico’s exclusive article from last week, might have been dangled as leverage. His newly “woke” party shares the same ideology as the US’ ruling liberal-globalists, with the only exception being his belief in financial multipolarity, so it’s imperative for him to formally ally with it through these means.
The Influence Of Ideology In Lula’s Grand Strategy
His envisaged grand strategy, which was explained at length here and here, involves “balancing” between China and the US (however clumsily) via de-dollarization with the first and proselytizing “wokeism” across the world with the second. Russia is regarded mostly only as a reliable commodities partner (including a potential energy one) and someone to work together with through BRICS on that group’s planned reserve currency, with its overall role paling in comparison to those two.
That being the case, upon being publicly pressured by the US, it was predictable that he’d once again badmouth Russia since formally launching his proposed global influence network in joint partnership with the US Democrats is considered much more important to him than Moscow’s sensitivities. He also knows that Russia won’t react to his politically unfriendly rhetoric either since it reportedly approves of him occasionally talking about peace and also officially has a de-ideologized approach to Latin America.
Considering this, the resultant cost-benefit calculation led to him badmouthing Russia right after Lavrov left by condemning its “violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity” in an attempt to politically appease the US and especially its ruling Democrats with whom he so desperately wants to formally ally. Whenever the proverbial push comes to shove, Lula can therefore be expected to badmouth Russia upon the US’ demand, though the US should be careful not to ever publicly pressure him too much.
The Risks Of Overreach In The US’ Public Pressure Campaign Against Lula
After all, there’s a chance that going too far could prompt him into doubling down on his peace rhetoric or whatever else it is that they try to pressure him on out of fear that capitulating to the US in that context could provoke a serious grassroots pushback from his base. Despite a rapidly increasing number of his supporters practicing the “secular religion” of “wokeism” that was invented in the US, they still feel uncomfortable seeing their leader being bullied on the world stage, hence the preceding prediction.
These dynamics mean that the US shouldn’t go too far in publicly pressuring Lula every time he annoys them since this could risk setting into motion a sequence of events that results in ruining their proposed global influence network that’s much more important to both of their interests than any rhetoric. While the US can indeed dangle the future prospects of this project as leverage for pressuring him to walk back some of his rhetoric like he just did after Lavrov left, it can only play this card so much before it gets old.
Furthermore, it likely can’t be employed to successfully pressure him on much more serious issues like his de-dollarization plans with China, which he could potentially accelerate in defiance of any maximum public pressure campaign despite their shared interests in launching this global influence network. It’s not off the ground just yet and there might still be a lot of work to do before it’s officially unveiled, thus meaning that Brazilian-US relations are rather sensitive at this particular point in time.
Russia’s Expendable Role In Lula’s Sino-US “Balancing” Act
Lula can’t go all-out in de-dollarizing trade with China right away lest the US Democrats decide to dump his proposed global influence network in response, the same as the US can’t go all-out in its public pressure campaign against him either lest he also decides to dump that same project in response. This means that their project serves as a means of restraining both of them from going too far against the other’s interests, at least for the time being unless one of them decides to act unilaterally in this respect.
Assessed within the larger context of Brazil’s “balancing” act between China and the US, Lula’s peace rhetoric is easily influenced by US pressure since it plays no role whatsoever in his envisaged multi-alignment between those two. Accordingly, he regards it as expandable in the event that backtracking on his words might relieve some of the US’ public pressure, especially if it dangles the future prospects of their proposed global influence network as a means of getting him to scale back his rhetoric.
These sensitive strategic calculations explain why Lula badmouthed Russia right after Lavrov left Brazil since he thought that politically appeasing the US was in his country’s best interests at this point in time. Honest observers in the AMC will acknowledge this insight even if it “inconveniently” goes against their wishful thinking expectations about him, while dishonest ones will continue denying it, thus enabling others to determine who among them truly wants to understand his “balancing” act and who doesn’t.
As I expected it indeed....