How Could Russia Mediate A Series Of Deals Between Djibouti, Ethiopia, & South Sudan?

This piece aims to inspire their policymakers to further contribute to this idea with a view towards eventually facilitating such talks between them. Their civil societies, scholars, media, and business communities could also participate as well, whether independently or ideally in coordination with their respective country’s diplomats.

Background Briefing

It was recently assessed that “Russia Could Unlock Djibouti, Ethiopia, & South Sudan’s Combined Geo-Economic Potential” by mediating a series of port, mineral, and pipeline deals between them. In brief, Russia could build a pipeline from South Sudan and Ethiopia to Djibouti, Ethiopia could obtain a port in the latter, while that coastal country would receive stakes in this project and others in exchange. The preceding hyperlinked analysis should be read in full before proceeding with the rest of this one.

The present piece expands up on it by describing each player’s interests more in detail prior to sharing arguments in support of the proposed Russian-mediation scenario. It aims to inspire their policymakers to further contribute to this idea with a view towards eventually facilitating such talks between them. Their civil societies, scholars, media, and business communities could also participate as well, whether independently or ideally in coordination with their respective country’s diplomats.  

National Interests

Beginning with Russia, its national interests are as follows:

* Become a major energy player in East Africa by mediating a deal to build the proposed pipeline

* Encourage closer economic integration between the participating countries along this route

* Expand business ties with the region after streamlining logistics through these means

* Transform energy-economic influence into political influence to mediate other regional disputes

* Clinch military transit deals for replacing lost access to the Central African Republic (CAR) from Sudan

* Accelerate multipolar processes to turn the Horn into one of Afro-Eurasia’s leading regions

Here’s what South Sudan is most interested in:

* Diversify from pipeline dependence on Sudan in light of its latest conflict and resultant instability  

* Map the entirety of its natural resources to understand the full extent of national wealth  

* Entice Russia with relevant deals to veto the UNSC’s arms embargo during next year’s vote

* Rely on that country’s arms and training to ensure security from domestic and international threats

* Devise a sustainable national development plan in partnership with Russia

* Finally give the South Sudanese people the future that they deserve after decades of suffering

These are Ethiopia’s national interests in this context:

* Preemptively avert socio-political crises stemming from its growing population and landlocked status

* Obtain access to a Red Sea port that doesn’t charge the onerous rates that Djibouti’s main one does

* Turbocharge economic growth after eliminating the abovementioned costs that place a ceiling on this

* Lead regional integration processes that serve to improve the Horn’s global reputation  

* Emulate EU-like political-military mechanisms for comprehensively ensuring the region’s stability

* Share these experiences with other African regions to speed up the continent’s multipolar rise

Those three’s ambitious plans are dependent on Djibouti, whose national interests are as follows:

* Defend national sovereignty by militarily partnering with a wide array of countries

* Maintain revenue flows from military bases, warehouses, and access to ports

* Diversify from dependence on the above through new investments at home and in the region  

* Redistribute the resultant wealth to improve living standards and avert poverty-driven instability

* Place the country on a Gulf-like development trajectory to justify perpetuating the ruling arrangement

* Positively reshape global perceptions to reduce foreign pressure during planned leadership transitions

Pragmatic Proposal

All four stakeholders’ national interests can realistically converge via this pragmatic proposal:

* Djibouti provides Russia and Ethiopia with unrestricted commercial-military access to Tadjourah Port

* The deal would cover a long-term period, constitute a trilateral lease, and be renewable after its expiry

* The proposed South Sudanese pipeline would also terminate there and a refinery could be built too

* Russia would finance these projects and all related infrastructure in Tadjourah

* Apart from the lease rate that they’d agree upon, Djibouti could also receive stakes in lucrative projects

* Russia can offer stakes in South Sudanese mineral extraction and/or processing companies

* Stakes in South Sudanese energy deposits are also possible after they and the above are fully mapped

* It’s assumed that Russia would receive ownership over many as a reward for vetoing UNSC sanctions

* Related terms can be agreed bilaterally in parallel with the proposed Djiboutian port-pipeline talks

* Ethiopia can offer stakes in existing/future megaprojects and promise to develop tourism in Tadjourah

* Djibouti’s Great Horn Investment Holding (GHIH) would manage all these investments

* Russia could also offer Djibouti privileged grain/oil rates via a long-term deal as a further incentive

* The same goes for offering GHIH stakes in Russia’s CAR mineral deposits and/or processing companies

Compelling Arguments

Here are some arguments for why Djibouti should seriously consider this proposal as the basis for talks:

* Ethiopia could rely on Berbera Port to diversify from its dependence on Port Djibouti’s onerous rates

* Djibouti has an interest in replacing its likely lost revenue by diversifying cooperation with Ethiopia

* It already rents bases to other countries so the precedent exists to rent to Ethiopia and Russia too

* A naval base with Russia would reassure Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia that Ethiopia isn’t a “hegemon”

* All three trust Russia and know that it wouldn’t support Ethiopia “threatening” them like they fear

* Djibouti would also dispel impressions that it’s pro-Western by showing its geopolitical neutrality  

* As for Tadjourah, it’s a new port in the north of its namesake gulf with plenty of room for expansion

* This makes it suitable for hosting a joint Russian-Ethiopian naval base, a pipeline, and an oil refinery

* The expected influx of Ethiopian tourists to their country’s new naval base will boost the local economy

* Russian investments could push Djibouti’s other partners to develop the gulf’s southern shore in kind

* Privileged grain/oil rates can compensate for lost port revenue by slashing commodity costs

* Much larger profits could be accrued through stakes in Ethiopian and Russian-South Sudanese projects

* Those two’s and Djibouti’s collective geo-economic potential could be unlocked to the region’s benefit

* These sustainable revenue flows could give GHIH the wealth it needs to become a major financial actor

* If properly invested and equitably redistributed, a Gulf-like development trajectory is indeed attainable

* Djibouti’s comparatively small population means that wealth can more easily and quickly be shared

* GHIH could subsidize commodities and later housing to tangibly improve people’s living conditions

* A universal basic income is possible if resource-derived investment revenue continues growing

* Socio-economic development will ensure political stability and positively reshape global perceptions

* These outcomes would legitimize the ruling arrangement by reducing multisided pressure against it

Concluding Thoughts

Djibouti could of course spoil these ambitious plans by refusing to countenance any such Russian-mediated talks on a series of deals between them, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, but that would forever rule out the chances that GHIH becomes a major financial actor with all that entails. In the event that Ethiopia successfully diversifies from its dependence on Port Djibouti’s onerous rates by relying more on Berbera to this end, for example, then Djibouti would lose the revenue upon which its stability depends.

The country’s already difficult socio-economic situation would inevitably worsen and thus threaten to derail the ruling arrangement’s next planned leadership transition whenever it comes to pass, which could plunge Djibouti into chaos in the worst-case scenario. This could be preemptively averted by increasing and then equitably redistributing the national wealth through the proposed series of deals, which is why Djibouti would do well to seriously consider them for its own benefit and the region’s.