How Viable Is The Turkish-Brokered Ethiopian-Somalian Joint Declaration?

A lot depends on whether Ethiopia’s anti-terrorist troops will now be allowed to remain in Somalia next year; the relationship between the new Somaliland President and the Ethiopian Prime Minister; and whether (and if so, on what terms) Trump recognizes Somaliland.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan defied expectations by getting Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somalian President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) to agree to a joint declaration for resolving their year-long dispute. Ethiopia’s MoU with Somaliland at the start of the year, where Addis promised to recognize Hargeisa’s redeclaration of independence and grant it stakes in at least one national company in exchange for military-commercial port access, was seen by Somalia as a threat.

Somalia reacted by saber-rattling about a new regional conflict, which served as the pretext for it to clinch a coastal security deal with Turkiye – which is also on excellent terms with Ethiopia – and then form a military axis with Ethiopia’s Egyptian and Eritrean rivals. As these events unfolded, Somalia started to come further apart at the seams as Puntland, Southwest, and Jubaland States distanced themselves from the federal center over constitutional and security differences.

The new joint declaration is aimed at managing the abovementioned tensions, repairing bilateral relations, and strengthening the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). Both parties importantly recognize the other’s “sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity”. They also agreed “to forgo and leave behind differences and contentious issues”. Another important point is that “Somalia recognizes the sacrifices of Ethiopian soldiers within the African Union Missions.”

The top takeaway though is that “They decided to start technical negotiations in good faith” so that Ethiopia can “enjoy reliable, secure and sustainable access to and from the sea, under the sovereign authority of the Federal Republic of Somalia.” These terms led to speculation that Ethiopia is de facto abandoning its MoU with Somaliland and coincided with Semafor’s report the day prior about how “A Trump White House looks set to recognize the world’s newest country”.

Before analyzing how viable the Turkish-brokered Ethiopian-Somalian joint declaration is, a few facts about it should be clarified. First, Somalia backtracked on its prior position not to negotiate with Ethiopia without its neighbor first formally abandoning the MoU. Second, there’s no reference to the MoU in their new joint declaration, so Ethiopia hasn’t abandoned it. And third, the March deadline for beginning technical negotiations means that they’ll start during the Trump 2.0 era.

Accordingly, the joint declaration can be seen as more of a concession on Somalia’s side than Ethiopia’s, especially since the latter’s reaffirmation of the former’s “sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity” – which critics consider to be a concession – is actually a present state of fact. To explain, the MoU hasn’t yet resulted in an official deal whereby Ethiopia will recognize Somaliland, thus meaning that Ethiopia does indeed still technically recognize the aforesaid when it comes to Somalia.

Having clarified and explained these sensitive points, it’s now time to assess the joint declaration’s viability. The three main variables are whether Somalia now changes its mind to let Ethiopia’s anti-terrorist forces remain in some capacity next year instead of demand their departure like was previously expected (though they might not leave even if asked); the new Somaliland President’s relations with Abiy; and whether or not (and if so, on what terms) Trump recognizes Somaliland.

Regarding the first, regional analyst Rashid Abdi reported on how the Somalian Foreign Minister now appears to be backtracking on the joint declaration’s implied possibility for Ethiopian forces to remain in the country next year, suggesting that this is due to pressure from HSM’s hardline base. If Ethiopia is still asked to depart, then Addis could argue that this betrays the part of the joint declaration about “forgoing and leaving behind differences and contentious issues” to suspend further negotiations.

As for the second, the UK-based Middle East Eye’s Turkish Bureau Chief Ragip Soylu wrote that “Somaliland’s new president, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, is reportedly less amenable to Abiy than his predecessor.” Whether this is wishful thinking that from that outlet’s and/or its bureau chief’s perspective or an accurate reflection of reality remains to be seen, but it’s not the first time that such speculation has swirled. This could prove decisive for the future of the MoU and the joint declaration.

And finally, if Trump decides to recognize Somaliland, then he might either offer it a much better deal than Ethiopia could and thus push Addis away from the MoU and closer to the joint declaration or this could be coordinated with Ethiopia – and possibly India and even the UAE – to revolutionize the region. No observer can confidently predict what’ll happen in this regard other than to assess that it could become the most important variable in determining which of these two agreements comes out on top.

With these points in mind, the viability of the Turkish-brokered Ethiopian-Somalian joint declaration is questionable, but it’s premature to speculate on its future. For the time being, it represents a Somalian concession aimed at de-escalating regional tensions ahead of Trump 2.0, though HSM’s hardline base could derail it before there’s a chance for their side to possibly reap its fruits. As such, the MoU’s well-wishers should withhold judgement and patiently wait to see how everything plays out.