Korybko To Harsh V. Pant: There Is No “Russian Challenge To India’s G-20 Ambitions”

The purpose of my response to Mr. Pant isn’t to rehash the prior insight that I shared in my earlier responses to other Indian intellectuals like C. Raja Mohan, Rajesh Rajagopalan, or Sameer Lalwani and Happymon Jacob, among many others whose works I’ve critiqued over the past year. Instead, I’ll keep this one concise and focus only on the seven points raised in his conclusion.

Highly respected Indian academic Harsh V. Pant, who’s also Vice President for studies and foreign policy at the prestigious Observer Research Foundation, published a piece on Monday about “The Russian Challenge to India’s G-20 Ambitions”. The gist of his argument can be summarized by the final paragraph, which is being republished in full below for the reader’s convenience:

“There can be no debate that India’s much-vaunted strategic autonomy is being challenged by the continued Russian misadventure in Ukraine.

New Delhi’s arms dependence on Russia has created a paradoxical situation where the issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity, which are at the heart of its contestation with China, are being sacrificed at the altar of trying to keep ties with Russia on an even keel. India wants its G20 presidency to be decisive and action-oriented.

It remains to be seen if Russia’s awaited offensive over the next few weeks will allow New Delhi the luxury of shaping an ambitious global agenda.”

Mr. Pant is entitled to his views, but I believe that his perception of the Ukrainian Conflict is as flawed as Anita Inder Singh’s, whose piece from last month I responded to for the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). These two experts lay blame for the latest phase of this conflict solely on Russia’s lap despite NATO having clandestinely crossed its national security red lines there and provoked it to act.

The purpose of my response to Mr. Pant isn’t to rehash the prior insight that I shared in my earlier responses to other Indian intellectuals like C. Raja Mohan, Rajesh Rajagopalan, or Sameer Lalwani and Happymon Jacob, among many others whose works I’ve critiqued over the past year. Instead, I’ll keep this one concise and focus only on the seven points raised in his conclusion.

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First, there most definitely is debate about his Mr. Pant’s claim that “India’s much-vaunted strategic autonomy is being challenged by the continued Russian misadventure in Ukraine.” Not only is it the US and not Russia that’s pressuring India, but his description of the latter’s special operation as a “misadventure” ignores the past two months’ disadvantageous developments for the West and Kiev.

Second, my earlier cited response to Lalwani and Jacob addressed the arms angle of Mr. Pant’s conclusion, as did my two recent analyses about the BrahMos chief’s praise of their enduring military-technical ties and the follow-up one about the continued robustness of these relations. With these in mind, it’s inaccurate to claim that Russia is exerting influence over India’s stance towards the conflict.

Third, its pragmatic practice of principled neutrality towards the New Cold War in general – not just its top proxy war in Ukraine – is driven by the Indian leadership’s desire to multi-align between all players and thus maximally benefit in pursuit of regional connectivity, energy, and international structural goals that altogether advance its grand strategic interests.

Fourth, India doesn’t have to get embroiled in a foreign conflict – let alone feel pressured by its Western partners to punish its decades-long special and privileged strategic partner for its role within it – in order to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Sino-Indo border dispute is bilateral and not influenced by Russia or the West. Those who try to multilateralize this are behaving manipulatively.

Fifth, India’s military-technical relations with Russia confidently ensure its national security interests, including vis-à-vis China and especially in the context of their unresolved border disputes. Sanctioning Russia could result in supply chain disruptions that the West is unable to rectify, thus unexpectedly creating a window of opportunity that Beijing could be tempted to exploit for its benefit.

Sixth, the success of India’s G20 chairmanship isn’t influenced by the dynamics of the Ukrainian Conflict. The Voice Of Global South Summit that it virtually hosted last month succeeded in assembling dozens of fellow developing countries under its leadership to brainstorm Delhi’s agenda during this event. That in and of itself already almost certainly ensured the success of its chairmanship and shouldn’t be ignored.

Finally, Mr. Pant probably isn’t aware that Kiev is gearing up for a major US-backed offensive later this spring exactly as it also a one year ago before Russia’s special operation preempted it by a few days. If he’s so concerned about Ukrainian-related developments supposedly affecting the success of India’s G20 chairmanship, then he should at least divide the blame equally or place more of it on Kiev’s lap.

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To summarize, this highly respected Indian academic’s inaccurate conclusion is the direct result of him perceiving the conflict through a fundamentally flawed paradigm. Mr. Pant is therefore kindly encouraged to countenance the possibility that his perspective is responsible for this and subsequently consider recalibrating it until his work more closely aligns with the complex reality of this situation.