Media of Chinese overseas dissidents supports Andrew's argument here based on their reading of China's domestic media. Geopolitically, China treats Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in similar ways: loans of good terms up front, followed with economic development focusing on harbors (much like the coaling ports for the British Empire), then mess up with their respective domestic political and social conflicts (fairly easy as the two nations have some inherent ethnic problems and population they cannot feed). The goal of the last step is to leave two cancers by the side of India because the one who has to come in to solve the problems for this country is India. As for USAID, well you all know what kind of aid it is.
>>"Either or both of those moves would suffice as indirect American punishment for India’s independent foreign policy, which would also align with China’s interests amidst their bitter border dispute."
I find it hard to believe that the US would do something that would "align with China's interests."
Obviously, the "students" are of short-term importance here. The Army, BNP and Jamaal-e-Islami are the potential players. I don't see how JEI could promote US policy aims. What about the Army and BNP? Can the US co-opt those two? We know how the US and the Pakistani military have been hand in glove for decades.
Perhaps we need to look at this in conjunction with the situation in Myanmar and Thailand. Is the US trying to carve out a pro-US group of satraps on the border of India and China with the expectation that since China and India won't get together, the risk is low?
Three interesting pieces from two Indians, MK Bhadrakumar and Chan Akya on the Bangladesh situation:
Just as the US intervened in Franceafrique when it became dissatisfied with how France was handling the situation, intervened in Ukraine when it became dissatisfied with how the EU was approaching the issue and waded into Melanesia/Polynesia when it became irked with how Australia and New Zealand were failing to "take care of business," we may be seeing the dissatisfaction with how India is managing (or mismanaging) its near abroad, South Asia. India's track record in Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives and Bangladesh has been fairly unimpressive. And when the US becomes unhappy about the turn of events in some part of the world, it typically decides that it has to take direct control.
Yet it's hard to to see just how the US is charting the way ahead in "CBI Theater" to use the WW II term for the area in question.
Media of Chinese overseas dissidents supports Andrew's argument here based on their reading of China's domestic media. Geopolitically, China treats Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in similar ways: loans of good terms up front, followed with economic development focusing on harbors (much like the coaling ports for the British Empire), then mess up with their respective domestic political and social conflicts (fairly easy as the two nations have some inherent ethnic problems and population they cannot feed). The goal of the last step is to leave two cancers by the side of India because the one who has to come in to solve the problems for this country is India. As for USAID, well you all know what kind of aid it is.
>>"Either or both of those moves would suffice as indirect American punishment for India’s independent foreign policy, which would also align with China’s interests amidst their bitter border dispute."
I find it hard to believe that the US would do something that would "align with China's interests."
Obviously, the "students" are of short-term importance here. The Army, BNP and Jamaal-e-Islami are the potential players. I don't see how JEI could promote US policy aims. What about the Army and BNP? Can the US co-opt those two? We know how the US and the Pakistani military have been hand in glove for decades.
Perhaps we need to look at this in conjunction with the situation in Myanmar and Thailand. Is the US trying to carve out a pro-US group of satraps on the border of India and China with the expectation that since China and India won't get together, the risk is low?
Three interesting pieces from two Indians, MK Bhadrakumar and Chan Akya on the Bangladesh situation:
https://www.indianpunchline.com/sheikh-hasina-was-a-time-tested-friend/
https://www.indianpunchline.com/thailand-aborts-the-colour-revolution/
https://asiatimes.com/2024/08/bangladesh-as-color-revolution-on-indias-doorstep/
Just as the US intervened in Franceafrique when it became dissatisfied with how France was handling the situation, intervened in Ukraine when it became dissatisfied with how the EU was approaching the issue and waded into Melanesia/Polynesia when it became irked with how Australia and New Zealand were failing to "take care of business," we may be seeing the dissatisfaction with how India is managing (or mismanaging) its near abroad, South Asia. India's track record in Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives and Bangladesh has been fairly unimpressive. And when the US becomes unhappy about the turn of events in some part of the world, it typically decides that it has to take direct control.
Yet it's hard to to see just how the US is charting the way ahead in "CBI Theater" to use the WW II term for the area in question.
She was ousted because she wasn't an American puppet.