Agreed, and it's personally disappointing to me, but I still do my best to analyze what Russia wants, why, and the risks involved.
I consider myself a cynic, at least much more so than most "Non-Russian Pro-Russians" (NRPRs) in the Alt-Media Community (AMC), but even I'm surprised by this news.
In my opinion, Russia is thinking too much about Western elite perceptions (and via the lens of wishful thinking at that!) at the expense of public opinion in the Global South.
I'm unsure that the latter would react positively to yet another "goodwill gesture" coming from Russia, one which might inevitably end up not having achieved anything tangible at all.
And therefore, I would speculate that the West do not want any binding and enforceable agreement. Instead, the West want Ukraine to fight Russia until the last Ukrainian. Only Ukrainian people can take the decisive action against the West wishes. Russia, at best, can only slowly grind down Ukraine military then spend another 3 years in pacification and 10 years in reconstruction. Personally, I do not expect the Ukraine people as a whole to make the right decision, for various reasons. In any way, there is no room for free will in Ukraine.
This is so sad (that the opportunity was missed). Westerners do not understand that this is a civil war, almost an intra-family war. How many, half?, of Urkanians are of Russian nationality?
Putin doe not want tonstarve his cousins. He wants them to prosper. He doesn't want to sell grain that supports the Chinese empire. He wants to keep it in the family.
>>"There’s no reason to doubt what [Lavrov] said since he’s Russia’s top diplomat so all that can be done is to try to make sense of this unexpected news. "
This is an interesting article, but why is there no reason to doubt what he said? Or at least to doubt the reality behind what he said? Could it not be that Russia agreed--perhaps reluctantly--to take part in negotiations as a sop to Erdogan that it never meant to conclude with an actual agreement and that now Lavrov merely wants Russia to get international credit for being the "reasonable" party after the Kursk operation (or some other factor) put paid to the negotiation process? When he says, "Erdogan really convinced us that this would be a step forward, he was completely sincere and tried to be helpful," all I can say is, "Way to lay it on thick, Sergei Viktorovich!"
Until Russia actually engages in conclusively authentic negotiations and starts to lay its negotiating cards on the table for others to see, our understanding of Putin's true "red lines," his desired endstate, and how he wants a negotiation process to work is almost entirely speculative.
Putin's problem is that Russian power has signifiant limitations, and he has had to fight this war while trying to fend off attempts to exploit the many Russian vulnerabilities. Whether, in the end, we will say that Putin was a leader was weak in some fundamental way, overly cautious, or truly "naive" as he himself has suggested (for public consumption), only history will be able to judge.
>>"Putin still won’t radically respond to the spree of provocations against Russia over the past two and a half years out of fear that he’d inadvertently spark the Third World War that he’s thus far worked so hard to avoid."
This is a case in point of what I'm saying. Many pro-Russia people are deeply rankled that Putin won't "respond" to NATO "provocations." By provocations, the linked article is talking about the use of US/NATO intelligence collections platforms in orbit and in international airspace such as over the Black Sea; support to targeting operations; facilitation of Ukraine's UAV program (which is probably their most robust offensive military capability); and other indirect support to Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia including Crimea. In the Russian media, there is endless anger over this failure to respond.
But what should Putin actually do? He could shoot down US UAVs easily enough and maybe even some satellites or perhaps interfere with them by more aggressively employing EW. But what happens then? The Russian economy and war effort are dependent on revenues from Russia oil, gas, and other commodities shipped to East Asia, South Asia and elsewhere. But Russia has little ability to protect this shipping. Yes, the "ghost fleet" may be useful in combatting anti-Russia lawfare, but if the Russians target US assets in international airspace, you can easily imagine that the US will "compensate" itself by seizing, or otherwise directly interfering with, Russian vessels and energy shipments that Russia simply can't protect once they leave Russian or near-Russian waters. I can understand why that is a box that Putin does not want to open.
Bottom line: I don't think we can deduce much from Lavrov's words which seem to me more likely to be propagandistic in nature rather than something to be taken at face value. And I don't think we know enough to say with any degree of precision what Putin wants by way of negotiations given that he plays his cards so close to his vest.
After the CIA/US/NATO planned and orchestrated Kursk incursion, Russia will no longer negotiate with the Empire of Lies. Russia was being pressured by nations from the Global Majority to negotiate with the Nazi Kiev regime (which in reality means Washington DC) but after the US invaded Russia (Ukraine is ordered by their master on everything) committing a genocide of civilians in Kursk including murdering a pregnant mother at point blank range (2 meters) the only endpoint now is complete capitulation of the Nazi Kiev regime. The pressure from the Global Majority for Russia to negotiate is now over.
"...neither of them [ever] had any intention of making good on their promises..."
No! You don't say?!
"...Russia’s supporters should therefore brace themselves for this"
I heard him on the radio earlier, saying progress along the front in Donbas was no longer being measured in meters per day, as it had been before the Americans called for the Ukrainians to put the last of their eggs into the 'Kursk (Nuclear!) Invasion' basket. Hopefully, Russia will secure all of the new territories, and obviously chase the Americans out of Russia itself, before entertaining any notions of negotiations with terrorists and their representatives, so far past any legal justification they might have used as 'elected representatives'. Personally, I don't think the Russians should entertain negotiations with the Americans until all of the Ukraine has been secured, at least up to the Dnepr.
What a shame to lose Odessa, but I understand the Ukraine is inviable as a rump state without it, and anything more or less than a viable rump state would eventually only lead to the Ukraine's return to the position from which the Americans were able to control it as it was before 2014.
Of course, there's nothing to guarantee the Americans won't simply use the new-and-improved rump state Ukraine as NATO bulkhead.
This is a mistake.
I'm sure Putin is right in concluding the world has been changed to such an extent by the American aggression that started this war, so they may not return to where they were before doing so. I'm sure that's right, but still... I can't feel comfortable with Russia not doing more to secure itself.
I know what these people are like. I've lived with them, grown up with them; and I've said it before: 'If you've wrestled a vampire to ground to drive a stake through its heart, you don't get up, dust yourself off, help it up, offer it your hand to shake and say, 'Best two of three?'!
It is abundantly obvious that Russia is seeking a Minsk-3.
Agreed, and it's personally disappointing to me, but I still do my best to analyze what Russia wants, why, and the risks involved.
I consider myself a cynic, at least much more so than most "Non-Russian Pro-Russians" (NRPRs) in the Alt-Media Community (AMC), but even I'm surprised by this news.
In my opinion, Russia is thinking too much about Western elite perceptions (and via the lens of wishful thinking at that!) at the expense of public opinion in the Global South.
I'm unsure that the latter would react positively to yet another "goodwill gesture" coming from Russia, one which might inevitably end up not having achieved anything tangible at all.
And therefore, I would speculate that the West do not want any binding and enforceable agreement. Instead, the West want Ukraine to fight Russia until the last Ukrainian. Only Ukrainian people can take the decisive action against the West wishes. Russia, at best, can only slowly grind down Ukraine military then spend another 3 years in pacification and 10 years in reconstruction. Personally, I do not expect the Ukraine people as a whole to make the right decision, for various reasons. In any way, there is no room for free will in Ukraine.
Fact is, the West would immediately break any Minsk-3.
This is so sad (that the opportunity was missed). Westerners do not understand that this is a civil war, almost an intra-family war. How many, half?, of Urkanians are of Russian nationality?
Putin doe not want tonstarve his cousins. He wants them to prosper. He doesn't want to sell grain that supports the Chinese empire. He wants to keep it in the family.
Nobody in Washington, Brussels or Kiev cares in the least. Rather, they see Russian reluctance as contemptible weakness.
>>"There’s no reason to doubt what [Lavrov] said since he’s Russia’s top diplomat so all that can be done is to try to make sense of this unexpected news. "
This is an interesting article, but why is there no reason to doubt what he said? Or at least to doubt the reality behind what he said? Could it not be that Russia agreed--perhaps reluctantly--to take part in negotiations as a sop to Erdogan that it never meant to conclude with an actual agreement and that now Lavrov merely wants Russia to get international credit for being the "reasonable" party after the Kursk operation (or some other factor) put paid to the negotiation process? When he says, "Erdogan really convinced us that this would be a step forward, he was completely sincere and tried to be helpful," all I can say is, "Way to lay it on thick, Sergei Viktorovich!"
Until Russia actually engages in conclusively authentic negotiations and starts to lay its negotiating cards on the table for others to see, our understanding of Putin's true "red lines," his desired endstate, and how he wants a negotiation process to work is almost entirely speculative.
Putin's problem is that Russian power has signifiant limitations, and he has had to fight this war while trying to fend off attempts to exploit the many Russian vulnerabilities. Whether, in the end, we will say that Putin was a leader was weak in some fundamental way, overly cautious, or truly "naive" as he himself has suggested (for public consumption), only history will be able to judge.
>>"Putin still won’t radically respond to the spree of provocations against Russia over the past two and a half years out of fear that he’d inadvertently spark the Third World War that he’s thus far worked so hard to avoid."
This is a case in point of what I'm saying. Many pro-Russia people are deeply rankled that Putin won't "respond" to NATO "provocations." By provocations, the linked article is talking about the use of US/NATO intelligence collections platforms in orbit and in international airspace such as over the Black Sea; support to targeting operations; facilitation of Ukraine's UAV program (which is probably their most robust offensive military capability); and other indirect support to Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia including Crimea. In the Russian media, there is endless anger over this failure to respond.
But what should Putin actually do? He could shoot down US UAVs easily enough and maybe even some satellites or perhaps interfere with them by more aggressively employing EW. But what happens then? The Russian economy and war effort are dependent on revenues from Russia oil, gas, and other commodities shipped to East Asia, South Asia and elsewhere. But Russia has little ability to protect this shipping. Yes, the "ghost fleet" may be useful in combatting anti-Russia lawfare, but if the Russians target US assets in international airspace, you can easily imagine that the US will "compensate" itself by seizing, or otherwise directly interfering with, Russian vessels and energy shipments that Russia simply can't protect once they leave Russian or near-Russian waters. I can understand why that is a box that Putin does not want to open.
Bottom line: I don't think we can deduce much from Lavrov's words which seem to me more likely to be propagandistic in nature rather than something to be taken at face value. And I don't think we know enough to say with any degree of precision what Putin wants by way of negotiations given that he plays his cards so close to his vest.
Past tense
After the CIA/US/NATO planned and orchestrated Kursk incursion, Russia will no longer negotiate with the Empire of Lies. Russia was being pressured by nations from the Global Majority to negotiate with the Nazi Kiev regime (which in reality means Washington DC) but after the US invaded Russia (Ukraine is ordered by their master on everything) committing a genocide of civilians in Kursk including murdering a pregnant mother at point blank range (2 meters) the only endpoint now is complete capitulation of the Nazi Kiev regime. The pressure from the Global Majority for Russia to negotiate is now over.
"...neither of them [ever] had any intention of making good on their promises..."
No! You don't say?!
"...Russia’s supporters should therefore brace themselves for this"
I heard him on the radio earlier, saying progress along the front in Donbas was no longer being measured in meters per day, as it had been before the Americans called for the Ukrainians to put the last of their eggs into the 'Kursk (Nuclear!) Invasion' basket. Hopefully, Russia will secure all of the new territories, and obviously chase the Americans out of Russia itself, before entertaining any notions of negotiations with terrorists and their representatives, so far past any legal justification they might have used as 'elected representatives'. Personally, I don't think the Russians should entertain negotiations with the Americans until all of the Ukraine has been secured, at least up to the Dnepr.
What a shame to lose Odessa, but I understand the Ukraine is inviable as a rump state without it, and anything more or less than a viable rump state would eventually only lead to the Ukraine's return to the position from which the Americans were able to control it as it was before 2014.
Of course, there's nothing to guarantee the Americans won't simply use the new-and-improved rump state Ukraine as NATO bulkhead.
This is a mistake.
I'm sure Putin is right in concluding the world has been changed to such an extent by the American aggression that started this war, so they may not return to where they were before doing so. I'm sure that's right, but still... I can't feel comfortable with Russia not doing more to secure itself.
I know what these people are like. I've lived with them, grown up with them; and I've said it before: 'If you've wrestled a vampire to ground to drive a stake through its heart, you don't get up, dust yourself off, help it up, offer it your hand to shake and say, 'Best two of three?'!