Azerbaijan’s dual messaging to Russia and the West might not just be driven by the short-term motivation of deterring criticism or the worst-case scenario of an intervention to stop its special operation, but by longer-term diplomatic goals.
Some questions/observations: The timing is absolutely odd, coinciding with the first major (albeit overhyped) UA victory on the battlefield in a long time.
Given the ssetup that you described and Pashinyan's rather unhidden aversion towards Moscow and his love for the EU, couldn't it e that the Pashinyan gvt actually very much ignited this right at this point?
At the same time - strange as it may sound - couldn't it be that Moscow isn't all that concerned about these developments? They know that the EU won't condemn the Azeris since they rely on them for substituting Russian gas. If Russia left Armenia hanging high and dry for just a while, Yerevan would quickly discover that the EU is as useless and unreliable a "partner" as can be.
Putin has good contacts to Alijev and Erdogan and could probably calm Baku down evwn without sending troops?!
Thanks for the great insights and analysis!
Some questions/observations: The timing is absolutely odd, coinciding with the first major (albeit overhyped) UA victory on the battlefield in a long time.
Given the ssetup that you described and Pashinyan's rather unhidden aversion towards Moscow and his love for the EU, couldn't it e that the Pashinyan gvt actually very much ignited this right at this point?
At the same time - strange as it may sound - couldn't it be that Moscow isn't all that concerned about these developments? They know that the EU won't condemn the Azeris since they rely on them for substituting Russian gas. If Russia left Armenia hanging high and dry for just a while, Yerevan would quickly discover that the EU is as useless and unreliable a "partner" as can be.
Putin has good contacts to Alijev and Erdogan and could probably calm Baku down evwn without sending troops?!