Putin’s Reminder That Odessa Is A Russian City Doesn’t Mean It’s In The Kremlin’s Crosshairs

The speculation that Russia is plotting to restore its historic writ over Odessa throughout the course of the special operation is based on similarly specious reasoning as the earlier speculation that it plotted to capture Kiev in three days.

President Putin reminded everyone that Odessa is a Russian city during his annual end of the year review in mid-December, which prompted some to speculate that it’s in the Kremlin’s crosshairs. They believe that he’s decided to reunify all of his country’s lost historical lands and won’t stop until this jewel and others like Kiev are in his geopolitical crown. Here’s exactly what he said, which will then be analyzed to argue against the aforementioned interpretation of Russia’s speculative plans:

“The southeastern part of Ukraine has always been pro-Russian because it is historically a Russian territory. I see a colleague holding up a sign saying ‘Turkiye.’ He knows, and people in Turkiye know that the entire Black Sea region was incorporated into Russia as the result of Russo-Turkish wars. What does Ukraine have to do with that? Neither Crimea nor the Black Sea region has any connection to Ukraine. Odessa is a Russian city. We know this. Everyone knows this. But they [Ukrainians] have concocted some historical nonsense.

Well now, Vladimir Lenin incorporated these regions into Ukraine when the Soviet Union was established. We did not dispute that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and we were ready to live within that paradigm. However, this southeastern part is pro-Russian, which was important to us. They aways voted for those who advocated a pro-Russian stance in Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy. On the whole, this suited Russia. But after the 2014 state coup, it became clear to us that they would use force to prevent us from developing normal relations with Ukraine.”

For starters, the Russian leader reaffirmed his willingness to recognize Ukraine’s post-Soviet borders with the notable exception of its “southeastern part” that remained “pro-Russian”, which was proven by them democratically reunifying with their historical homeland in 2014 and 2022. The only reason why the geopolitical map changed in that part of Lenin’s unnatural mini-empire is because of “EuroMaidan” and the special operation, the first of which led to Crimea’s reunification and the second led to the others’.

The people of those historically Russian regions that were arbitrarily incorporated into Ukraine for ideologically driven nation-building purposes were either at risk of oppression like in Crimea and Donbass’ cases when they preemptively seceded or already oppressed like in Kherson and Zaporozhye. Ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the rest of rump Ukraine are being oppressed worse than ever, but the current on-the-ground military-strategic reality makes it unlikely that they’ll secede as well.

The conflict is finally winding down after the counteroffensive failed, but Zelensky ordered the entire front to be fortified to complicate any potential offensive that Russia might be planning. He hopes to buy enough time for some Western funding to resume and possibly for his most warmongering patrons to carry out a false flag provocation for escalating this proxy war. Nevertheless, newly exacerbated political rivalries and his country’s conscription crisis mean that he can’t take his remaining time for granted.

For his part, President Putin pledged in the same speech as his remarks about Odessa that his country’s goals of demilitarizing Ukraine, denazifying it, and ensuring that country’s neutrality will be achieved, ideally through diplomatic means at some point but definitely through military ones if that isn’t possible. Nowhere did he say in that speech or any prior ones that his country has claims to any other territory beyond its control and presently under Ukraine’s apart from the rest of those recently reunified regions.

The speculation that Russia is plotting to restore its historic writ over Odessa throughout the course of the special operation is based on similarly specious reasoning as the earlier speculation that it plotted to capture Kiev in three days. Each appears superficially plausible and has been parroted by commentators from both sides at various points, but neither reflects official policy, being nothing more than wishful thinking that each side occasionally references for diametrically opposed narrative reasons.

Those on Russia’s side who briefly lent credence to the now totally debunked “three days theory”, which was introduced into the global discourse by reports about what former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley allegedly told Congress in early February 2022, wanted to boost morale. Likewise, hyping up the possibility of Odessa once again coming under Russia’s control is intended to do the same whenever the situation along the front line gets tough.

As for those in the West who briefly propagated Milley’s theory, they wanted to fearmonger about what would happen if the US didn’t proactively dispatch as many arms to Ukraine as possible. They nowadays reference his words without attribution to dishonestly mock their opponents on social media. Similarly, their warnings about Russia’s alleged plans for Odessa serve to simultaneously fearmonger and mock, the first for the purpose of keeping aid flowing and the second for narcissistic reasons.

Just like there was never any indisputable evidence in support of the “three days theory”, nor has there ever emerged any in support of the Odessa one either, but the recycling of each by both sides to different degrees and in different contexts misleads average folks into thinking that they’re credible. All that they ever represented were scenarios of a maximalist Russian victory over Ukraine, which is unlikely nowadays barring a black swan such as a major Russian military breakthrough across the front lines.

Even in that event, NATO could always gamble that it’s better from their perspective to launch a conventional intervention aimed at drawing a “red line” beyond which Russia likely wouldn’t dare to cross, which could potentially keep both the Ukrainian capital and its top seaport under Kiev’s control. At most, Russia could regain control of the rest of its newly reunified regions and perhaps parts of adjacent ones east of the Dnieper, but the chances of it capturing Kiev and/or Odessa would be very slim.

The insight shared in this analysis shouldn’t be misinterpreted or spun as supposedly arguing against the legitimacy of Russia’s historical claims to each city, but simply as a much-needed reality check amidst the incessant speculation that one or both might soon come under its control. Each side’s supporters have self-interested narrative reasons for recycling these scenarios, especially the Odessa one nowadays, but average folks shouldn’t allow themselves to be misled into thinking that there’s any credence to either.