If I may, I'll ask some more questions since you didn't coherently answer them earlier:
4. Absent the need for a draft, in what way outside of the election cycle (which isn't always truly free and fair and whose winners sometimes go against their promises after being elected) does Western sentiment shape policy towards this proxy war?
If I may, I'll ask some more questions since you didn't coherently answer them earlier:
4. Absent the need for a draft, in what way outside of the election cycle (which isn't always truly free and fair and whose winners sometimes go against their promises after being elected) does Western sentiment shape policy towards this proxy war?
5. You now insist that whatever major thing Russia might do won't lead to a nuclear war with NATO, so why do you expect a prolonged hot one that would extend long enough for NATO to need to draft troops? Why won't either side escalate to using nukes?
If I may, I'll ask some more questions since you didn't coherently answer them earlier:
4. Absent the need for a draft, in what way outside of the election cycle (which isn't always truly free and fair and whose winners sometimes go against their promises after being elected) does Western sentiment shape policy towards this proxy war?
5. You now insist that whatever major thing Russia might do won't lead to a nuclear war with NATO, so why do you expect a prolonged hot one that would extend long enough for NATO to need to draft troops? Why won't either side escalate to using nukes?