The path to peace will predictably be paved by a ceasefire, which will itself likely require some territorial concessions on Ukraine’s part in order for Putin to agree to compromise on his associated demands, then new elections can be held for legitimizing peace talks.
I mentioned that neither side would likely be requested to rescind their claims to the other at this initial point. I also don't take for granted that Ukraine will officially cede Crimea to Russia, not that it makes any difference in terms of the ground reality, though.
Thanks for your interesting and perceptive analysis.
A couple of comments:
A financial blockade of Russian oil would likely send prices sharply higher, and would rapidly impact Trump’s base, and not in a good way. The only way of offsetting this would be to convince the Saudis to maximally boost their own output. Do you think they would play ball?
Both India and China would be seriously ticked off by being in effect made parties to the conflict and seeing their own economies suffer while the US economy benefits.
I think Russia could probably do without oil export revenue for three months or so without suffering unduly. I’m not sure that everyone else could say the same.
You have a knack for repeating official talking points, whether China or Russian, but they don't always ultimately align with reality. Russia hasn't even captured an entire region after over 1,000 days of fire. It's doubtful that it can force a complete Ukrainian surrender AND that the US wouldn't intervene in some way to salvage part of Project Ukraine.
This comment is unprecise. There is no doubt whatsoever that, current situation standing, the Ukrainian army will collapse. It is strictly talking only a matter of time, but - one more year? Two more years? - there is no doubt whatsoever that the crash is coming. So, any peace talks rotate around these two points: 1) can Russia, in case of maximum sanctions, manage to keep its economy up for the time necessary to force Ukraine to capitulation and 2) would Nato, with or without the US, really intervene in Ukraine?
For point 1), i think it might but the pain would be so great that Putin would prefere a compromise, even if flawed. After all, he conducted this war with great attention to the involvement of Russia's civil society, keeping it as low as possible.
For point 2), i find it extremely unlikely bar a low level expedition corps gathered from what professional soldiers are already available. There is NO appetite for total war among western societies. Their populations do not believe in their government anymore, or their fairness, and all governments are already reeling under high level of debts.. The idea of of a complete cutting of social welfare on the economic side, and military age men being packed and sent to the barracks on the civil side, is preposterous. It just wouldn't happen without protests so huge any government would collapse instantly.
My comment is deliberately unprecise because I'm concisely responding to someone by pointing out the trend in their posts, not writing an article-length rebuttal that would in any case reiterate points that I've made in my work.
As I've written but which you're presumably unfamiliar with, my view is that the US will not stand by and let Russia achieve its maximum goals in Ukraine, which could hypothetically take the form of planting boots on NATO's border with that country.
I don't believe that Trump will let nearly $200 billion worth of taxpayer funds expended under his predecessor go to waste without trying to salvage some of Project Ukraine, to which end he might escalate to brinksmanship in that scenario.
I also don't believe that Putin would risk WWIII over control of ultra-nationalist Western Ukraine, which could turn into 1980s Afghanistan on steroids in terms of its credible insurgency risk and associated costs, ergo why he'd likely back down.
We also know for a fact that Russia repeatedly declines to reciprocally escalate and continues to exercise self-restraint, thus reducing the chances that it would sprint towards Kiev with the goal of conquering it even if the road to there reopened.
Even if Putin jumped out of character and inexplicable threw his stereotypical caution to the wind by doing so, he might not authorize strikes against a symbolic NATO intervention force whose purpose would be to serve as a tripwire.
Attacking them en route to their potential occupation of Western Ukraine west of the Dnieper would instantly provoke a Cuban-like nuclear brinksmanship crisis that could predictably end with Ukraine's de facto partition along the river.
This forecast is premised on a close reading of Russian behavior thus far, Putin in particular, and my knowledge of Russian policymaking calculations. The idea that Russia will conquer all of Ukraine is a talking point and political fantasy.
It's unrealistic to expect Russia to achieve that, yet many leftists and activists (oftentimes but not always one and the same) insist otherwise, and that's because most like the original poster enjoy parroting talking points for ideological reasons.
They're free to do so, but I personally discourage it under my posts, which are analytical and not propagandistic. I don't care much for talking points, political fantasies, and wishful thinking, but about how the world really works.
Many of these same leftists and activists are going to be deeply disappointed if the conflict ends with anything other than the full achievement of Russia's maximum goals. I know that none of them will recognize that they were wrong though.
Nowhere i wrote about annexation. I said capitulation. Even Russian hardliners often talks of annexing Odessa, maybe Kiev, but not western Ukraine. Honestly, a de facto partition along the Dniepr is vastly better than anything else Trump could offer - Russia keep the territories that have more russian-speaking citizens and are economically valuable, plus a strong border. If Russia's security dilemma revolves around NOT having Nato troops on its borders, having them - in a omnipresent ISR enviroment - behind a main river could be considered "good enough" and worth suffering in the middle term being aware that, due to Trump's desired pivot to asia, the sanctions and a normalization of relationships would arrive eventually anyway.
As for how the situation is, it seems to me we wrote similar things - Russia doesn't seem interested to go all the way, NATO pretty much can't - but we disagree on what might be seen acceptable as a compromise. For me, the idea that Russia's compromise is keeping what they already conquered plus some sanction reliefs - that might be reapplied at any time - in exchange for a persistent Ukrainian government is preposterous. Politically, is a terrible defeat, and security wise it leaves them open to Minsk-like rearment. I just can't see Putin accepting such a deal unless forced by terrible economic pressure. But full-on secondary sanctions might not develop the way the US might hope, either.
A cease fire, seriously? No way Russia will ever trust that again. I don't know what Putin has in mind. Has he forgotten about the three main goals? Doubt it. Russia is in the catbird seat and will end this very soon with the complete capitulation of Ukraine/NATO/the EU/and the USA. Putin has to know they are all in disarray and imminent collapse.
Andrew I appreciate your daily input but this reeks of an amateurish military analysis of captured land vs destroyed materiel. Germany was never even significantly penetrated in WW1, it would do you good to listen to Putin rather than Washington Post.
Finally, a realistic hope that isn't more mere copium.
I seriously doubt any Russian would agree to anything like this, which could be called "Minsk III - The Final Hoax".
Absolutely no mention of Crimea?! It would certainly have to be officially ceded to Russia.
I mentioned that neither side would likely be requested to rescind their claims to the other at this initial point. I also don't take for granted that Ukraine will officially cede Crimea to Russia, not that it makes any difference in terms of the ground reality, though.
Thanks for your interesting and perceptive analysis.
A couple of comments:
A financial blockade of Russian oil would likely send prices sharply higher, and would rapidly impact Trump’s base, and not in a good way. The only way of offsetting this would be to convince the Saudis to maximally boost their own output. Do you think they would play ball?
Both India and China would be seriously ticked off by being in effect made parties to the conflict and seeing their own economies suffer while the US economy benefits.
I think Russia could probably do without oil export revenue for three months or so without suffering unduly. I’m not sure that everyone else could say the same.
LF
The path to peace will predictably be paved by a ceasefire?
After giving Ukraine several chances, Russia will insist on complete surrender. Capitulation, in other words.
You have a knack for repeating official talking points, whether China or Russian, but they don't always ultimately align with reality. Russia hasn't even captured an entire region after over 1,000 days of fire. It's doubtful that it can force a complete Ukrainian surrender AND that the US wouldn't intervene in some way to salvage part of Project Ukraine.
This comment is unprecise. There is no doubt whatsoever that, current situation standing, the Ukrainian army will collapse. It is strictly talking only a matter of time, but - one more year? Two more years? - there is no doubt whatsoever that the crash is coming. So, any peace talks rotate around these two points: 1) can Russia, in case of maximum sanctions, manage to keep its economy up for the time necessary to force Ukraine to capitulation and 2) would Nato, with or without the US, really intervene in Ukraine?
For point 1), i think it might but the pain would be so great that Putin would prefere a compromise, even if flawed. After all, he conducted this war with great attention to the involvement of Russia's civil society, keeping it as low as possible.
For point 2), i find it extremely unlikely bar a low level expedition corps gathered from what professional soldiers are already available. There is NO appetite for total war among western societies. Their populations do not believe in their government anymore, or their fairness, and all governments are already reeling under high level of debts.. The idea of of a complete cutting of social welfare on the economic side, and military age men being packed and sent to the barracks on the civil side, is preposterous. It just wouldn't happen without protests so huge any government would collapse instantly.
My comment is deliberately unprecise because I'm concisely responding to someone by pointing out the trend in their posts, not writing an article-length rebuttal that would in any case reiterate points that I've made in my work.
As I've written but which you're presumably unfamiliar with, my view is that the US will not stand by and let Russia achieve its maximum goals in Ukraine, which could hypothetically take the form of planting boots on NATO's border with that country.
I don't believe that Trump will let nearly $200 billion worth of taxpayer funds expended under his predecessor go to waste without trying to salvage some of Project Ukraine, to which end he might escalate to brinksmanship in that scenario.
I also don't believe that Putin would risk WWIII over control of ultra-nationalist Western Ukraine, which could turn into 1980s Afghanistan on steroids in terms of its credible insurgency risk and associated costs, ergo why he'd likely back down.
We also know for a fact that Russia repeatedly declines to reciprocally escalate and continues to exercise self-restraint, thus reducing the chances that it would sprint towards Kiev with the goal of conquering it even if the road to there reopened.
Even if Putin jumped out of character and inexplicable threw his stereotypical caution to the wind by doing so, he might not authorize strikes against a symbolic NATO intervention force whose purpose would be to serve as a tripwire.
Attacking them en route to their potential occupation of Western Ukraine west of the Dnieper would instantly provoke a Cuban-like nuclear brinksmanship crisis that could predictably end with Ukraine's de facto partition along the river.
This forecast is premised on a close reading of Russian behavior thus far, Putin in particular, and my knowledge of Russian policymaking calculations. The idea that Russia will conquer all of Ukraine is a talking point and political fantasy.
It's unrealistic to expect Russia to achieve that, yet many leftists and activists (oftentimes but not always one and the same) insist otherwise, and that's because most like the original poster enjoy parroting talking points for ideological reasons.
They're free to do so, but I personally discourage it under my posts, which are analytical and not propagandistic. I don't care much for talking points, political fantasies, and wishful thinking, but about how the world really works.
Many of these same leftists and activists are going to be deeply disappointed if the conflict ends with anything other than the full achievement of Russia's maximum goals. I know that none of them will recognize that they were wrong though.
Nowhere i wrote about annexation. I said capitulation. Even Russian hardliners often talks of annexing Odessa, maybe Kiev, but not western Ukraine. Honestly, a de facto partition along the Dniepr is vastly better than anything else Trump could offer - Russia keep the territories that have more russian-speaking citizens and are economically valuable, plus a strong border. If Russia's security dilemma revolves around NOT having Nato troops on its borders, having them - in a omnipresent ISR enviroment - behind a main river could be considered "good enough" and worth suffering in the middle term being aware that, due to Trump's desired pivot to asia, the sanctions and a normalization of relationships would arrive eventually anyway.
As for how the situation is, it seems to me we wrote similar things - Russia doesn't seem interested to go all the way, NATO pretty much can't - but we disagree on what might be seen acceptable as a compromise. For me, the idea that Russia's compromise is keeping what they already conquered plus some sanction reliefs - that might be reapplied at any time - in exchange for a persistent Ukrainian government is preposterous. Politically, is a terrible defeat, and security wise it leaves them open to Minsk-like rearment. I just can't see Putin accepting such a deal unless forced by terrible economic pressure. But full-on secondary sanctions might not develop the way the US might hope, either.
Nobody will ask western populations whether they want war or not.
If putin should agree to these conditions, he ought to be replaced for squandering blood and treasure for nothing.
A cease fire, seriously? No way Russia will ever trust that again. I don't know what Putin has in mind. Has he forgotten about the three main goals? Doubt it. Russia is in the catbird seat and will end this very soon with the complete capitulation of Ukraine/NATO/the EU/and the USA. Putin has to know they are all in disarray and imminent collapse.
And what is the point if a ceasefire exactly? To give time for NATO to refit the Ukrainian army?
No point to that.
In Ukraine elections "can’t be conducted during times of marital [sic] law."
Nope. Putin won't accept any "cease fire" agreement. Those are never honored.
Basically none of Russia's war aims, the result of Russian dithering and indecision.
Andrew I appreciate your daily input but this reeks of an amateurish military analysis of captured land vs destroyed materiel. Germany was never even significantly penetrated in WW1, it would do you good to listen to Putin rather than Washington Post.