The Czecho-Slovak Split Over Ukraine Symbolizes The Spread Of New Cold War Divisions

What’s so symbolic about this dynamic is that Czechs and Slovaks are fraternal people, yet they’re embracing diametrically opposite views on the New Cold War.

The New Cold War is conceptualized differently by many but can objectively be described as the division between those who want to retain the US-led West’s unipolar hegemony, with all that it entails for countries’ domestic affairs, and those who want to accelerate multipolar processes across the world. These divisions have already penetrated the West after Hungary sought to lead that bloc’s conservative counterrevolution but have now spread deeper into Central Europe with the Czecho-Slovak split.

The Washington Post drew attention to this development in their piece about “How the war in Ukraine has split the Czechs and Slovaks”, which casts aspersions on Prime Minister Fico, who’s now serving his fourth term in office following his return last year after time in opposition. His campaign was opposed by America, which Russia accused of meddling in the run-up to the vote, but he still won due to how much his conservative-nationalist promises resonated with his people after they soured on liberal-globalism.

He then reaffirmed his pragmatic approach towards the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine, which earned him the hatred of the Western elite and especially those Czech members with whom his country was previously united after World War I till their “Velvet Divorce” in 1993. Around the same time, Poland’s conservative-nationalist government was replaced by a German-backed liberal-globalist one, which had the effect of restoring Germany’s superpower trajectory and reshaping European geopolitics.

These respective domestic political reversals were inextricably connected to the previously described New Cold War division between unipolar and multipolar supporters. Fico returned to office despite American meddling because his conservative-nationalist vision promised to remove Slovakia from the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine, which is the most geostategically significant conflict since World War II. By contrast, Poland’s previous government remained committed to it in spite of the growing costs.

Whereas Fico was therefore able to consolidate and expand his base, the latter of which was due to him promising to extricate Slovakia from this conflict and therefore reduce the costs that it’s experienced as a result, his Polish conservative-nationalist counterpart split his base and accordingly lost re-election. The domestic political dynamics are altogether different in Czechia, however, since that country’s population is mostly in favor of unipolarity and its liberal-globalist domestic model although some opposition exists.

Furthermore, unlike the Polish and Slovak states, the Czech one actually profits from this proxy war due to what a boon it’s been for that country’s military-industrial complex. That said, second and third order costs are indeed piling up and will inevitably become more obvious, but they haven’t yet been felt as much as in its two neighbors and that explains why a former NATO general won the presidency in March 2023. Until then, however, Czecho-Slovak differences will continue widening for the foreseeable future.

The consequence of this rift is that mutual perceptions at the political and civil society levels might worsen, which could harm efforts to retain cordial relations after their “Velvet Divorce” three decades ago. If this trend spirals out of control, then Czechia might start meddling in Slovak affairs once more, and this could toxify their ties and thus further weaken the Visegrad Group within which they, Hungary, and Poland all participate.

As time goes on, Czechia might also subordinate itself to Germany just like Poland has done in solidarity with the EU’s de facto leader, who envisages itself leading the bloc’s containment of Russia despite newfound competition from France. To that end, Prague could become a party to the “military Schengen” that was signed last month between Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands, which would facilitate the movement of its troops and equipment to the Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian borders. 

By contrast, Slovakia is expected to retain its principled stance of no longer involving itself in this conflict, which could exacerbate the New Cold War divisions between them and in turn worsen their ties at all levels. What’s so symbolic about this dynamic is that Czechs and Slovaks are fraternal people, yet they’re embracing diametrically opposite views on the New Cold War. This shows that the ideational divisions brought about by the global systemic transition transcend even the closest historical ties.