People should be mature enough to accept that no country is perfect, not even their favorite one like Russia, and that setbacks are an unavoidable part of every military conflict.
Excellent analysis. Had the initial gamble worked, lots of innocent lives and uncountable suffering could have been avoided. Unfortunately, the Western imperialists were bent on war, and the Ukrainian puppet government could not resist. The more I study WW2, the more I think almost all respective leaders had done were probably the best solutions at the time even if they knew how the historical trend would turn later due to the recent past. Chamberlain was the one who authorized major boost in funding for (1) the radar chain (2) Spitfire development (major bust of budget and Parliament resistance) (3) territorial army skeleton reactivation (deactivated after WW1) and some other measures. Yet today people only remember Chamberlain as the appeaser without knowing how fragile British military was at the time. Germany's military plans to march into Austria and Czech were all improvised with many flaws and problems were abundant at the time of execution.
Absolutely, the more I learn about it too, the more I realize how much everything had to "perfectly" fall into place. Look at the Norwegian Campaign or the French one: Germany wasn't predestined to win either, in fact, it could have easily lost the first and then been unable to launch the second without exposing itself to very serious risks.
I'm not sharing these observations to justify the Germans -- just a preemptive disclaimer to ward off triggered trolls -- but to encourage folks to look at everything differently. They had the will to take over Europe and the means as well, but the way in which the latter manifested themselves was somewhat attributable to "luck" and wasn't at all guaranteed to succeed.
Ah yes. That was an excellent article. I wrote a summary for it after reading it (but not yet the reference links in that article) and recommended that interview to others.
I found it particularly gratifying, having followed Irving since the halcyon (NOT) days of Zundel, all through the Lipstadt (sort of a thin Fats Nuland with enough brain cells to spare half a dozen or so to bang together at some given points) Trial (2000).
So gratifying to see vindication coming to pass after so long!
When I eventually managed to get an (old-fashioned, dial-up) internet connection in 1999, the first thing I did was subscribe to 'The Zundelgram'. British justice being what it is, and the foundation of its now long-overdue and-failing expression in the Americas, the conclusion was forgone but it made for exciting reading to follow at the time, twenty-odd years ago, nonetheless.
Agreed on both counts: the West overstepped and didn't think Russia would intervene, but when the intervention didn't go as planned in its initial stages, everything had to be improvised but Ukraine is still losing and bearing the brunt of this.
The Russian plan worked, they forced the ukr government into negotiations and destroyed their combat power by May - June 2022. After massive western financial and military assistance they then had to change plans. This is normal in any situation where the dynamic is fluid.
I recommend this book for an in depth analysis of the SMO
I half-agree and half-disagree: the initial stage had some partial successes and the original Ukrainian Army was destroyed, but Russia underestimated the West's will to indirectly intervene by constantly replacing every lost Ukrainian Army, which I touched upon in the hyperlinked analysis from the introduction if you'd like to check it out.
A lot of observers become convinced of something, in this case that it was obvious that the West would indirectly intervene, but that's not always how decisionmakers like those in the Kremlin thought at the time that something happened.
Accordingly, there's constant revisionism of the narrative to realign with the predetermined agenda of presenting everything as a "master plan" amidst twists and turns, with there rarely being calm explanations of what happened in hindsight.
What I sought to do was challenge the "master plan" narrative by reminding folks of some things that they might have forgotten and which are deliberately omitted from the aforesaid narrative to generate a discussion about what happened since February 2022.
"Russia underestimated the west's will to directly intervene"
Its highly unlikely the possibility wasn't considered by the Kremlin, its standard practice to game out a whole range of different scenarios. However you can't organise/ prepare in advance for every possible contingency.
You have to make your move then adjust accordingly. That's how every action works.
What was the other option? Mobilise the whole of russian society for a full scale war? No doubt they have had to learn and adapt as they go but that's just how life works.
I'd be interested to hear what people think they should have done instead.
It was considered, but they didn't think it would happen, let alone at the scale that it did, hence Putin's strongly worded statement advising against this on the day the SMO began.
I'm also not suggesting that there was another realistic option to the SMO. Please review my archives or do some targeted Google searches since it seems like you're totally unfamiliar with my views towards this conflict:
My only point in this context is that political goals have always predominated over military ones and continue to this day. Please don't make any strawmen again.
Bridges were never targeted and the "war of attrition" was improvised, not the plan all along.
I wholeheartedly support the SMO, so much that I've produced original analyses about it and multipolarity daily since the SMO began.
That's 930+ consecutive days, which you can verify from my Substack and earlier from the now-defunct oneworld.press portal.
There's literally nobody else in the world who's shown such commitment to this conflict on the information front as I have.
Despite moving apartments, the grandfather who raised me passing away, getting married, and having a baby, I never stopped working for a single day.
So please spare me the strawmen suggesting that I of all people am doubting the rationale of the SMO, it's incredibly insulting even if that wasn't your intent.
My only point is that "5D chess master plan" conspiracy theories are intellectually insulting and self-discrediting.
Nothing ever perfectly goes according to plan, especially not a conflict that's already been raging for 30 months.
Putin doesn't share the same views that most of his foreign followers do, and that's why there's such a disconnect and cognitive dissonance.
He's hardcore pro-Israel, doesn't want to go all-in on the SMO by turning it into an official "war", and still sells resources to the West to this day:
If people were actually aware of Russian policy as it objectively exists, not as it's wishfully spun, there'd be so much less confusion.
I see myself as able to clarify this for everyone given my professional and academic experiences.
What I provide everyone is think tank-quality analyses that challenge them to reconsider the dogma that they took for granted.
In this case, too many people have drowned themselves in the Kool-Aid of "5D chess master plan" conspiracy theories and don't realize what's happening.
Russia is still winning, the SMO was the right thing to do, but everything is now being improvised and setbacks have indeed occurred.
Moreover, political considerations continue to influence military decisions, and that might not changed after Putin invested so much in staying the course.
And I 100% agree with the 5D chess advocates. Plenty of those around. However I generally ignore those parts of their "analysis" guys like Scott Ritter come to mind. Although he also does some good stuff. I just use my discretion and ignore the obvious biased rants.
I've been reading and sharing your articles since around the beginning of the smo and greatly admire and agree with 80-90% of your analysis so don't take this the wrong way. I apologise if I caused any offence definitely not intended.
All I'm saying is IMO this particular analysis of yours is a little off the mark.
Anyway nobody can agree 💯% on everything, if that was the case I'd be limited to a discussion circle of just myself.
Anyway many thanks for the great work and please continue. You are one of my favourite prolific commentators 💕
Russia was in no way ready for a protracted conflict but they were quick to recognize and adapt. Shortening their defensive lines, building the Surovikin line and deploying every weapon they had effectively — despite some being ancient — represents a foresight and depth severely lacking in the West.
The evolution into an attritional war was a natural for them given their history but one that they recognized particularly suited the circumstances and they’ve proceeded accordingly.
The west hasn’t shown anything more than simply throwing ever more men and weapons against the SMO wall and hoping something would stick.
Maybe not the cunning grand plan from the beginning, but the war is still indicative of thoughtful, patient chess vs. emotionally demonstrative checkers.
"...many members of the Alt-Media Community (AMC) remain convinced that this was actually the plan all along."
Quite possibly, but those who insist on wearing hats at least lined on the inside with aluminium foil, and preferably good, old-fashioned, full-blown tin-foil jobs, really should be taken with at least a pinch of salt.
I think this is a fair and honest appraisal of the general course of the Ukraine War. I'll only add that, as an American, I really do believe the West thought its sanctions would bring Russia to its knees, and in just a few months at most.
We were saturated with propaganda at the time, and most of it ballyhooed the sanctions and the talking heads all pronounced Russia's economy would collapse and Putin would be ousted. When it became clear that wouldn't happen, they just doubled down on the Putin is Hitler nonsense and accused anyone questioning the war of being Putin puppets or traitors.
As a student of Russian history since my mom took me to see Dr. Zhivago and Nicholas and Alexandria at the theater, I can say the Russians never surprised me. They made mistakes at first, learned from them, adapted, and figured out a way to win in the long run. Just like they always do.
Yes. If you go back to 2021 (this is from memory) there was a Biden Putin meeting. Russia sent very serious proposal for new security arrangements, and in that they wanted Ukraine neutrality. Answer was very blunt and apolitical, the “for USA eyes only” was replied to via media. The answer was very blunt and wrapped in publicly acceptable language but could be translated in only two words “Fu.. you”. In other words, USA insisted in embarrassing and belittling Russia and its concerns. What followed was a discussing campaign of smearing Russia and literally goading it into action. I clearly remember Biden speech where he did that. It kept happening and at the same time they were accelerating Ukraine addition into nato. Russia did not really have a choice at that point, whoever thinks otherwise is wrong.
So I have no doubt in my mind that nato wanted Russia to attack. NATO assessment of Russia was that it would fall apart from within, with enough shaking and pressure, basically the tactics applied for decades on USSR. We all know it worked magically well then.
Will it work now? It still might. I don’t have any verifiable data, but I think one day when we do get realistic numbers the losses both sides suffered will be mind boggling. Both in material and men. The question is how much is too much. For nato Ukraine losses don’t even count what counts is number of dead Russians. So the question is how many dead can Russia take?
And this is why I have been thinking that time is not exactly on Russia side, but then again, I can’t be sure it’s on natos either.
I've worked in manufacturing (including heavy machinery fabrication & the design and launch of production lines) for a number of years in several European countries. My position from the very moment that "the West" failed to ramp up production and Russia started to win the industrial war is that this was a massive failure of European governments. From my experience i can say that if there had been the will, European countries COULD have built & started production of a large enough number of military equipment production lines for a reasonable amount of investment (definitely less than the 800bllion/yr that Draghi wants for his "New Marshall Plan").
This is a rather long way to say that IMO the Industrial War is being lost by Europe / The West, rather than being won by Russia.
Also, there are a lot of weird things about this war. As you just pointed out, the question of the Dnieper river bridges is one.
The electric war is another open question - why has Russia not finished off the conventional UKR power plants instead of mainly hitting switch yards and transformer substations??
Or - and this is very hard for me to understand - why is Russia fighting the UKR Donbas fortifications frontally instead of bypassing these along the North or South. My understanding is that the UKR has heavily fortified its positions in the whole Donbas region since 2014. See Bakhmut, Avdeevka, Mariupol, Chasov Yar, etc. and this is the main reason for the slow advances. But everything West of Ugledar is open country, so, why is the Russian Army not actively trying to flank and roll over the UKR fortifications from this flank??
Or - if Russia is having a bottleneck in industrial production due to a lack of installed capacity and/or skilled workers - why hasn't Russia set up production lines of some of the best performing systems in friendly countries with the condition to get back a % of the production for a number of years? I don't think the Iranians or the North Koreans wouldn't mind to get their own Iskander or S-400 factories....
Anyway, questions within questions... Thanks for your work!
5D chess theory is blatantly silly. But I think calling Russian military moves “improvisation” is not accurate. Military actions try to accomplish the political objectives of the leadership. Feb 22 objective was to force U to negotiate, and in this it was completely successful. The breaking down of Istanbul process was a political setback (for Russia) and U was mobilising and becoming fully aggressive on the battlefield. This forced a different strategy from R and continued occupation of Sumy, Kiev etc would have been entirely counterproductive. This is not so much improvisation but adopting a different strategic posture in line with new political reality, that is Kiev’s rejection of negotiations. I am sure the Stavka had a contingency plan for this.
Russia’s leadership also had to adapt to the new situation and redefine their response to Kiev’s attitude and determine how the now inevitable expanded war was to be conducted. At this point political and military objectives become almost entirely mixed together. But war of attrition at this point becomes very attractive for Russia, an almost inevitable outcome of the calculations of the war planners from virtually any angle.
But you’re right it wasn’t chess, it was complicated and risky, and ultimately the plan had to be tested in fire! It prevailed.
That 5D chess canard is simply a way of dismissing people you disagree with. In this case an entire article devoted to dismissing one individual's considered opinions, the point being that they are just opinions, his and mine. It comes down to a question of whether you're willing to engage in debate without denigrating your opponent (while knowing nothing of his background or actual level of knowledge).
The problem with making categorical statements based on limited knowledge is that, much like the 5D chess players our host disparages, you end up in the same trap of believing your own narrative over the facts as they present themselves.
The example that most stands is our hosts puzzlement about the bridges not being destroyed. This is not only explained by the need to preserve them in the event of an advance across the river (for which there no doubt exists a plan) but also the physical consequences of destroying them, given that several of those bridges sit atop power or flood control dams.
Odd that our host would miss this point as we've seen one dam breach already.
"As with any dam, the water reservoirs of the Dnieper in Ukraine pose a significant threat of a large-scale, human-made disaster if their dams fail. Those concerns were raised in particular in connection with the 2009 Sayano–Shushenskaya Dam disaster.[4] Concerns had yet again been raised regarding an air attack of the Kakhovka Dam on July 11, 2022. The Kakhovka Dam would later fail in the result of an explosion that occurred on June 6, 2023.[5] Flooding will impact downstream communities such as Kherson and will have devastating consequences to communities on the bank of the Dnipro River south of Nova Kakhovka.[6]"
The other consequence of a dam breach is that you create shallows where once you had deep water. So in destroying the dam you actually create the conditions for an easier crossing at multiple points using pontoons.
In war planning you have to take into account every possible scenario, as well as accepting that some situations may occur that you haven't planned for. The Mike Tyson effect. That said, there are substantial reasons for not destroying bridges, first being that you may want to use them later, thus a calculation on the trade-off between allowing your enemy a river crossing as opposed to destroying it when there are serious consequences that may undermine other priorities, such as minimizing damage to inhabited areas, plus the cost of rebuilding should your war aims include permanent annexation of the territory under consideration.
I don't see this sort of calculation being made here. What I see are bold assertions stated as fact, the same dogmatism our host accuses others of. I haven't been here long enough to say, so perhaps you can tell me - does he ever cite sources other than his own previous articles? Has he presented any military credentials? He lays claim to professional journalism, but that's not the same as having the military background to make the sort of assertions that characterize his narrative. Personally, I prefer to rely on information from people experienced in the art of war, not just bystanders writing about it from a safe distance.
Back to the 5D thing. Maybe the title of my substack threw him off? когда сталкиваются миры (when worlds collide) could be taken as a war blog, but it's not, it's simply a music site focused on post soviet culture. I don't blog about the war, I just search for reliable sources and make comments where I feel it's appropriate. I do play chess though, and I actually came close to beating a Spanish national champion in 1975 - the uncle of my ex-wife who was a captain in the Republican Army during the Spanish Civil War. I don't wear it on my sleeve though. Close only counts in horseshoes.
The use of the word 'gamble' indicates that there was a prefered plan A, which assumes the possible necessity of a plan B. Hard to believe that in the face of everything that the Russian general staff must have known aobut the huge Donbass fortifications and NATO plans that Russia did not at least contemplate a long war. But it was clearly not what they wanted.
I think you push the argument too far in the other direction. It is clearly not the case that the Russian forces were 'Pushed out of the Nikolayev Region. It was clear military choice but with obvious political downside. Note that the Ukrainians after their disastrous phyrric victory around Kharkov were aftraid to follow up and the Russian troops withdrew without losing a man or a vehicle. Note also that after the Kharkow withdrawal the huge ammuniton depot was found to be completely empty.
It was't 5D chess and obviously mistakes were made but Gerazimov has had plenty of time to think about this war in advance.
Simply cutting the gas to Europe in Feb 2022 would have brought NATO to its knees in 4 weeks.
The attrition war is obviously a plan to content and enrich immensely oligarchs on both sides of the fence - actually many of them are on both sides , gambling on every side victory but mostly getting fat while the conflict lasts.
Quite a sensible analysis. Whatever one’s sentiment about Russia’ decency and the Wicked West’s evilness, one should make an effort to separate signal from noise, look at the facts and draw the most logical conclusions. The old Ockham’s razor should prevail: if there is a simple explanation, it is likely to be the proper one.
It becomes an aggravation listening to that bunch of experts and analysts who repeat in a broken record fashion that the West is about to exhale its last breath, that NATO is bled dry of weapons, that the western nations are collapsing under the weight of failing economies and ineffective governments; that, by contrast, Russia has built a hyper-effective military-industrial system capable of providing an unlimited supply of armored equipment, missiles, artillery rounds, drones, etc, that the western sanction programs, instead of weakening Russia’s socioeconomic fabric, only enhanced its economic power, its financial strength, and the well-being of the people, and, in a nutshell, that Russia is just about to strike the final lethal blow on the Ukrainian-NATO forces.
This is not true. The decline of the West is unquestionable, but it still has a lot of muscle, it is far from being moribund. Russia has shown remarkable stamina, but despite its potential, it is also vulnerable: demographically, industrially, economically, socially and in terms of nationalities. Russia is probably, but not surely the winner of the contest. It would be sheer gullibility to believe that “all goes well, Madame la Marquise” (the old French song), when there are lots of fires to put out in the house. The price to pay may be unaffordable.
I think you're quite right in believing that the original Russian script hardly foresaw a war of attrition, did not anticipate the power of the Ukrainian side, and contained no provision for a protracted war. The Russians took a bold gamble, they lost, and from then on they had to rethink everything: strategy, domestic policy, supplies, relations with other states, relations with the Russian people.
I also believe that a better intelligence service, more subtle listening to Western cabinets and a more realistic military doctrine could have better educated the Russian leadership about the real risks of the gamble.
At this point, we can only hope that decisions will be taken on the basis of the known facts and the probabilities of the unknowns, and not on the basis of the fairy tales of the zealots. It’s I think you're quite right in believing that the original Russian script hardly foresaw a war of attrition, did not anticipate the power of the Ukrainian side, and contained no provision for a protracted war. The Russians took a bold gamble, they lost, and from then on they had to rethink everything: strategy, domestic policy, supplies, relations with other states, relations with the Russian people.
I also believe that a better intelligence service, more subtle listening to Western cabinets and a more realistic military doctrine could have better educated the Russian leadership about the real risks of the gamble.
At this point, we can only hope that decisions will be taken on the basis of facts and probabilities, and not on the basis of the fairy tales of the zealots. It’s a narrow path to victory.
"I think you're quite right in believing that the original Russian script hardly foresaw a war of attrition, did not anticipate the power of the Ukrainian side, and contained no provision for a protracted war."
Bear in mind that Ukraine was once part of the Soviet Union, and that some of the senior officers on both sides actually trained together or attended the same academies. In short, both sides are working from the same military playbook and are aware of that. Also, at the outset at least, both sides were using the same Soviet era equipment or its modern equivalent, so there was little uncertainty regarding those resources, neither in capability or in numbers. Add to this that as part of the USSR, the military installations and the terrain on which they are fighting are well known to the Russian side. The situation is somewhat unique in that effectively both sides are fighting on familiar territory which both regard as their own, and have had a full 8 years in which to prepare.
Frankly, it beggars belief that Russia would be unprepared for contingencies arising from fighting a peer force on terrain that, by their own repeated declarations, is considered a serious vulnerability, an existential threat. The USSR would obviously have made plans for confronting a peer force (NATO) in that exact domain. The fact that they're fighting Ukraine and not NATO directly doesn't alter the equation in terms of the territory, resources, conditions and contingencies one would encounter. On the contrary, since Ukraine was considered a primary invasion route, and historically was exactly that, I doubt that any stone was left unturned in planning for both defensive and offensive operations, both in the Soviet era and the present.
That said, you can never entirely predict the outcome of such operations, and mistakes will be made, but to describe events since the SMO began as poorly planned and lacking in foresight is to me, just Monday morning quarterbacking.
The work you do is remarkable and in most cases I agree with you. However, you yourself lack nuance in this case.
It is likely that at the beginning Russia expected the special operation to be short in time and force Ukraine to accept a kind of "Minsk agreement" with neutralization and non-entry into NATO.
If I think it was naive and moreover a mistake, as I thought at the time of the Minsk agreements themselves in 2015, the fact is that it could have factually been signed and the conflict at least suspended.
If you have not read this book, "Art of Russian War", I believe that is the English title of Jacques Baud's book in English, I recommend it to you, like all his works that are translated into English.
To return to the subject, war actually never follows a pre-established linear pattern and each movement that an adversary makes can imply a significant modification in an overall plan.
This is what happened with the sabotage of the peace plan and the orderly retreat that followed was not of the same nature as that which would have been carried out if this treaty had not been broken. What conditioned and this retreat and the construction of the Surovikin line as well as the strategy of attrition that followed in the absence of general mobilization and c.
Do not forget that Kherson Zelensky was suspicious and thought that the retreat was a trap and that by means of which it took three days for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to enter the Kherson oblast. As for the Kharkov oblast, the important Russian ammunition depot close to the front line had been moved. which can take a good week. Note also that the Ukrainian blizkrieg was very costly in human and material terms and was stopped in a cauldron where the Ukrainian Armed Forces took a heavy toll.
It is in my opinion inaccurate to speak of improvisation. There were adaptations and a transformation of the objectives. But, as all actions produce reactions, this retreat gave the opportunity to the adversary of the Bucha assembly, then encouraged among other things the catastrophe of Finland's entry into NATO.
To conclude, In my opinion I believe that one of the main mistakes of Russia is to have underestimated the brainwashing operated especially in Western Ukraine since even before 2014 and to have considered that the majority of this people was a brother people. I think that Russia is now beginning to realize it.
Excellent analysis. Had the initial gamble worked, lots of innocent lives and uncountable suffering could have been avoided. Unfortunately, the Western imperialists were bent on war, and the Ukrainian puppet government could not resist. The more I study WW2, the more I think almost all respective leaders had done were probably the best solutions at the time even if they knew how the historical trend would turn later due to the recent past. Chamberlain was the one who authorized major boost in funding for (1) the radar chain (2) Spitfire development (major bust of budget and Parliament resistance) (3) territorial army skeleton reactivation (deactivated after WW1) and some other measures. Yet today people only remember Chamberlain as the appeaser without knowing how fragile British military was at the time. Germany's military plans to march into Austria and Czech were all improvised with many flaws and problems were abundant at the time of execution.
Absolutely, the more I learn about it too, the more I realize how much everything had to "perfectly" fall into place. Look at the Norwegian Campaign or the French one: Germany wasn't predestined to win either, in fact, it could have easily lost the first and then been unable to launch the second without exposing itself to very serious risks.
I'm not sharing these observations to justify the Germans -- just a preemptive disclaimer to ward off triggered trolls -- but to encourage folks to look at everything differently. They had the will to take over Europe and the means as well, but the way in which the latter manifested themselves was somewhat attributable to "luck" and wasn't at all guaranteed to succeed.
Sounds like David Irving is the man for you. (One of my favourites.)
Try this: Mike Whitney Interview with Ron Unz
RON UNZ AND MIKE WHITNEY • JULY 17, 2023 • 9,700 WORDS — https://www.unz.com/runz/hitler-churchill-the-holocaust-and-the-war-in-ukraine/
Ah yes. That was an excellent article. I wrote a summary for it after reading it (but not yet the reference links in that article) and recommended that interview to others.
I found it particularly gratifying, having followed Irving since the halcyon (NOT) days of Zundel, all through the Lipstadt (sort of a thin Fats Nuland with enough brain cells to spare half a dozen or so to bang together at some given points) Trial (2000).
So gratifying to see vindication coming to pass after so long!
So glad to learn you've also appreciated it.
By "Trial", did you mean the book "The Eichmann Trial" ?
No, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irving_v_Penguin_Books_Ltd.
When I eventually managed to get an (old-fashioned, dial-up) internet connection in 1999, the first thing I did was subscribe to 'The Zundelgram'. British justice being what it is, and the foundation of its now long-overdue and-failing expression in the Americas, the conclusion was forgone but it made for exciting reading to follow at the time, twenty-odd years ago, nonetheless.
Однако, end run-on sentence. Sorry!
this stupid war started simply by the failure to talk properly and go easy on bombastic demands
now the aim of the war has changed alas not to the benefits of Ukraine
Agreed on both counts: the West overstepped and didn't think Russia would intervene, but when the intervention didn't go as planned in its initial stages, everything had to be improvised but Ukraine is still losing and bearing the brunt of this.
The Russian plan worked, they forced the ukr government into negotiations and destroyed their combat power by May - June 2022. After massive western financial and military assistance they then had to change plans. This is normal in any situation where the dynamic is fluid.
I recommend this book for an in depth analysis of the SMO
https://www.amazon.com.au/Russian-Art-War-Ukraine-Defeat/dp/2315013062
I half-agree and half-disagree: the initial stage had some partial successes and the original Ukrainian Army was destroyed, but Russia underestimated the West's will to indirectly intervene by constantly replacing every lost Ukrainian Army, which I touched upon in the hyperlinked analysis from the introduction if you'd like to check it out.
A lot of observers become convinced of something, in this case that it was obvious that the West would indirectly intervene, but that's not always how decisionmakers like those in the Kremlin thought at the time that something happened.
Accordingly, there's constant revisionism of the narrative to realign with the predetermined agenda of presenting everything as a "master plan" amidst twists and turns, with there rarely being calm explanations of what happened in hindsight.
What I sought to do was challenge the "master plan" narrative by reminding folks of some things that they might have forgotten and which are deliberately omitted from the aforesaid narrative to generate a discussion about what happened since February 2022.
"Russia underestimated the west's will to directly intervene"
Its highly unlikely the possibility wasn't considered by the Kremlin, its standard practice to game out a whole range of different scenarios. However you can't organise/ prepare in advance for every possible contingency.
You have to make your move then adjust accordingly. That's how every action works.
What was the other option? Mobilise the whole of russian society for a full scale war? No doubt they have had to learn and adapt as they go but that's just how life works.
I'd be interested to hear what people think they should have done instead.
It was considered, but they didn't think it would happen, let alone at the scale that it did, hence Putin's strongly worded statement advising against this on the day the SMO began.
I'm also not suggesting that there was another realistic option to the SMO. Please review my archives or do some targeted Google searches since it seems like you're totally unfamiliar with my views towards this conflict:
https://web.archive.org/web/20220326170401/https://astutenews.com/2022/03/russia-is-waging-an-existential-struggle-in-defense-of-its-independence-sovereignty/
https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/columns/military-and-security/why-did-u-s-prioritize-containing-russia-over-china/
My only point in this context is that political goals have always predominated over military ones and continue to this day. Please don't make any strawmen again.
Bridges were never targeted and the "war of attrition" was improvised, not the plan all along.
I wholeheartedly support the SMO, so much that I've produced original analyses about it and multipolarity daily since the SMO began.
That's 930+ consecutive days, which you can verify from my Substack and earlier from the now-defunct oneworld.press portal.
There's literally nobody else in the world who's shown such commitment to this conflict on the information front as I have.
Despite moving apartments, the grandfather who raised me passing away, getting married, and having a baby, I never stopped working for a single day.
So please spare me the strawmen suggesting that I of all people am doubting the rationale of the SMO, it's incredibly insulting even if that wasn't your intent.
My only point is that "5D chess master plan" conspiracy theories are intellectually insulting and self-discrediting.
Nothing ever perfectly goes according to plan, especially not a conflict that's already been raging for 30 months.
Putin doesn't share the same views that most of his foreign followers do, and that's why there's such a disconnect and cognitive dissonance.
He's hardcore pro-Israel, doesn't want to go all-in on the SMO by turning it into an official "war", and still sells resources to the West to this day:
https://orientalreview.su/2018/05/10/president-putin-on-israel-quotes-from-the-kremlin-website/
https://voiceofeast.net/2022/04/08/vladimir-putin-monster-madman-or-mastermind/
If people were actually aware of Russian policy as it objectively exists, not as it's wishfully spun, there'd be so much less confusion.
I see myself as able to clarify this for everyone given my professional and academic experiences.
What I provide everyone is think tank-quality analyses that challenge them to reconsider the dogma that they took for granted.
In this case, too many people have drowned themselves in the Kool-Aid of "5D chess master plan" conspiracy theories and don't realize what's happening.
Russia is still winning, the SMO was the right thing to do, but everything is now being improvised and setbacks have indeed occurred.
Moreover, political considerations continue to influence military decisions, and that might not changed after Putin invested so much in staying the course.
And I 100% agree with the 5D chess advocates. Plenty of those around. However I generally ignore those parts of their "analysis" guys like Scott Ritter come to mind. Although he also does some good stuff. I just use my discretion and ignore the obvious biased rants.
I've been reading and sharing your articles since around the beginning of the smo and greatly admire and agree with 80-90% of your analysis so don't take this the wrong way. I apologise if I caused any offence definitely not intended.
All I'm saying is IMO this particular analysis of yours is a little off the mark.
Anyway nobody can agree 💯% on everything, if that was the case I'd be limited to a discussion circle of just myself.
Anyway many thanks for the great work and please continue. You are one of my favourite prolific commentators 💕
Thank you, I sincerely appreciate that.
This is the most balanced & to the point recap of the Ukraine "not-war" that I've read until now.
Thanks señor Andrew!
Excellent piece.
Russia was in no way ready for a protracted conflict but they were quick to recognize and adapt. Shortening their defensive lines, building the Surovikin line and deploying every weapon they had effectively — despite some being ancient — represents a foresight and depth severely lacking in the West.
The evolution into an attritional war was a natural for them given their history but one that they recognized particularly suited the circumstances and they’ve proceeded accordingly.
The west hasn’t shown anything more than simply throwing ever more men and weapons against the SMO wall and hoping something would stick.
Maybe not the cunning grand plan from the beginning, but the war is still indicative of thoughtful, patient chess vs. emotionally demonstrative checkers.
"...many members of the Alt-Media Community (AMC) remain convinced that this was actually the plan all along."
Quite possibly, but those who insist on wearing hats at least lined on the inside with aluminium foil, and preferably good, old-fashioned, full-blown tin-foil jobs, really should be taken with at least a pinch of salt.
Good analysis - thank you.
I think this is a fair and honest appraisal of the general course of the Ukraine War. I'll only add that, as an American, I really do believe the West thought its sanctions would bring Russia to its knees, and in just a few months at most.
We were saturated with propaganda at the time, and most of it ballyhooed the sanctions and the talking heads all pronounced Russia's economy would collapse and Putin would be ousted. When it became clear that wouldn't happen, they just doubled down on the Putin is Hitler nonsense and accused anyone questioning the war of being Putin puppets or traitors.
As a student of Russian history since my mom took me to see Dr. Zhivago and Nicholas and Alexandria at the theater, I can say the Russians never surprised me. They made mistakes at first, learned from them, adapted, and figured out a way to win in the long run. Just like they always do.
Yes. If you go back to 2021 (this is from memory) there was a Biden Putin meeting. Russia sent very serious proposal for new security arrangements, and in that they wanted Ukraine neutrality. Answer was very blunt and apolitical, the “for USA eyes only” was replied to via media. The answer was very blunt and wrapped in publicly acceptable language but could be translated in only two words “Fu.. you”. In other words, USA insisted in embarrassing and belittling Russia and its concerns. What followed was a discussing campaign of smearing Russia and literally goading it into action. I clearly remember Biden speech where he did that. It kept happening and at the same time they were accelerating Ukraine addition into nato. Russia did not really have a choice at that point, whoever thinks otherwise is wrong.
So I have no doubt in my mind that nato wanted Russia to attack. NATO assessment of Russia was that it would fall apart from within, with enough shaking and pressure, basically the tactics applied for decades on USSR. We all know it worked magically well then.
Will it work now? It still might. I don’t have any verifiable data, but I think one day when we do get realistic numbers the losses both sides suffered will be mind boggling. Both in material and men. The question is how much is too much. For nato Ukraine losses don’t even count what counts is number of dead Russians. So the question is how many dead can Russia take?
And this is why I have been thinking that time is not exactly on Russia side, but then again, I can’t be sure it’s on natos either.
You do underscore several very important points.
I've worked in manufacturing (including heavy machinery fabrication & the design and launch of production lines) for a number of years in several European countries. My position from the very moment that "the West" failed to ramp up production and Russia started to win the industrial war is that this was a massive failure of European governments. From my experience i can say that if there had been the will, European countries COULD have built & started production of a large enough number of military equipment production lines for a reasonable amount of investment (definitely less than the 800bllion/yr that Draghi wants for his "New Marshall Plan").
This is a rather long way to say that IMO the Industrial War is being lost by Europe / The West, rather than being won by Russia.
Also, there are a lot of weird things about this war. As you just pointed out, the question of the Dnieper river bridges is one.
The electric war is another open question - why has Russia not finished off the conventional UKR power plants instead of mainly hitting switch yards and transformer substations??
Or - and this is very hard for me to understand - why is Russia fighting the UKR Donbas fortifications frontally instead of bypassing these along the North or South. My understanding is that the UKR has heavily fortified its positions in the whole Donbas region since 2014. See Bakhmut, Avdeevka, Mariupol, Chasov Yar, etc. and this is the main reason for the slow advances. But everything West of Ugledar is open country, so, why is the Russian Army not actively trying to flank and roll over the UKR fortifications from this flank??
Or - if Russia is having a bottleneck in industrial production due to a lack of installed capacity and/or skilled workers - why hasn't Russia set up production lines of some of the best performing systems in friendly countries with the condition to get back a % of the production for a number of years? I don't think the Iranians or the North Koreans wouldn't mind to get their own Iskander or S-400 factories....
Anyway, questions within questions... Thanks for your work!
5D chess theory is blatantly silly. But I think calling Russian military moves “improvisation” is not accurate. Military actions try to accomplish the political objectives of the leadership. Feb 22 objective was to force U to negotiate, and in this it was completely successful. The breaking down of Istanbul process was a political setback (for Russia) and U was mobilising and becoming fully aggressive on the battlefield. This forced a different strategy from R and continued occupation of Sumy, Kiev etc would have been entirely counterproductive. This is not so much improvisation but adopting a different strategic posture in line with new political reality, that is Kiev’s rejection of negotiations. I am sure the Stavka had a contingency plan for this.
Russia’s leadership also had to adapt to the new situation and redefine their response to Kiev’s attitude and determine how the now inevitable expanded war was to be conducted. At this point political and military objectives become almost entirely mixed together. But war of attrition at this point becomes very attractive for Russia, an almost inevitable outcome of the calculations of the war planners from virtually any angle.
But you’re right it wasn’t chess, it was complicated and risky, and ultimately the plan had to be tested in fire! It prevailed.
That 5D chess canard is simply a way of dismissing people you disagree with. In this case an entire article devoted to dismissing one individual's considered opinions, the point being that they are just opinions, his and mine. It comes down to a question of whether you're willing to engage in debate without denigrating your opponent (while knowing nothing of his background or actual level of knowledge).
The problem with making categorical statements based on limited knowledge is that, much like the 5D chess players our host disparages, you end up in the same trap of believing your own narrative over the facts as they present themselves.
The example that most stands is our hosts puzzlement about the bridges not being destroyed. This is not only explained by the need to preserve them in the event of an advance across the river (for which there no doubt exists a plan) but also the physical consequences of destroying them, given that several of those bridges sit atop power or flood control dams.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dnieper_reservoir_cascade
Odd that our host would miss this point as we've seen one dam breach already.
"As with any dam, the water reservoirs of the Dnieper in Ukraine pose a significant threat of a large-scale, human-made disaster if their dams fail. Those concerns were raised in particular in connection with the 2009 Sayano–Shushenskaya Dam disaster.[4] Concerns had yet again been raised regarding an air attack of the Kakhovka Dam on July 11, 2022. The Kakhovka Dam would later fail in the result of an explosion that occurred on June 6, 2023.[5] Flooding will impact downstream communities such as Kherson and will have devastating consequences to communities on the bank of the Dnipro River south of Nova Kakhovka.[6]"
The other consequence of a dam breach is that you create shallows where once you had deep water. So in destroying the dam you actually create the conditions for an easier crossing at multiple points using pontoons.
In war planning you have to take into account every possible scenario, as well as accepting that some situations may occur that you haven't planned for. The Mike Tyson effect. That said, there are substantial reasons for not destroying bridges, first being that you may want to use them later, thus a calculation on the trade-off between allowing your enemy a river crossing as opposed to destroying it when there are serious consequences that may undermine other priorities, such as minimizing damage to inhabited areas, plus the cost of rebuilding should your war aims include permanent annexation of the territory under consideration.
I don't see this sort of calculation being made here. What I see are bold assertions stated as fact, the same dogmatism our host accuses others of. I haven't been here long enough to say, so perhaps you can tell me - does he ever cite sources other than his own previous articles? Has he presented any military credentials? He lays claim to professional journalism, but that's not the same as having the military background to make the sort of assertions that characterize his narrative. Personally, I prefer to rely on information from people experienced in the art of war, not just bystanders writing about it from a safe distance.
Back to the 5D thing. Maybe the title of my substack threw him off? когда сталкиваются миры (when worlds collide) could be taken as a war blog, but it's not, it's simply a music site focused on post soviet culture. I don't blog about the war, I just search for reliable sources and make comments where I feel it's appropriate. I do play chess though, and I actually came close to beating a Spanish national champion in 1975 - the uncle of my ex-wife who was a captain in the Republican Army during the Spanish Civil War. I don't wear it on my sleeve though. Close only counts in horseshoes.
Agreed 💯
Thank you!
The use of the word 'gamble' indicates that there was a prefered plan A, which assumes the possible necessity of a plan B. Hard to believe that in the face of everything that the Russian general staff must have known aobut the huge Donbass fortifications and NATO plans that Russia did not at least contemplate a long war. But it was clearly not what they wanted.
I think you push the argument too far in the other direction. It is clearly not the case that the Russian forces were 'Pushed out of the Nikolayev Region. It was clear military choice but with obvious political downside. Note that the Ukrainians after their disastrous phyrric victory around Kharkov were aftraid to follow up and the Russian troops withdrew without losing a man or a vehicle. Note also that after the Kharkow withdrawal the huge ammuniton depot was found to be completely empty.
It was't 5D chess and obviously mistakes were made but Gerazimov has had plenty of time to think about this war in advance.
Agreed 💯
There was no need for war.
Simply cutting the gas to Europe in Feb 2022 would have brought NATO to its knees in 4 weeks.
The attrition war is obviously a plan to content and enrich immensely oligarchs on both sides of the fence - actually many of them are on both sides , gambling on every side victory but mostly getting fat while the conflict lasts.
Quite a sensible analysis. Whatever one’s sentiment about Russia’ decency and the Wicked West’s evilness, one should make an effort to separate signal from noise, look at the facts and draw the most logical conclusions. The old Ockham’s razor should prevail: if there is a simple explanation, it is likely to be the proper one.
It becomes an aggravation listening to that bunch of experts and analysts who repeat in a broken record fashion that the West is about to exhale its last breath, that NATO is bled dry of weapons, that the western nations are collapsing under the weight of failing economies and ineffective governments; that, by contrast, Russia has built a hyper-effective military-industrial system capable of providing an unlimited supply of armored equipment, missiles, artillery rounds, drones, etc, that the western sanction programs, instead of weakening Russia’s socioeconomic fabric, only enhanced its economic power, its financial strength, and the well-being of the people, and, in a nutshell, that Russia is just about to strike the final lethal blow on the Ukrainian-NATO forces.
This is not true. The decline of the West is unquestionable, but it still has a lot of muscle, it is far from being moribund. Russia has shown remarkable stamina, but despite its potential, it is also vulnerable: demographically, industrially, economically, socially and in terms of nationalities. Russia is probably, but not surely the winner of the contest. It would be sheer gullibility to believe that “all goes well, Madame la Marquise” (the old French song), when there are lots of fires to put out in the house. The price to pay may be unaffordable.
I think you're quite right in believing that the original Russian script hardly foresaw a war of attrition, did not anticipate the power of the Ukrainian side, and contained no provision for a protracted war. The Russians took a bold gamble, they lost, and from then on they had to rethink everything: strategy, domestic policy, supplies, relations with other states, relations with the Russian people.
I also believe that a better intelligence service, more subtle listening to Western cabinets and a more realistic military doctrine could have better educated the Russian leadership about the real risks of the gamble.
At this point, we can only hope that decisions will be taken on the basis of the known facts and the probabilities of the unknowns, and not on the basis of the fairy tales of the zealots. It’s I think you're quite right in believing that the original Russian script hardly foresaw a war of attrition, did not anticipate the power of the Ukrainian side, and contained no provision for a protracted war. The Russians took a bold gamble, they lost, and from then on they had to rethink everything: strategy, domestic policy, supplies, relations with other states, relations with the Russian people.
I also believe that a better intelligence service, more subtle listening to Western cabinets and a more realistic military doctrine could have better educated the Russian leadership about the real risks of the gamble.
At this point, we can only hope that decisions will be taken on the basis of facts and probabilities, and not on the basis of the fairy tales of the zealots. It’s a narrow path to victory.
"I think you're quite right in believing that the original Russian script hardly foresaw a war of attrition, did not anticipate the power of the Ukrainian side, and contained no provision for a protracted war."
Bear in mind that Ukraine was once part of the Soviet Union, and that some of the senior officers on both sides actually trained together or attended the same academies. In short, both sides are working from the same military playbook and are aware of that. Also, at the outset at least, both sides were using the same Soviet era equipment or its modern equivalent, so there was little uncertainty regarding those resources, neither in capability or in numbers. Add to this that as part of the USSR, the military installations and the terrain on which they are fighting are well known to the Russian side. The situation is somewhat unique in that effectively both sides are fighting on familiar territory which both regard as their own, and have had a full 8 years in which to prepare.
Frankly, it beggars belief that Russia would be unprepared for contingencies arising from fighting a peer force on terrain that, by their own repeated declarations, is considered a serious vulnerability, an existential threat. The USSR would obviously have made plans for confronting a peer force (NATO) in that exact domain. The fact that they're fighting Ukraine and not NATO directly doesn't alter the equation in terms of the territory, resources, conditions and contingencies one would encounter. On the contrary, since Ukraine was considered a primary invasion route, and historically was exactly that, I doubt that any stone was left unturned in planning for both defensive and offensive operations, both in the Soviet era and the present.
That said, you can never entirely predict the outcome of such operations, and mistakes will be made, but to describe events since the SMO began as poorly planned and lacking in foresight is to me, just Monday morning quarterbacking.
Interview with economics and foreign policy experts (John Mearsheimer and Jeffrey Sachs)
https://youtu.be/uvFtyDy_Bt0?feature=shared
The work you do is remarkable and in most cases I agree with you. However, you yourself lack nuance in this case.
It is likely that at the beginning Russia expected the special operation to be short in time and force Ukraine to accept a kind of "Minsk agreement" with neutralization and non-entry into NATO.
If I think it was naive and moreover a mistake, as I thought at the time of the Minsk agreements themselves in 2015, the fact is that it could have factually been signed and the conflict at least suspended.
If you have not read this book, "Art of Russian War", I believe that is the English title of Jacques Baud's book in English, I recommend it to you, like all his works that are translated into English.
To return to the subject, war actually never follows a pre-established linear pattern and each movement that an adversary makes can imply a significant modification in an overall plan.
This is what happened with the sabotage of the peace plan and the orderly retreat that followed was not of the same nature as that which would have been carried out if this treaty had not been broken. What conditioned and this retreat and the construction of the Surovikin line as well as the strategy of attrition that followed in the absence of general mobilization and c.
Do not forget that Kherson Zelensky was suspicious and thought that the retreat was a trap and that by means of which it took three days for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to enter the Kherson oblast. As for the Kharkov oblast, the important Russian ammunition depot close to the front line had been moved. which can take a good week. Note also that the Ukrainian blizkrieg was very costly in human and material terms and was stopped in a cauldron where the Ukrainian Armed Forces took a heavy toll.
It is in my opinion inaccurate to speak of improvisation. There were adaptations and a transformation of the objectives. But, as all actions produce reactions, this retreat gave the opportunity to the adversary of the Bucha assembly, then encouraged among other things the catastrophe of Finland's entry into NATO.
To conclude, In my opinion I believe that one of the main mistakes of Russia is to have underestimated the brainwashing operated especially in Western Ukraine since even before 2014 and to have considered that the majority of this people was a brother people. I think that Russia is now beginning to realize it.
"...Russia is winning..."
That works for me, not really too bothered about anything else, neither past nor present.
I do have concerns about the future but I'm content on the winning side.