This Weekend’s Astana Summit Is Likely The Last Chance For A Political Solution In Syria

If he declines to cut a deal, then Russia might punish him by not letting him live out the rest of his days in Moscow if he’s overthrown, let alone evacuate him if the need arises.

Lavrov confirmed to Tucker that he plans to meet with his Iranian and Turkish counterparts on the sidelines of this weekend’s Doha Forum. This upcoming session of their Astana format will likely represent the last chance for a political solution in Syria. The Turkish-backed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which is designated by some countries as a terrorist group, just captured Hama days after walking into the country’s second-largest city of Aleppo largely unopposed.

Here are three background briefings that readers should review before proceeding:

* 28 November: “The Terrorist Offensive In Aleppo Is Meant To Deliver A Coup De Grace To Syria”

* 30 November: “The Five Reasons Why Syria Was Caught By Surprise”

* 2 December: “Terrorist Blitz In Syria”

They’ll now be summarized for the reader’s convenience before moving on to this weekend’s talks.

Erdogan wants Assad to grant broad Bosnian-like federalized autonomy to his country’s Islamist proxies while ideally undertaking joint action against the US-backed Kurds who he considers to be terrorists, but Assad refused to talk with Erdogan until Erdogan withdraws all Turkish troops from Syria. Erdogan therefore sought to break this stalemate through the latest offensive, which took advantage of Russia being distracted by the special operation and Iran being weakened by its West Asian Wars with Israel.

It was the understandable absence of support from its allies coupled with its unacceptable lack of preparations that resulted in the Syrian Arab Army’s (SAA) historic retreat from the north. If a political solution isn’t reached by this weekend, then the Battle of Homs will likely follow sometime soon, after which it’s possible that HTS could march on Damascus if that city swiftly falls just like Aleppo and Hama. The only realistic chance of averting this scenario is for Assad to immediately make political concessions.

He could take a page from the Russian-written draft constitution that was unveiled in early 2017, which his government refused to implement due to the numerous concessions that it entails but which now might be the only viable model for resolving this conflict through anything other than military means. Readers can review the document in full here and a raft of constructive critiques about it here. The most relevant principle is that it concerns the creative decentralization of the country.

The domestic and regional circumstances have changed since 2017, however, so the aforesaid principle might have to be taken to more of an extreme by offering to grant broad Bosnian-like federalized autonomy to the north like Erdogan wants. The Kurds would also demand the same, which Putin might encourage Assad to give them as part of a package deal for finally ending this hybrid civil-international war. The historically Alawite-populated coastal region might also get its own federal autonomous zone.

Considering the deep distrust between Syria and Turkiye, Arab League peacekeepers (possibly led by the UAE and Egypt) might have to be deployed along the Line of Contact (LOC) between the SAA and Turkish-backed HTS in order to prevent the latter from once again going on the offensive at an opportune time. Even if HTS refuses to stop its advance, these peacekeepers could be rapidly deployed just beyond the LOC to halt them in their tracks before they reach Homs, the coast, and/or the desert.

About those last two vectors, HTS might eschew the coast since its mountainous geography works to the defenders’ advantage, plus Russia might fear drastically scale its bombing operations in the SAA’s support if it fears that Turkiye is trying to threaten its two bases there by proxy. As for the desert direction, a rapid thrust there might look impressive on the map, but HTS might not want to stretch its forces thin ahead of Homs in order to avoid creating any openings for a counteroffensive to succeed.

If Arab League peacekeepers are deployed, then Assad might have to commit to removing Iran and Hezbollah from Syria, which could also unlock phased sanctions relief for facilitating those countries’ efforts (chiefly the UAE’s and possibly also Saudi Arabia’s) to reconstruct the country afterwards. Likewise, even if they’re not deployed for whatever reason, he could also hypothetically call upon Israel for air support so long as he commits to removing those two as a precondition.

From Russia’s perspective, the ideal scenario is that Syria fully defeats the terrorists and regains total control over the country, but that’s a wishful thinking fantasy at this point. Accordingly, the most realistic best-case scenario for its interests is that Assad and his government don’t enter into the dustbin of history since that would harm Russia’s reputation by association as a perceived ally, hence why it might want Syria to immediately decentralize, which would also help preserve some of Russia’s influence there.

Moreover, if the Syrian War is wrapped up by the time that Trump is reinaugurated and the outcome preserves some American influence over agriculturally and energy-rich northeastern Syria via the US’ Kurdish partners, then he might be more prone to concessions in Ukraine to repay this favor. Russia’s “goodwill gesture” there might ultimately be unappreciated, but policymakers might still calculate that it’s worth attempting since their country is unable to help Syria achieve its maximalist goals.

A complementary objective that’s much more attainable in the event that Russia’s speculative draft constitution-inspired decentralization bears fruit is to reinforce its role as the supreme balancing force in West Asia. This was one of the reasons why it intervened in Syria in the first place apart from the immediate military imperative of defeating Russian and former Soviet terrorists there before they return home to cause chaos. It took a backseat in recent years but might now have a new lease on life.

Despite Russia’s best diplomatic efforts, Assad might still refuse whatever deal he’s presented just like he refused to make any progress on promulgating even part of the draft constitution. Unlike then, however, he can no longer rely on Iran to back him up like before if everything continues worsening after his next potential refusal. If he still declines to cut a deal, then Russia might punish him by not letting him live out the rest of his days in Moscow if he’s overthrown, let alone evacuate him if the need arises.