Trump Should Let Indonesia Purchase Jointly Russian-Indian Produced BrahMos Missiles

Biden let the Philippines purchase them last year so the precedent exists for Trump to do the same with regard to Indonesia and eventually other Asia-Pacific states too, which could raise the chances of reaching a grand deal with Russia if paired with energy- and Ukrainian-related incentives.

The election of new Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto last February, who previously served as Defense Minister from 2019 until his inauguration last October, coincided with the comprehensive expansion of his country’s ties with Russia. The Valdai Club, which is Russia’s top elite networking platform and also a prestigious think tank, produced plenty of analytical materials on this and even held their first seminar on bilateral relations in nine years in Jakarta in September. Here’s some of their work:

* 16 September: “Maritime Geopolitics of the Pacific and Indian Oceans: A View from Moscow”

* 17 September: “Russia and Indonesia: A Time-Tested Partnership”

* 23 September: “Indonesia-Russia 2025-2037: Maritime Cooperation, Diplomacy & Military Build Up”

* 24 September: “Indonesia – Russia: From the Past to the Future, History and Prospects”

* 30 September: “Openly About the Past, Optimistically About the Future: The Valdai Club’s Russian-Indonesian Seminar in Jakarta”

* 18 October: “Prospects for Indonesian Foreign Policy at the Current Stage”

* 12 November: “A Historical Perspective of Bilateral Relations between Indonesia and Russia”

* 30 November: “Andrey Bystritskiy Speaks at the Conference on Indonesian Foreign Policy”

* 24 December: “Indonesia With BRICS, A Bridge to the Future: Challenges and Opportunities”

* 26 December: “Strengthening Indonesia-Russia Bilateral Defence Relations”

Each of these is worthwhile reading or at least skimming in their own right, but for those who don’t have the time, the prevailing trend is that Russia and Indonesia have concluded that they can complement one another’s grand strategy of multi-aligning between Great Powers in the New Cold War. This approach is inspired by India but takes specific forms as regards Russia and Indonesia, each of which wants to preemptively avert potentially disproportionate dependence on any single partner.

As regards Russia, it fears entering into such relations with China, ergo why it relies on India and the “Ummah” (the international Muslim community) as counterweights. Indonesia shares similar concerns vis-à-vis the People’s Republic but is also wary of falling too much under American influence too. Each has accordingly come to see the other as complementary counterweights in their respective balancing acts, which explains why they’re so enthusiastic about expanding relations in recent months.

Indonesia’s status as the world’s most populous Muslim country and its geostrategic location in Southeast Asia have led to Russia considering it to be a promising partner for strengthening the existing “Ummah” pillar of its balancing act and serving as the centerpiece of its envisaged Asia-Pacific one. At the same time, Indonesia believes that building strategic relations with Russia can relieve some of the Sino-US pressure upon it as those two’s rivalry intensifies, especially in the military-technical sphere.

To elaborate on each’s imperatives, Russia requires access to new markets for its military-technical and commercial exports in order to better withstand the West’s sanctions, and Indonesia can easily fulfill this need. As for Indonesia, closer military-technical cooperation with China is unrealistic given their recently worsening maritime dispute, but buying a bunch of US arms could worsen the aforesaid emerging security dilemma, hence the interest in procuring these from China’s Russian partner instead.

The Indonesian Defense Ministry reaffirmed in late November that Russia is one of their strategic defense partners amidst reports about them seeking more weapons from it, while Prabowo earlier clinched a $10 billion deal with China and effusively congratulated Trump days before that. This sequence of events shows how carefully Indonesia’s new leader is trying to multi-align between these three Great Powers, with an important emphasis on the Russian dimension of this balancing act.

What he signaled was that the US still remains one of Indonesia’s top allies, but that won’t impede the cultivation of mutually beneficial economic ties with China, while relations with the People’s Republic might be counterbalanced in the military-technical sphere through more arms from Russia. The first is meant to reassure America that he harbors no ill will towards it, the second accomplishes the same vis-à-vis China, while the third shows the priority that he places on military-technical ties with Russia.

If Prabowo capitulates to US pressure and suddenly decides to buy a bunch of its arms instead of Russian ones, however, then he’ll undermine the aforementioned balancing act by pivoting Indonesia towards the Western camp in ways that China couldn’t help but interpret as unfriendly. After all, the large-scale purchase of such weapons would create the momentum – both in terms of substance and optics – for incorporating Indonesia into AUKUS+, which is the US’ unofficially envisaged Asian NATO.

The consequence of that happening would be disastrous for the region since it would spike the risk of a US-instigated proxy war with China breaking out by miscalculation, to say nothing of the ease with which the US could divide-and-rule this part of the world even in the absence of that worst-case scenario. It’s therefore in Indonesia’s objective national interests to avoid that, to which end it should see its reported interest in a Russian arms deal through to its conclusion, and India can lend a helping hand in this regard.

The US allowed India to export jointly Russian-produced BrahMos supersonic missiles to its Philippine ally last year for the tacit purpose of enhancing the recipient’s ability to deter China from any unilateral military moves amidst those two’s maritime dispute. The strategic logic behind this arrangement was analyzed here at the time, including insight into why Russia would agree to indirectly arm an American mutual defense ally against China, which contradicts the general public’s understanding of its interests.

The precedent therefore exists for the US to approve a BrahMos deal between India and Indonesia, which has been discussed for a few years and was brought up by the media again last week with regard to what Prabowo might discuss with Narendra Modi during this month’s visit to Delhi. From the US’ perspective, letting partners like the Philippines and possibly soon Indonesia purchase jointly Russian-produced missiles without fear of sanctions can build trust with Moscow ahead of talks on Ukraine.

It also serves to reinforce the perception of Russia as a “friendly” counterbalance to China in the region for those countries that don’t want to commit to large-scale Chinese or US arms deals amidst those two’s intensifying rivalry in order to not ruin relations with one or the other as a result. While the Philippines is firmly in the US’ camp, Indonesia and nearby Vietnam aren’t, so they and others like Thailand might want to rely more on Russia as a pressure valve in this regard beginning with BrahMos missile purchases.

It's in the US’ interest to passively facilitate the Kremlin’s aforesaid envisaged role. While it’s impossible to “un-unite” Russia and China like Trump pledged to do, he can still shape events in such a way that their ties don’t expand beyond their present level, which can avert Russia’s potentially disproportionate dependence on China that neither Moscow nor Washington wants. If coupled with the energy-related incentives described in detail here, the trappings of a grand Russian-American deal might emerge.

Readers should review the preceding hyperlinked analysis for more insight, but it boils down to the US letting the EU resume some gas pipeline imports from Russia and then investing into the Russian energy industry alongside India and Japan (who’d receive waivers), which could deprive China of these reserves. Adding a military-technical aspect to this package by agreeing to let Russia arm Asia-Pacific states against China (like it already arms India) without fear of them coming under sanctions might seal the deal.

If Trump gets greedy and tries to monopolize this regional arms market, then his country’s military-industrial complex would profit at the expense of the US’ grand strategic goal of pressuring China on all fronts for the purpose of coercing the People’s Republic into its own grand deal later on. The key to success lies in Russia informally agreeing not to turbocharge China’s superpower rise by subordinating itself to China as nothing more than a raw materials reserve out of desperation to win in Ukraine.

Therein lies the reason why it’s in the US’ interests to let Russia achieve as many of its maximum goals there as possible in exchange for Russia agreeing to keep China at arm’s length instead of subordinating itself to it at the expense of the US’ grand strategic goals. In pursuit of this grand deal, the US would have to offer Russia incentivizes in its energy industry to overcompensate for lost revenue with China, and throwing in military-technical opportunities in the Asia-Pacific would make this even more attractive.

The Sino-US rivalry is shaping up to be the century’s greatest challenge, but the US has no chance of winning or even reaching a draw unless it ensures that China’s superpower rise isn’t turbocharged by decades-long access to ultra-cheap Russian resources. If Trump doesn’t give Putin at least most of what he wants in Ukraine, then the Russian leader will order his troops to keep fighting, which would necessitate Chinese financial and other forms of support that could only come with strings attached.

These are agreeing to China’s reported demands for bargain-basement gas prices equivalent to Russia’s own domestic ones, which could then eventually place Russia in a relationship of disproportionate budgetary dependence on China that could be leveraged towards other ends. If Russia wants modern arms from China that would provoke the US’ sanctions wrath, for example, then it might have to first informally agree to cut India off from arms so as to weaken it amidst their Himalayan border dispute.

As can be seen, agreeing to China’s gas price demands could catalyze a chain reaction of consequences that might drastically reshape the New Cold War’s dynamics in China’s favor, which would be contrary to the US’ grand strategic interests. If letting Indonesia and others in the region purchase jointly Russian-Indian produced BrahMos missiles and later other Russian arms is required for getting Putin to consider averting this scenario via a grand deal with the US, then Trump should seriously consider this concession.