Accepting the impossibility of Russia abandoning its mutually beneficial cooperation with China and acknowledging that lifting the sanctions likely won’t happen either, the rest of his proposals could form the parameters of a potential Russian-American deal for ending their proxy war in Ukraine.
I just don't see Russia permanently severing Ukraine's growing ties with NATO after 18 months of trying its utmost to this end. Since the special operation began, those same ties unprecedentedly intensified to the point where Ukraine is now a full-fledged NATO proxy.
As for Russia's other interests, I do believe that it's willing to accept a scaled-back version of its desired end game that at least tacitly recognizes the new ground realities and de facto freezes NATO expansion.
"I just don't see Russia permanently severing Ukraine's growing ties with NATO after 18 months of trying its utmost to this end."
This is not a joke nor a game, but it is a long-game: eighteen months is hardly a tick of the clock. Stoltenberg was right about attrition but wrong in fuelling the delusion that it might be possible to overwhelm Russia in the long run. Russia is what it is and always will be: «Так было, так есть и так будет всегда!». No attrition, whatever the source, is going to change that.
"Since the special operation began, those same ties unprecedentedly intensified to the point where Ukraine is now a full-fledged NATO proxy. "
And this IS what must be stopped; this is why hostilities could no longer be suppressed.
"As for Russia's other interests, I do believe that it's willing to accept a scaled-back version of its desired end game..."
Yes, of course: there's ALWAYS room for compromise (and very few things under the sun can be either 'always' or 'never', but this is one of them).
"... that at least tacitly recognizes the new ground realities and de facto freezes NATO expansion."
I understand that Russia has long-term strategic goals, but it's limited in terms of how it pursues them. Even if it achieves a major breakthrough across the front lines and storms through the rest of Ukraine, NATO can still conventionally intervene to freeze the Line of Contact.
Neither bombers nor cruise missiles nor anything else has thus far succeeded in completely removing Ukrainian-emanating threats to Russia's national security. At best, it's helped manage them, but they keep sprouting back up like mushrooms. Russia therefore hasn't been able to completely achieve this goal thus far.
Regarding the last part, Russia's security guarantee requests from December 2021 explicitly sought to freeze NATO expansion, while Russian officials have been saying since September 2022's referenda that the new ground realities have to be recognized in some capacity as a prerequisite for peace.
"I understand that Russia has long-term strategic goals, but it's limited in terms of how it pursues them. Even if it achieves a major breakthrough across the front lines and storms through the rest of Ukraine, NATO can still conventionally intervene to freeze the Line of Contact."
True, there could be such a Korea-type standoff, whereby the US believes it can contain Russia, as it has contained North Korea. North Korea, however, regardless how it's reported in the West, hasn't fared too badly in its war of attrition. In fact, one might even say they're winning. Now imagine Russia in a similar type of situation and consider what the consequences might be. How long do you think it would last? All the might of the combined West has managed to suppress N. Korea, increasingly ineffectively, since the mid-50's. You reckon they've got the strength to keep Russia down by a similar means for a similar duration? Ultimately, I believe, this could only work to Russia's advantage.
"Neither bombers nor cruise missiles nor anything else has thus far succeeded in completely removing Ukrainian-emanating threats to Russia's national security. At best, it's helped manage them, but they keep sprouting back up like mushrooms. Russia therefore hasn't been able to completely achieve this goal thus far."
True, and if Tucker Carlson is right and they do admit to initiating the war they've created in order to suppress the will of their people, things could change rapidly. And they might not. The thing that worries me about this, is what he said about the 'low-IQ' part of the Republican party: there really is a disturbing proportion of Americans (Republicans) who don't understand that John McCain's ability to chew gum and walk at the same time did not make him deserving of a seat at the table with Putin. So, yes, I agree: there is that danger.
"Regarding the last part, Russia's security guarantee requests from December 2021 explicitly sought to freeze NATO expansion, while Russian officials have been saying since September 2022's referenda that the new ground realities have to be recognized in some capacity as a prerequisite for peace."
And since then Finland moved the goalposts and tipped the playing field. Who cares about NATO expansion? It doesn't make any difference: whether it consists of 20 or 30 or 40 members the only way to dissuade it in the worst case would be nuclear, so expansion is irrelevant.
Something of an afterthought, which actually relates to the original post; you initially wrote that Russia should, perhaps, agree to allow foreign military 'support' and 'hard guarantees' in the Ukraine in exchange for some undertaking not to expand NATO any further. This is the idea I would consider an absolute non-starter. The validity for the Special Military Operation — one of it's three goals: 1) de-militarise the Ukraine, 2) de-nazify the Ukraine and 3) preclude the possibility of any such recurrence (of foreign meddling) in the Ukraine — would not be satisfied by such a compromise. As long as the Americans have something they can call a legitimate presence in the Ukraine, they will use it to hurt Russia; they will continually seek to expand that presence, using their rules-based justifications, to further hurt and ultimately destroy Russia by any means they can find.
You seem to think the Americans promising not to expand NATO any further, now that they've already shackled all Europe and much beyond, including Finland and Sweden since the Operation began, is of some value. I don't see it like that and I think it's dangerously fallacious to encourage such thinking. It wouldn't be a big deal for them to say, 'OK, we won't expand NATO any further.' And then turn around to say, 'Ah, yeah, but North Africa isn't NATO and Pakistan isn't part of the Quad.' when, the reality on the ground, as you put it, is they're all the same thing.
And, as I point about above, what difference does it make if there are ten, twenty, thirty, forty or fifty countries officially shackled to the American war machine? Until that machine disintegrates, as it has started to do now under pressure from Russia's success in the Ukraine, no-one is safe and nothing will stop it. Please don't take offence, but any other reasoning on this point, given the evidence, is purely fallacious.
It is critical to Biden's political survival not to seem to have lost in the "SMO." It is also critical to Putin's political survival not to be seen as having lost in the SMO. So a ceasefire and negotiations are unlikely to occur until after the 2024 presidential elections. It is also critical to Biden's political survival not to be seen as starting World War III. That is why arms to Ukraine have been given in dribs and drabs. If Russia were to make the kind of breakthrough mentioned above, the arms that have been withheld so far would no doubt be supplied, possibly leading to the kind of defeat of Russian forces that would imperil Mr.Putin. Yet all realist foreign policy experts in the US (Mearsheimer is an example) agree that the removal of Mr.Putin puts Russia at risk of a political vacuum and power struggle that might end in civil war and the eventual breakup of the Russian Federation. This would be a political catastrophe of the highest order given the quantity of strategic nuclear weapons possesed by RF. This is why I do not want Ukraine to "win the war," because that would have the consequences just outlined. It is therefore in everybodys interest that the war (sorry, SMO) continue in the stalemate that is under way at present.
"...Ukraine’s privileged post-conflict relationship with NATO..."
No!
"...but these could be acceptable if its other interests are met."
No!
"...what it truly is: Russia putting its interests first."
No!
Couldn't be more simple, really: the most dangerously fallacious analysis I've witnessed you produce.
I just don't see Russia permanently severing Ukraine's growing ties with NATO after 18 months of trying its utmost to this end. Since the special operation began, those same ties unprecedentedly intensified to the point where Ukraine is now a full-fledged NATO proxy.
As for Russia's other interests, I do believe that it's willing to accept a scaled-back version of its desired end game that at least tacitly recognizes the new ground realities and de facto freezes NATO expansion.
"I just don't see Russia permanently severing Ukraine's growing ties with NATO after 18 months of trying its utmost to this end."
This is not a joke nor a game, but it is a long-game: eighteen months is hardly a tick of the clock. Stoltenberg was right about attrition but wrong in fuelling the delusion that it might be possible to overwhelm Russia in the long run. Russia is what it is and always will be: «Так было, так есть и так будет всегда!». No attrition, whatever the source, is going to change that.
"Since the special operation began, those same ties unprecedentedly intensified to the point where Ukraine is now a full-fledged NATO proxy. "
And this IS what must be stopped; this is why hostilities could no longer be suppressed.
"As for Russia's other interests, I do believe that it's willing to accept a scaled-back version of its desired end game..."
Yes, of course: there's ALWAYS room for compromise (and very few things under the sun can be either 'always' or 'never', but this is one of them).
"... that at least tacitly recognizes the new ground realities and de facto freezes NATO expansion."
No, this is NOT one of them.
I understand that Russia has long-term strategic goals, but it's limited in terms of how it pursues them. Even if it achieves a major breakthrough across the front lines and storms through the rest of Ukraine, NATO can still conventionally intervene to freeze the Line of Contact.
Neither bombers nor cruise missiles nor anything else has thus far succeeded in completely removing Ukrainian-emanating threats to Russia's national security. At best, it's helped manage them, but they keep sprouting back up like mushrooms. Russia therefore hasn't been able to completely achieve this goal thus far.
Regarding the last part, Russia's security guarantee requests from December 2021 explicitly sought to freeze NATO expansion, while Russian officials have been saying since September 2022's referenda that the new ground realities have to be recognized in some capacity as a prerequisite for peace.
"I understand that Russia has long-term strategic goals, but it's limited in terms of how it pursues them. Even if it achieves a major breakthrough across the front lines and storms through the rest of Ukraine, NATO can still conventionally intervene to freeze the Line of Contact."
True, there could be such a Korea-type standoff, whereby the US believes it can contain Russia, as it has contained North Korea. North Korea, however, regardless how it's reported in the West, hasn't fared too badly in its war of attrition. In fact, one might even say they're winning. Now imagine Russia in a similar type of situation and consider what the consequences might be. How long do you think it would last? All the might of the combined West has managed to suppress N. Korea, increasingly ineffectively, since the mid-50's. You reckon they've got the strength to keep Russia down by a similar means for a similar duration? Ultimately, I believe, this could only work to Russia's advantage.
"Neither bombers nor cruise missiles nor anything else has thus far succeeded in completely removing Ukrainian-emanating threats to Russia's national security. At best, it's helped manage them, but they keep sprouting back up like mushrooms. Russia therefore hasn't been able to completely achieve this goal thus far."
True, and if Tucker Carlson is right and they do admit to initiating the war they've created in order to suppress the will of their people, things could change rapidly. And they might not. The thing that worries me about this, is what he said about the 'low-IQ' part of the Republican party: there really is a disturbing proportion of Americans (Republicans) who don't understand that John McCain's ability to chew gum and walk at the same time did not make him deserving of a seat at the table with Putin. So, yes, I agree: there is that danger.
"Regarding the last part, Russia's security guarantee requests from December 2021 explicitly sought to freeze NATO expansion, while Russian officials have been saying since September 2022's referenda that the new ground realities have to be recognized in some capacity as a prerequisite for peace."
And since then Finland moved the goalposts and tipped the playing field. Who cares about NATO expansion? It doesn't make any difference: whether it consists of 20 or 30 or 40 members the only way to dissuade it in the worst case would be nuclear, so expansion is irrelevant.
Something of an afterthought, which actually relates to the original post; you initially wrote that Russia should, perhaps, agree to allow foreign military 'support' and 'hard guarantees' in the Ukraine in exchange for some undertaking not to expand NATO any further. This is the idea I would consider an absolute non-starter. The validity for the Special Military Operation — one of it's three goals: 1) de-militarise the Ukraine, 2) de-nazify the Ukraine and 3) preclude the possibility of any such recurrence (of foreign meddling) in the Ukraine — would not be satisfied by such a compromise. As long as the Americans have something they can call a legitimate presence in the Ukraine, they will use it to hurt Russia; they will continually seek to expand that presence, using their rules-based justifications, to further hurt and ultimately destroy Russia by any means they can find.
You seem to think the Americans promising not to expand NATO any further, now that they've already shackled all Europe and much beyond, including Finland and Sweden since the Operation began, is of some value. I don't see it like that and I think it's dangerously fallacious to encourage such thinking. It wouldn't be a big deal for them to say, 'OK, we won't expand NATO any further.' And then turn around to say, 'Ah, yeah, but North Africa isn't NATO and Pakistan isn't part of the Quad.' when, the reality on the ground, as you put it, is they're all the same thing.
And, as I point about above, what difference does it make if there are ten, twenty, thirty, forty or fifty countries officially shackled to the American war machine? Until that machine disintegrates, as it has started to do now under pressure from Russia's success in the Ukraine, no-one is safe and nothing will stop it. Please don't take offence, but any other reasoning on this point, given the evidence, is purely fallacious.
Russia doesn't want anyone to provide security guarantees for Ukraine but it's powerless to prevent these from being reached.
They already existed in the shadows somewhat before the special operation but are now in public view and have become stronger.
The unprecedented military and other forms of aid provided to Ukraine testify to the existence of such guarantees at present.
To your point about expanding NATO, Russia still remains committed to that point from December 2021 despite it being outdated a bit.
In my personal view, I feel there were serious mistakes in the special operation from the get-go, and some have yet to be corrected.
This undermined the entire campaign at its most crucial phase and led to Russia being unable to achieve all its goals.
That feeling is beginning to be reflected in Russian statements hinting at an interest in compromising to freeze the conflict.
I wish all its goals could be achieved and prefer if they already had been, but I just don't see it happening at this point.
Russia wants to freeze this and wouldn't mind if the US refocused its attention on the Asia-Pacific instead of keeping it on Europe.
That's not to say that it wants the US to contain China even more, but just that it would choose this over continuing the proxy war.
The only realistic variable that could change these calculations is if Russia breaks through the front lines by winter.
In that scenario, it would have to go as far and fast as possible before NATO likely intervenes to freeze the front lines.
Even then, however, I still don't see this ending in a way where Russia achieves all of its original objectives in full. It'll have to compromise.
And dangerously so!
It is critical to Biden's political survival not to seem to have lost in the "SMO." It is also critical to Putin's political survival not to be seen as having lost in the SMO. So a ceasefire and negotiations are unlikely to occur until after the 2024 presidential elections. It is also critical to Biden's political survival not to be seen as starting World War III. That is why arms to Ukraine have been given in dribs and drabs. If Russia were to make the kind of breakthrough mentioned above, the arms that have been withheld so far would no doubt be supplied, possibly leading to the kind of defeat of Russian forces that would imperil Mr.Putin. Yet all realist foreign policy experts in the US (Mearsheimer is an example) agree that the removal of Mr.Putin puts Russia at risk of a political vacuum and power struggle that might end in civil war and the eventual breakup of the Russian Federation. This would be a political catastrophe of the highest order given the quantity of strategic nuclear weapons possesed by RF. This is why I do not want Ukraine to "win the war," because that would have the consequences just outlined. It is therefore in everybodys interest that the war (sorry, SMO) continue in the stalemate that is under way at present.