What Can The Horn Of Africa Learn From The Moldovan-Ukrainian Land Swap Of 1999?

The Moldovan-Ukrainian land swap occurred one-quarter of a century ago in very different conditions, but the example of restoring a landlocked state’s historical access to the sea in pursuit of mutual benefits can form the basis of a spiritually similar deal in the Horn if Eritrea and/or Djibouti agree.

Addis Standard published a piece earlier in the month titled “Op-ed: Red Sea is not the Suez Canal: What will be the outcome of Egyptian intervention in Ethiopia's sea access quest?” It was authored by Miessa Elema Robe, who holds a PhD in Political Science and International Relations and is currently serving as head of the press secretariat at the Addis Abeba City Administration. He relevantly referenced the Moldovan-Ukrainian land swap of 1999 as a lesson for the Horn of Africa, which will be elaborated on.

His article cited the New York Times’ 2015 piece about how “Time-Worn Village in Moldova Springs Back to Life, Thanks to Port”, which celebrated the way in which the aforesaid swap helped that former Soviet Republic’s struggling economy. The historical context is that the medieval Principality of Moldavia used to connect to the Black Sea, as did the Russian Empire’s Bessarabia Governorate, which is one of its subnational successors. Contemporary Moldova then became landlocked as a result of border changes.

Stalin gave the historically Moldovan/Romanian land (they’re kindred people who are considered to be part of the same civilization) of what’s now known as Budjak to Ukraine after World War II upon capturing it from interwar Romania, which cut Moldova off from the Black Sea. The post-independence era was very difficult for Moldova, but its leadership knew that restoring their access to the sea could help stabilize the socio-economic situation and therefore the political one a lot more.

For all their faults, of which there are many, their leadership and Ukraine’s agreed to swap land to this end. Kiev’s motives were pragmatic since it didn’t want its smaller neighbor to remain unstable and impoverished, which could further impede its own development plans. Although Ukraine was ultimately unable to improve its domestic situation for reasons that are beyond the scope of this analysis, the point is that it agreed to this swap in order to advance the greater regional good.

Ethiopia’s history is similar to Moldova’s in that it too used to have access to the sea, but distant imperial powers were responsible for changing that, not its neighbors like in Moldova’s case. Italy’s colonization of Ethiopia’s historical Red Sea coast was then falsely “legitimized” by its fellow European empires, after which the administrative borders of “Italian Eritrea” were inherited upon that land’s reunification with Ethiopia. This policy later became the standard for post-colonial territories across the world.

That wasn’t a problem for Ethiopia until after Eritrea became independent in 1993 and then provoked a war between them five years later, which once again cut Ethiopia off from the sea and made it dependent on Djibouti since the nearby port of Assab was no longer accessible for obvious reasons. This new geo-economic reality was exploited by Djibouti to enrich itself at Ethiopia’s expense, with neither Eritrea nor Somalia wanting to help Ethiopia diversify from that statelet since they sought to contain it.

The regional strategic situation is altogether different for Ethiopia than for Moldova though since the latter’s economy depends largely on nearby states with whom there are many overland trade opportunities and the nearby Black-Mediterranean Sea beyond the Danube River is very safe. The same can’t be said for Ethiopia, whose top trade partners are in different corners of the world, and the maritime logistics upon which its economic and therefore political stability depend aren’t safe at all.

Moreover, Ethiopia is the second most populous state in Africa and while Moldova is one of the least populous in Europe, so instability stemming from the first’s fragile maritime supply chains could reverberate much more widely to the detriment of millions while the second’s instability is manageable. If ulterior motives weren’t at play and Ethiopia’s neighbors didn’t conspire to contain it, both on their own regard and nearby historical rival Egypt’s, then they’d rationally help it resecure access to the sea.

After all, ensuring Ethiopia’s economic growth and associated stability would naturally benefit them too, and this can only be achieved by allowing it military-commercial access to a nearby port in order to rebuild its navy (for protecting its maritime supply chains with time) and freely conducting global trade. In furtherance of this end, Ethiopia clinched its Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, but complementing it with more deals in the region would expand the scope of benefits for all.

With this in mind, just like justice in Southeastern Europe was served by Ukraine swapping land with Moldova in order to restore the latter’s historical access to the sea, so too could it be served in the Horn of Africa through a spiritually similar deal between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti if the political will existed. Land doesn’t need to be swapped, but an arrangement modeled off of the Somaliland MoU could be negotiated in which Ethiopia would obtain military-commercial access to Assab and Tadjoura.

Commercial access isn’t enough due to Ethiopia’s need to eventually defend the maritime logistics upon which its economic and political depends, which ideally requires a set of bases in the Gulf of Aden-Red Sea (GARS) region instead of relying on the one that it plans to obtain in Somaliland. Eritrea and Djibouti would do well to stop trying to contain Ethiopia and enrich itself at its expense respectively and instead seriously consider the mutual benefits inherent in replicating the Somaliland MoU model.

Stakes in Ethiopia’s national companies can be offered to them too, which can help Eritrea obtain more sources of revenue while assisting Djibouti in diversifying from its dependence on port fees. Eritrea previously flirted with resuming Ethiopia’s commercial access to Assab while Djibouti recently offered full management of Tadjoura, but neither wants to include military rights into their proposal. Therein lies the rub since they still want to contain Ethiopia, but that’s counterproductive and dangerous.

It’s better to move beyond the regional security dilemma and towards more complex economic interdependence in order for the Horn to rise as one instead of being picked apart by others like Egypt. The Moldovan-Ukrainian land swap occurred one-quarter of a century ago in very different conditions, but the example of restoring a landlocked state’s historical access to the sea in pursuit of mutual benefits can form the basis of a spiritually similar deal in the Horn if Eritrea and/or Djibouti agree.