What Impact Might The US’ Latest Energy Sanctions Have On Russo-Indo Relations?

Trump’s preference for sanctions and his latest threat to double down on secondary ones could derail India’s careful multi-alignment between the US and Russia by forcing it to choose between them.

The media has been awash with reports speculating that Russo-Indo relations might suffer as a result of the US’ latest energy sanctions seeing as how they’ve recently centered on Delhi’s large-scale import of discounted oil from Moscow that could be jeopardized by these latest unilateral restrictions. An unnamed Indian source told the media that “Russia will find ways to reach us” and predicted steeper discounts to counteract the new sanctions risks, however, so there isn’t much cause to worry for now.

The measures won’t kick in till March so there’s still time for both parties to plan workarounds, one of which is taking the form of India recently expanding its Russian insurers’ pool to include non-sanctioned companies, though it remains unclear what they’ll do about Russia’s sanctioned “shadow fleet”. In any case, it’s a step in the right direction and shows the importance that India places on continuing its large-scale import of discounted Russian oil, the strategic significance of which will now be explained.

Not only did it help avert a polycrisis over the past few years that could have catalyzed disastrously cascading consequences across the Global South as touched upon here in late 2023, but it also kept India’s impressive growth trajectory on track, thus retaining its foreign investment attractiveness too. Additionally, India preemptively averted Russia’s potentially disproportionate dependence on China by diversifying its energy revenue streams, thus preventing Russia from becoming China’s junior partner.

This stopped Sino-US bi-multipolar trends and facilitated the tri-multipolar transitional phase of the global systemic transition towards more complex multipolarity (“multiplexity”). That outcome might be seen by some US policymakers as detrimental to their country’s grand strategic interests, but on the flipside, Russia has yet to turn into a raw materials reserve for turbocharging China’s superpower rise like it could have already become had it not been for India diversifying Russia’s energy revenue streams.

India’s grand strategic interests are to prevent that from happening due to the possibility that China might one day leverage its senior partnership over Russia to get the latter to curtail and ultimately suspend (regardless of the pretext) new and spare military supplies to India. Moreover, Russia’s turbocharging of China’s superpower rise could compel India to become the US’ junior partner in kind, which could lead to serious concessions on its hard-earned strategic autonomy.

These imperatives suggest that India will do everything in its power to retain its large-scale import of discounted Russian oil since the alternative is to risk Russia becoming China’s junior partner with all that would entail for reshaping the global systemic transition by restoring Sino-US bi-multipolarity. In the event that India feels coerced into complying with these latest sanctions, such as if Trump is misled by misguided advisors into threatening crippling secondary sanctions, then it could try to strike a deal.

In exchange for sanctions waivers, which India could explain would be required for preventing Russia’s transformation into a raw materials reserve for turbocharging China’s superpower rise at the expense of the US’ grand strategic interests, it could try to convince Russia to accept Trump’s peace plan. While it remains unclear exactly what he has in mind, the signals that he’s sent thus far suggest that he’ll demand tough compromises from Russia, which Putin might reject and then Trump could escalate in response.

This could lead to even more anti-Russian sanctions, including the enforcement of threatened secondary ones against third countries like India, and more armed aid to Ukraine for perpetuating the conflict. If Russia doesn’t accept the ceasefire, armistice, or peace terms on offer, then it might have no choice but to become China’s junior partner out of desperation for funding and potentially even military-technical equipment in exchange for selling its resources at basement-bargain prices like it’s thus far refused to do.

Trump wants to “Pivot (back) to Asia” pronto in order to more muscularly contain China, which necessitates him swiftly resolving the Ukrainian Conflict, so its possible perpetuation could indefinitely delay that while resulting in Russia turbocharging China’s superpower rise like he wants to avoid. He and his advisors might not see it that way, but India could help convince them of this scenario forecast, which some on his team might be receptive to due to their Indophilia.

Even if India can’t convince Trump to demand tough compromises of Putin and then can’t convince Putin to accept them, it might still defy the US’ predictable secondary sanctions threats to continue importing discounted Russian oil, even if perhaps not at the same scale as before. This possibility is premised on the grand strategic importance of their energy ties as they relate to the global systemic transition from India’s perspective and the imperative to prevent Russia from becoming China’s junior partner.

With all this insight in mind, the likelihood of the US’ latest energy sanctions harming Russo-Indo ties is low and nowhere near what some in the media have speculated, but the risk still exists that they might be damaged a bit if they’re not successful in pioneering workarounds. The other variable of significance is whether India can convince Trump to grant it a sanctions waiver due to how these large-scale purchases prevent Russia from becoming China’s junior partner or in exchange for mediating on Ukraine.

Trump’s preference for sanctions and his latest threat to double down on secondary ones in that event could derail India’s careful multi-alignment between the US and Russia by forcing it to choose between them, which it doesn’t want to do under any circumstances. This contextualizes India’s recent expansion of its Russian insurers’ pool as a pragmatic compromise for now at least, which proves how much India doesn’t want to be forced into the aforementioned dilemma, though it might still ultimately be.

At the end of the day, everything depends on how far Trump is willing to pressure India on its large-scale import of discounted Russian oil and the degree to which India might then defy him. Trump might be convinced by India to reconsider going all out, while India might then boldly pursue its grand strategic interests if that doesn’t happen, though at the risk of a serious crisis with the US. Observers should therefore keep a close eye on these dynamics due to their potentially huge impact on the world order.