What’s Really Behind Putin’s Generous Ceasefire Proposal?

President Putin knew that they’d reject the terms of his ceasefire proposal but he still publicly shared them in order to place the responsibility for this summer’s predictable escalation on their shoulders.

President Putin shocked friends and foes alike, most of whom were hitherto convinced that Russia wants to capture all of Ukraine, by sharing a ceasefire proposal on Friday during his speech at the Foreign Ministry. The terms are simple: Ukraine must withdraw from the administrative borders of those four regions that joined Russia after September 2022’s referenda and declare that it no longer wants to join NATO. Upon doing so, “we will immediately cease fire and start negotiations”, he promised.

There’s more to this than meets the eye, however, since the timing came one day before the Swiss talks that Russia fiercely opposes for the reasons that were explained here. His proposal was also shared amidst the incipient Sino-Brazilian efforts to organize a parallel non-Western peace process that they and Russia hope will culminate in a deal at November’s G20 Summit in Rio. As such, while there’s no reason to doubt his sincerity like some have, it’s clear that he intended to foil the first and support the second.

Not only that, but he likely also had in mind the larger military-strategic context of an impending escalation by sometime this summer that could occur if NATO members conventionally intervene in Ukraine on the pretext of “defending” it in the event of a Russian breakthrough across the front lines. If an invasion force crosses the Dnieper and appears to threaten Russia’s new regions, then it’s possible that tactical nukes could be used to stop them as a last resort in self-defense, ergo the ongoing drills.

Considering the likelihood that this sequence of events might soon unfold and recognizing that everything could then spiral into World War III, President Putin’s supplementary motive for sharing his ceasefire proposal at this specific time was to avert that scenario. If Ukraine complied with his requests, then there’d be no reason to continue the military phase of the special operation since the conditions would have been established for focusing solely on diplomatic means for ensuring his country’s interests.

Nevertheless, it was also predictable that these generous terms would be unacceptable for Ukraine and especially its Western overlords since they amount to recognizing Russia’s new borders, which both have repeatedly said that they’ll never do. It’s also unimaginable that they’d grant Russia control over Kherson and Zaporozhye’s populous namesake cities as well as those regions’ territories west of the Dnieper, the latter of which would be difficult to hold but are still considered by Moscow to be its own.

President Putin knew that they’d reject the terms of his ceasefire proposal but he still publicly shared them in order to place the responsibility for this summer’s predictable escalation on their shoulders. This insight hints that he’s deadly serious about using tactical nukes as a last resort in self-defense if a NATO invasion force crosses the Dnieper in the event of a Russian breakthrough across the front lines. Even if they remain west of the river, Russia might still conventionally strike some of them to send a message.

This escalation scenario, which could easily spiral into World War III, can only be averted by Ukraine and the West complying with Russia’s minimum terms for peace talks. They’re very generous since they don’t concern demilitarization and denazification, though Russia likely expects to advance those goals through diplomatic means. Even so, it also knows that it might not achieve them in full (if at all), but it would have at least gotten those two to recognize its new borders and for Ukraine to abandon its NATO plans.

The Russian leader is no longer naïve like he candidly admitted that he was last December and therefore knows that any Korean-like armistice would just buy both sides time to rearm before the conflict likely resumes, but he’s prepared for that eventuality if no comprehensive peace is reached during the talks. Ukraine and the West also know this, which is another reason why they won’t comply with his terms since they’d be at a disadvantage during the second round of hostilities if Russia gains so much ground.  

Accordingly, military means are the only way through which Russia will meet its minimum political goal in the special operation of getting those two to recognize its new borders, but it would be loath to stop then even if that’s obtained after all the costs that it would have paid to get to that point. President Putin couldn’t agree to freeze the conflict without achieving some of his security goals too even if it’s only Ukraine superficially abandoning its NATO plans while remaining an informal member of the bloc.

Honestly speaking, Ukraine and the West have more to gain by accepting President Putin’s generous ceasefire terms and then doubling down on their militarization irrespective of possibly resuming the conflict than continuing to fight in vain to dislodge Russia from the territory that Kiev claims as its own. The military-strategic trends are entirely in Russia’s favor due to its victory over NATO in the “race of logistics”/“war of attrition” so it makes perfect sense for the bloc to call a time-out in order to rearm.

Even if they decide against a second round of hostilities, Ukraine can still arm itself to the teeth and have enough time to train its troops for operating sophisticated weapons systems while the US could further arm its Asian allies as part of its anti-Chinese containment efforts. The problem from their perspective, however, is that this first requires them tacitly acknowledging that they failed to strategically defeat Russia like they promised they’d do as well as recognizing its new borders.

Both are politically unacceptable so they’d rather continue fighting in vain for the sake of salvaging their reputations even at the risk of everything spiraling into World War III. The only conditions under which they’ll stop is if they achieve something symbolic that can be then spun as a strategic victory. This could be obtained through the formal entrance of NATO troops to Ukraine and that country’s subsequently de facto membership in the bloc, for example, even if Kiev loses more land in the process.

What’s most important to them is the optics of victory, even if it’s ultimately a pyrrhic one after the enormous military, economic, and opportunity costs that’ll have been paid in pursuit of it. Since their strategic goal of defeating Russia is unattainable, they’re now desperate to at least make it seem like they’ve achieved one of their political goals before agreeing to end this proxy war. These calculations are very dangerous since they suggest that the West will indeed risk World War III in order to obtain this.