As Trump said to Z, you have no cards. Trump doesn’t have any either. Russia has already won, and unless Putin’s conditions are met there’s no reason not to finish the mopping up job. The US has amply proven that it cannot be trusted, especially with respect to honoring ceasefires. There’s no difference between Trump and Netanyahu in this regard. The sanctions have backfired. The battles have been lost in the proxy war. The US has all but admitted defeat, and Z isn’t invited to the table. He’s not legitimate governor of anything. Yes, it’s too bad, especially for most Ukrainians who didn’t ask for this. If Trump wants peace he could offer the heads of Z, Nuland and Starmer (figuratively speaking, of course). Escalating to de-escalate is just a path to WWIII.
Well, V.Putin is not under a pressure of freeing the hostages and surely knows of ceasefires Israel pushed in because of need to free citizens kidnapped by Islamisation bandits of Gaza.
With ceasefires, Netanyahu works on the principle if you break ceasefire, he isn't going to the US for green light, he will respond as is. So if Hamas or Hezbollah militants break the ceasefire as Israelis see it they are eliminated and that is it.
With Putin, he has a much longer fuse, and that is known everywhere. So there is a much bigger potential for Ukrainian provocation and testing.
The main point for Trump is that he is several degrees more efficient than Biden. So if he does want to increase the lethality of the US army, or production of cheap but cutting edge material he can probably do it. Of course MSM don't talk about that because of TDS. This is also the reason why Putin wanted Ms Harris to win.
That europeans are cheering the idea of a "truce" as an opportunity for Ukraine to rearm and regroup tells you all that you need to know. Doesn't mean Russia will not take the bait. Again. See, e.g. Minsk, Minsk-2, Istanbul.
Anyway, Trump immediately resumed arms and intelligence to Ukraine.
Well, it has long been abundantly obvious that Russia does not want this war and never has wanted this war, and was seeking any excuses to get out of this war. Even at cost of a Minsk-3.
Needless to say, the West sees this, not as reasonableness or humanitarianism, but as contemptible weakness and smells blood.
No worries. Ukraine "preliminarly" agreed at a ceasefire and negotiations, if RF could co-play a good girl, would last till a cow comes home under a salute of drone barrages continuing.
Nyet means nyet. No cease fire. Putin has already made that clear and the US has resumed military aid and intelligence. The US just wants time to rearm Ukraine.
The intention of this agreement seems to be to provoke a Russian refusal, in order to make Russia looking bad. Even the wording is provocative. So, for instance, it mentions "the return of forcibly transferred Ukrainian children." That will not go down well with the Russians.
The "Ukrainian children" nonsense is a poison pill. So, if I assume that the ceasefire was expected to be rejected, how does that help Trump? Why send nonsense proposals and why restore satellite telemetry for Ukrainian attacks into Russia? All this chaos seems much more Marco than Donald.
It helps Trump, because it puts him in a good light. He is very much dependent on continued public support---once he loses popularity, he is as good as gone, because all his enemies will rally. So he is doing at least half of what he is doing for the sake of image, to make himself look like he is going to bring about economic recovery, world peace, rejection of wokeism, and whatever else his supporters will get high on.
Your first 5 reasons (for Russia to refuse the ceasefire offer) will likely make much more sense to Russia than the contrary argument. Besides, given that Russia has been pursuing a war of attrition rather than a territorial war, why on earth would they want to stop now, when the long slog to get to the Ukrainian military's breaking point is so close? The West can do very little at this point to prolong the agony--if a resort to military force alone could have done the job, it would have been done long ago.
> "Everyone will soon find out whether or not Putin agrees to a ceasefire..." I respectfully disagree. In my assessment, Putin understands the optics of rejecting a ceasefire and also understands the dangers of a ceasefire, so I expect him to delay and distract while Western opinion's focus on the ceasefire deal slowly decays.
Putin's policy of "fight while talking" is his obvious strong card and I expect him to play this card at least until Russia has gained most, if not all, Novorossiya.
As a matter of statecraft, the task is to avoid a hard boil and keep diplomacy at a warm simmer so as not to embarrass Trump.
Putin understands that his most hardened enemies are among the professional managerial class in Europe. These PMCs are also Trump's most determined enemies, so there is a community of interest between Trump and Putin, but the relationship is asymmetrical in that success of the "new detente" between Russia and the US would garner laurels for Putin domestically but would only empower Trump's domestic and European PMC enemies.
In my opinion, Trump has made a strategic error in emphasizing Ukrainian security as a US strategic interest. This leaves the door open to him being pushed through it with more proxy arms and more diplomatically wasted capital in a new tit for tat proxy escalation. The error in this policy is that proxy escalation while harmful to Russia cannot change Russian policy because Russian policy is based on existential realities and a tit for tat US proxy strategy is only based on Trump's need for prestige in his struggle against the international PMC.
Therefore, Trump's "proxy war while talking" is handicapped because Russia has escalatory dominance. Why? Because Putin's "fight while talking" has no political cost and Trump's "proxy war while talking" risks making Trump adopt the same flawed strategy that his PMC enemies advocate. At some level Trump knows this, and that makes the current US ceasefire offer very strange.
Some recent convincing analysis about the UK's current and future positions in Odessa and how London is already entrenched there, having received the OK in the 100-year UK Support Deal, which gives UK control of port facilities and other Ukrainian infrastructure.
If Russia allows that to happen, by agreeing to a Peace, with Odessa in Ukrainian/UK hands, the probability of significant problems is surely enhanced. If Russia agrees to a Cease Fire that allows Ukraine to be rearmed and their army re-populated, how long do they have to drag out the war after the 30-days, to take Odessa?
Russia resuming the war after the 30 days ceasefire will likely invite US sanction escalation on Russia and more US support for Ukraine in what will then have truly become Trump's Proxy War against Russia, adding Trump Saving Face as a deterrent to eventual Peace.
Given your long history of (almost) daily analysis and predictions about Russia, I am surprised and disappointed you neglected to use your knowledge of Putin and the goals of the Russian leadership and people to predict what DECISION WILL be made about the 30-day cease fire.
I was hoping you would explain to us WHY YOU made your choice, or in this case, neglected to make a prediction.
If I have to guess, from the content of today's essay, I have to guess that you must think the two alternatives are approximately equal in probability.
I am very surprised that anyone who has followed the many explicit speeches of Putin, Lavrov and others could think that, after explicitly and publicly rejecting cease fires without a long list of preconditions, that the Russian leadership will take an action that labels all of its serious Red Lines as just Red Lies.
This makes me all the more interested why you listed reasons, with no assessment.
I find it very odd, given VVP himself has taken himself to task, repeatedly, for believing US and Western politicians given how often they change their tune and go back on their word.
Do you really think Russia will act to confirm its critics' view that they have no Red Lines that mean anything?
Political Scientists are not magicians, we can predict long-term trends properly only. I learned this the hard way; In 1991 I took a bet for 10 bottles of French Cognac: My position was that armed hostilities with at least 100 victims (in a year) will start within a year in Yugoslavia as a consequence of the general breakdown of the Soviet Bloc. (Yugoslavia was a patchwork of various highly hostile ethnic groups who kept killing each other since time memorial.) My opponent was a commie tax collector and an alcoholic. I lost the bet (and paid it) because the war there started only two or three years later. The commie tax collector died young a few years later, mostly from alcohol.
The issue on hand is extremely complex and Andrew could only present a range of possibilities. My bet is (if any) that Putin will adjust and change his arrangements to the last hour here as the decision is a very important one. Trump might just go back to the drawing tables with him and sweeten the deal, dropping something on Ukraine again. The hardest point in this deal is to get the two parties over the initial step and manage them from there. Z might be only playing the cooperation game and throw a monkey wrench into the whole act, blaming Putin. Russia and Putin will survive without a pat on the shoulder from Trump. On the other hand, Ukraine will go down without American help.
I was trained as a scientist, not a political scientist, and am aware of mathematical aids to prediction. This came in handy in daily life, in making investments, and lots more things in everyday life. This was/is true, especially where one can recognize the existence of overwhelming odds. In your case, you just weren't correct with the part of the bet that was about timing.
It is very simple to opine a prediction when the odds are 2 standard deviations above the mean, or when the large majority of the binary determinant factors all come pointing is the same direction. In fact, I think political scientists should provide prediction to validate their data and analysis.
If we only wanted to consult on expert without relevance to the future, a history book would do.
I am always interested in the views of the future of people with knowledge, experience, and a history of synthesizing what is known and making correct predictions. Humans have been after this kind of information since it dawned on them that "tomorrow is another day".
I have seen some attempts to use mathematical formulas to apply toward historical, political situations. Major military conflicts bring forward revolutionary ideas, new technologies and unaccepted turns nobody could predict. Think of the Peloponnesian Wars, Athens was definitely the likely winner and Sparta pulled off an unlikely victory. WWII: The little known reality was/is that Germany was proceeding neck to neck with the U.S. to build the first nukes. Had they produce 5 or 6 bombs before May 1945 they could have stopped the War right there. The War of the States started in the U.S. in 1861. Honest Abe showed up with some grilled chickens at Manassas (the first land battle at D.C.) ready for final victory. The whole world was surprised at the ability of the South to fight on for years with very limited resources and industry. I really think that calculating long-term trends is the best we can do presently. Politics and wars are the most complex human activities and AI will run away from predictions.
My own example above connected to Yugoslavia is also reflecting the same. I have known the 20th century history and political developments of the area in general and I still missed the timing but predicted the trend properly. I understood well the absurdly forced nature, how that country was created out of many hostile ethnic groups. The bet I mentioned above was actually placed earlier, either early 1990 or the second half of 1989. This was before the Soviet Union actually was broken up by Yeltsin in December of 1991. Hostilities in Yugoslavia started in March of 1991and lasted for over ten years. It was an overwhelming conflict and actually easy to predict under the circumstances.
In the first days of the Ukraine War I openly stated and wrote: There is no way Ukraine can win this conflict. I predicted two possible outcomes: 1, Russian victory of some sort. 2, A nuclear war. Americans were generally unable to comprehend this logic and first turned hostile on me. Today, they are getting the idea. Trump told Zelenskyy twice: ”You are gambling with nuclear war!” And the whole of the Western population realized this slowly and this was a strong drive toward populism in the West in the last two years.
The article posits that Russia might be pushed into submission by the threat of China being turned against it. There are two significant reasons why China won't, unless there's a regime change; and perhaps not even then.
For one thing, China realizes the obvious ill intent of such intrigue. This is blatant /divide et impera/ along Kissinger's lines, attempting to pit China and Russia against each other so that the US ends up dominating and subjugating both. The Chinese are very much aware of that; they have been subjected to that ploy before, and know its intent is to defeat China.
Another key factor is the US nuclear doctrine, which holds that, if a nuclear strike (first or retaliatory) is made against Russia, it must be made against China as well, and vice versa. The cynical reason for that policy is that China must not be left standing as a dominant superpower after the other two gut themselves. Whether China is innocent of any wrongdoing, or even allied, is irrelevant. Every effort must be made that the US is the /sole/ survivor of such an exchange. Another reason for that doctrine is that the silo-based part of the US nuclear triad is based on obsolete technology, and probably cannot be retargeted on the spur of the moment; so that these ICBMs are simply covering all the bases, Russian and Chinese targets both. But even if they can be swiftly retargeted, the first reason still applies.
Both China and Russia are aware of that doctrine, and they cannot be convinced that it no longer applies, because how reliably perfidious and untrustworthy any promises by the US are. So Chinese and Russian governments are aware that their countries are, in a way, like siamese twins; if one dies, so will the other. This is a very powerful incentive for China not to undermine Russia and put it into an existential threat situation.
Trump really wants to stop this war, and Russia’s input into the ceasefire process will be allowed soon. As usual, the devil will be in the details. There are a lot of things Russia will try to secure but what will Russia settle for?
Allowing the rearmament of Ukraine during the ceasefire is a NO!
Exposing large numbers of ethnic Russians to Ukraine authorities in the border regions, NO!
Standing by while U.S./NATO floods Ukraine with soldiers on the ground, NO!
Any process that aims to break the momentum of forward movement of the Russian Army for 30 days of peace and pat on the shoulder by Trump, NO!
Generally, Trump and U.S./NATO has zero credit in this process. That all went down the drain with NATO advances, Minsk, etc. The Russia-China relations are lot more stable than they seem on the surface and neither country will risk this relationship for a U.S. smile. They fully understand that behind the sudden Trump turn there is Giant Mountain of insecurity. Four years from now the ship can turn again. Trump’s execution of the promised domestic changes are already breaking up. China and Russia, these two large nations were living together, sharing a long border while keeping their conflicts minor and well managed going back to the Stalin era. There was even a degree of military cooperation during the Korean War. Putin can simply not afford to give up his gains on the battlefields for a theatrical event.
The U.S. public might not remember but the Chinese leadership does: On June 28, 2010 three U.S. nuclear submarines surfaced simultaneously around China, as an unmistakable argument for U.S. “exceptionalism”. A course was set for China that day that they keep following ever since.
This is an excellent analysis. I should also mention that I appreciate the author's consistently diplomatic language, a hallmark of his work.
One could possibly go on all day with reasons why Putin would not want to accept this offer, not the least of which being that it appears disingenuous. The Europeans and the UK were frothing at the mouth about weaponing up for eternal battle with the Russians just a few short news cycles ago. Suddenly they have all formed a Vulcan mind meld with Secretary Rubio, and the world has received their divine proclamation: "The ball is in the Russians' court."
On days like this one, it is difficult to understand how the people at the Kremlin didn't lose their minds a long time ago.
But it is Mr. Korybko's most insightful #4 that I wanted to applaud in particular. Once upon a time there was another negotiation between "the Russians" and "the Americans." They call it the Caribbean Crisis and we call it the Cuban Missile Crisis. There was a meeting, a negotiation, and a peaceful resolution. A deal was cut. The public was not told all the details. I'm going off memory and I may not have it quite right, but I believe the American public was not told that we were going to withdraw missiles from two sites, not one. I believe the American public was not told who would withdraw first. And I believe the Russian missiles were either never armed in the first place or never wired up to operational level.
I would not expect to be told all of the details with respect to a transaction of this nature. There are all sorts of things that might be traded to get to a peaceful result in Ukraine. Trump and Putin have extremely extensive experience with respect to commercial deals. But there is a lot at stake, any such deals would be complex, and neither side has had the opportunity to engage in meaningful dialogue to advise the other side as to what they want and what they have to offer because they're hardly past what has been possibly the ugliest period in relations since WWII.
When it started in February of 2022, my assumption was that it would take about six months of discussions from the point at which both sides have sincere intentions with respect to a settlement. I think we may be at the beginning of that six month period. Yet the contact line could collapse like a wet paper bag before that. ☮
The following are the 6,632 footnotes, 7,908 citations, from Scott Horton’s 2024 book Provoked: How Washington Started the New Cold War with Russia and the Catastrophe in Ukraine. If any hyperlink seems broken, first try adding the www. after the https:// or possibly deleting the s from the https:// if it’s an older one. If that does not work, try putting them in the box at https://web.archive.org. If all else fails, try contacting the author at scott at scotthorton.org or on X @scotthortonshow.
The Russians could agree to a short ceasefire that would allow Ukraine to hold elections? It's in Russia's best interest to get rid of Zelenksy. I think Trump agrees here as well. I argue Zelensky can't afford peace because everyone would find out pretty soon how many Ukrainians have died and those numbers will be shocking.
It's not in Russia's interest to remove Zelensky. Doing that would have been easy peasy. Instead Putin gave word to Naftali Bennett that he won't do it early in 2022. And has stuck to that word given almost 3 years ago even if Bennett is currently not even a Knesset member.
Removing someone by vote is different from assassination. I agree that Zelenksy was somewhat useful for Russia because he made a lot of blunders in the war. Failed counter offensive, failed Kursk excursion etc. But he's blocking legitimate negotiations and lost all legitimacy as well. Eventually he will need to go, one way or the other.
It's a bit like the golden snitch's "I open at the close" - ie not until Russia has won completely. Russia knows that his replacement won't be any more Russia friendly. So no reason to do it. For the US all the more reason to replace him. But then, the S Vietnam's experience in the 1960s with that is not encouraging for the US either.
"Russia knows that his replacement won't be any more Russia friendly."
.
Perhaps in the years where war fatigue was not prominent or present. Chances of a "wrong" candidate winning are growing with every day. Insignificant Z was one of them, but he was an actor so he played plebs quite well. The sentiment is there.
Chances of puppet removal are non-linearly connected with compliance. Compliance only avoids increasing chances of removal but that bit may be insignificant if the puppet is already marked for culling.
As Trump said to Z, you have no cards. Trump doesn’t have any either. Russia has already won, and unless Putin’s conditions are met there’s no reason not to finish the mopping up job. The US has amply proven that it cannot be trusted, especially with respect to honoring ceasefires. There’s no difference between Trump and Netanyahu in this regard. The sanctions have backfired. The battles have been lost in the proxy war. The US has all but admitted defeat, and Z isn’t invited to the table. He’s not legitimate governor of anything. Yes, it’s too bad, especially for most Ukrainians who didn’t ask for this. If Trump wants peace he could offer the heads of Z, Nuland and Starmer (figuratively speaking, of course). Escalating to de-escalate is just a path to WWIII.
"Escalating to de-escalate is just a path to WWIII."
This is why the europeans are cheering on the "ceasefire" just as they were lauding the "rare earths deal" a couple weeks ago.
Make no mistake.
Well, V.Putin is not under a pressure of freeing the hostages and surely knows of ceasefires Israel pushed in because of need to free citizens kidnapped by Islamisation bandits of Gaza.
With ceasefires, Netanyahu works on the principle if you break ceasefire, he isn't going to the US for green light, he will respond as is. So if Hamas or Hezbollah militants break the ceasefire as Israelis see it they are eliminated and that is it.
With Putin, he has a much longer fuse, and that is known everywhere. So there is a much bigger potential for Ukrainian provocation and testing.
The main point for Trump is that he is several degrees more efficient than Biden. So if he does want to increase the lethality of the US army, or production of cheap but cutting edge material he can probably do it. Of course MSM don't talk about that because of TDS. This is also the reason why Putin wanted Ms Harris to win.
That europeans are cheering the idea of a "truce" as an opportunity for Ukraine to rearm and regroup tells you all that you need to know. Doesn't mean Russia will not take the bait. Again. See, e.g. Minsk, Minsk-2, Istanbul.
Anyway, Trump immediately resumed arms and intelligence to Ukraine.
Minsk - III
Well, it has long been abundantly obvious that Russia does not want this war and never has wanted this war, and was seeking any excuses to get out of this war. Even at cost of a Minsk-3.
Needless to say, the West sees this, not as reasonableness or humanitarianism, but as contemptible weakness and smells blood.
The Zio Empire is ruthless.
Perhaps the ceasefire offer is Marco's idea that Trump may eventually regret.
No worries. Ukraine "preliminarly" agreed at a ceasefire and negotiations, if RF could co-play a good girl, would last till a cow comes home under a salute of drone barrages continuing.
Trump is weak, stupid and easily manipulated.
Nyet means nyet. No cease fire. Putin has already made that clear and the US has resumed military aid and intelligence. The US just wants time to rearm Ukraine.
The intention of this agreement seems to be to provoke a Russian refusal, in order to make Russia looking bad. Even the wording is provocative. So, for instance, it mentions "the return of forcibly transferred Ukrainian children." That will not go down well with the Russians.
Yes, exactly. Russian leaders aren't fooled by DJT's machinations & bluster. Ultimately, it's all to make Russia look like the bad guy, as usual.
The "Ukrainian children" nonsense is a poison pill. So, if I assume that the ceasefire was expected to be rejected, how does that help Trump? Why send nonsense proposals and why restore satellite telemetry for Ukrainian attacks into Russia? All this chaos seems much more Marco than Donald.
It helps Trump, because it puts him in a good light. He is very much dependent on continued public support---once he loses popularity, he is as good as gone, because all his enemies will rally. So he is doing at least half of what he is doing for the sake of image, to make himself look like he is going to bring about economic recovery, world peace, rejection of wokeism, and whatever else his supporters will get high on.
I agree and I wrote more about Trump's weakened position on my Substack.
There will be NO Minsk 3.
Nyet means nyet.
Your first 5 reasons (for Russia to refuse the ceasefire offer) will likely make much more sense to Russia than the contrary argument. Besides, given that Russia has been pursuing a war of attrition rather than a territorial war, why on earth would they want to stop now, when the long slog to get to the Ukrainian military's breaking point is so close? The West can do very little at this point to prolong the agony--if a resort to military force alone could have done the job, it would have been done long ago.
> "Everyone will soon find out whether or not Putin agrees to a ceasefire..." I respectfully disagree. In my assessment, Putin understands the optics of rejecting a ceasefire and also understands the dangers of a ceasefire, so I expect him to delay and distract while Western opinion's focus on the ceasefire deal slowly decays.
Putin's policy of "fight while talking" is his obvious strong card and I expect him to play this card at least until Russia has gained most, if not all, Novorossiya.
As a matter of statecraft, the task is to avoid a hard boil and keep diplomacy at a warm simmer so as not to embarrass Trump.
Putin understands that his most hardened enemies are among the professional managerial class in Europe. These PMCs are also Trump's most determined enemies, so there is a community of interest between Trump and Putin, but the relationship is asymmetrical in that success of the "new detente" between Russia and the US would garner laurels for Putin domestically but would only empower Trump's domestic and European PMC enemies.
In my opinion, Trump has made a strategic error in emphasizing Ukrainian security as a US strategic interest. This leaves the door open to him being pushed through it with more proxy arms and more diplomatically wasted capital in a new tit for tat proxy escalation. The error in this policy is that proxy escalation while harmful to Russia cannot change Russian policy because Russian policy is based on existential realities and a tit for tat US proxy strategy is only based on Trump's need for prestige in his struggle against the international PMC.
Therefore, Trump's "proxy war while talking" is handicapped because Russia has escalatory dominance. Why? Because Putin's "fight while talking" has no political cost and Trump's "proxy war while talking" risks making Trump adopt the same flawed strategy that his PMC enemies advocate. At some level Trump knows this, and that makes the current US ceasefire offer very strange.
Some recent convincing analysis about the UK's current and future positions in Odessa and how London is already entrenched there, having received the OK in the 100-year UK Support Deal, which gives UK control of port facilities and other Ukrainian infrastructure.
If Russia allows that to happen, by agreeing to a Peace, with Odessa in Ukrainian/UK hands, the probability of significant problems is surely enhanced. If Russia agrees to a Cease Fire that allows Ukraine to be rearmed and their army re-populated, how long do they have to drag out the war after the 30-days, to take Odessa?
Russia resuming the war after the 30 days ceasefire will likely invite US sanction escalation on Russia and more US support for Ukraine in what will then have truly become Trump's Proxy War against Russia, adding Trump Saving Face as a deterrent to eventual Peace.
Given your long history of (almost) daily analysis and predictions about Russia, I am surprised and disappointed you neglected to use your knowledge of Putin and the goals of the Russian leadership and people to predict what DECISION WILL be made about the 30-day cease fire.
I was hoping you would explain to us WHY YOU made your choice, or in this case, neglected to make a prediction.
If I have to guess, from the content of today's essay, I have to guess that you must think the two alternatives are approximately equal in probability.
I am very surprised that anyone who has followed the many explicit speeches of Putin, Lavrov and others could think that, after explicitly and publicly rejecting cease fires without a long list of preconditions, that the Russian leadership will take an action that labels all of its serious Red Lines as just Red Lies.
This makes me all the more interested why you listed reasons, with no assessment.
I find it very odd, given VVP himself has taken himself to task, repeatedly, for believing US and Western politicians given how often they change their tune and go back on their word.
Do you really think Russia will act to confirm its critics' view that they have no Red Lines that mean anything?
Political Scientists are not magicians, we can predict long-term trends properly only. I learned this the hard way; In 1991 I took a bet for 10 bottles of French Cognac: My position was that armed hostilities with at least 100 victims (in a year) will start within a year in Yugoslavia as a consequence of the general breakdown of the Soviet Bloc. (Yugoslavia was a patchwork of various highly hostile ethnic groups who kept killing each other since time memorial.) My opponent was a commie tax collector and an alcoholic. I lost the bet (and paid it) because the war there started only two or three years later. The commie tax collector died young a few years later, mostly from alcohol.
The issue on hand is extremely complex and Andrew could only present a range of possibilities. My bet is (if any) that Putin will adjust and change his arrangements to the last hour here as the decision is a very important one. Trump might just go back to the drawing tables with him and sweeten the deal, dropping something on Ukraine again. The hardest point in this deal is to get the two parties over the initial step and manage them from there. Z might be only playing the cooperation game and throw a monkey wrench into the whole act, blaming Putin. Russia and Putin will survive without a pat on the shoulder from Trump. On the other hand, Ukraine will go down without American help.
Thanks for the story.
I was trained as a scientist, not a political scientist, and am aware of mathematical aids to prediction. This came in handy in daily life, in making investments, and lots more things in everyday life. This was/is true, especially where one can recognize the existence of overwhelming odds. In your case, you just weren't correct with the part of the bet that was about timing.
It is very simple to opine a prediction when the odds are 2 standard deviations above the mean, or when the large majority of the binary determinant factors all come pointing is the same direction. In fact, I think political scientists should provide prediction to validate their data and analysis.
If we only wanted to consult on expert without relevance to the future, a history book would do.
I am always interested in the views of the future of people with knowledge, experience, and a history of synthesizing what is known and making correct predictions. Humans have been after this kind of information since it dawned on them that "tomorrow is another day".
I have seen some attempts to use mathematical formulas to apply toward historical, political situations. Major military conflicts bring forward revolutionary ideas, new technologies and unaccepted turns nobody could predict. Think of the Peloponnesian Wars, Athens was definitely the likely winner and Sparta pulled off an unlikely victory. WWII: The little known reality was/is that Germany was proceeding neck to neck with the U.S. to build the first nukes. Had they produce 5 or 6 bombs before May 1945 they could have stopped the War right there. The War of the States started in the U.S. in 1861. Honest Abe showed up with some grilled chickens at Manassas (the first land battle at D.C.) ready for final victory. The whole world was surprised at the ability of the South to fight on for years with very limited resources and industry. I really think that calculating long-term trends is the best we can do presently. Politics and wars are the most complex human activities and AI will run away from predictions.
My own example above connected to Yugoslavia is also reflecting the same. I have known the 20th century history and political developments of the area in general and I still missed the timing but predicted the trend properly. I understood well the absurdly forced nature, how that country was created out of many hostile ethnic groups. The bet I mentioned above was actually placed earlier, either early 1990 or the second half of 1989. This was before the Soviet Union actually was broken up by Yeltsin in December of 1991. Hostilities in Yugoslavia started in March of 1991and lasted for over ten years. It was an overwhelming conflict and actually easy to predict under the circumstances.
In the first days of the Ukraine War I openly stated and wrote: There is no way Ukraine can win this conflict. I predicted two possible outcomes: 1, Russian victory of some sort. 2, A nuclear war. Americans were generally unable to comprehend this logic and first turned hostile on me. Today, they are getting the idea. Trump told Zelenskyy twice: ”You are gambling with nuclear war!” And the whole of the Western population realized this slowly and this was a strong drive toward populism in the West in the last two years.
Great summary thank you
The article posits that Russia might be pushed into submission by the threat of China being turned against it. There are two significant reasons why China won't, unless there's a regime change; and perhaps not even then.
For one thing, China realizes the obvious ill intent of such intrigue. This is blatant /divide et impera/ along Kissinger's lines, attempting to pit China and Russia against each other so that the US ends up dominating and subjugating both. The Chinese are very much aware of that; they have been subjected to that ploy before, and know its intent is to defeat China.
Another key factor is the US nuclear doctrine, which holds that, if a nuclear strike (first or retaliatory) is made against Russia, it must be made against China as well, and vice versa. The cynical reason for that policy is that China must not be left standing as a dominant superpower after the other two gut themselves. Whether China is innocent of any wrongdoing, or even allied, is irrelevant. Every effort must be made that the US is the /sole/ survivor of such an exchange. Another reason for that doctrine is that the silo-based part of the US nuclear triad is based on obsolete technology, and probably cannot be retargeted on the spur of the moment; so that these ICBMs are simply covering all the bases, Russian and Chinese targets both. But even if they can be swiftly retargeted, the first reason still applies.
Both China and Russia are aware of that doctrine, and they cannot be convinced that it no longer applies, because how reliably perfidious and untrustworthy any promises by the US are. So Chinese and Russian governments are aware that their countries are, in a way, like siamese twins; if one dies, so will the other. This is a very powerful incentive for China not to undermine Russia and put it into an existential threat situation.
Trump really wants to stop this war, and Russia’s input into the ceasefire process will be allowed soon. As usual, the devil will be in the details. There are a lot of things Russia will try to secure but what will Russia settle for?
Allowing the rearmament of Ukraine during the ceasefire is a NO!
Exposing large numbers of ethnic Russians to Ukraine authorities in the border regions, NO!
Standing by while U.S./NATO floods Ukraine with soldiers on the ground, NO!
Any process that aims to break the momentum of forward movement of the Russian Army for 30 days of peace and pat on the shoulder by Trump, NO!
Generally, Trump and U.S./NATO has zero credit in this process. That all went down the drain with NATO advances, Minsk, etc. The Russia-China relations are lot more stable than they seem on the surface and neither country will risk this relationship for a U.S. smile. They fully understand that behind the sudden Trump turn there is Giant Mountain of insecurity. Four years from now the ship can turn again. Trump’s execution of the promised domestic changes are already breaking up. China and Russia, these two large nations were living together, sharing a long border while keeping their conflicts minor and well managed going back to the Stalin era. There was even a degree of military cooperation during the Korean War. Putin can simply not afford to give up his gains on the battlefields for a theatrical event.
The U.S. public might not remember but the Chinese leadership does: On June 28, 2010 three U.S. nuclear submarines surfaced simultaneously around China, as an unmistakable argument for U.S. “exceptionalism”. A course was set for China that day that they keep following ever since.
https://time.com/archive/6916302/u-s-missiles-deployed-near-china-send-a-message/
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-freaked-navy-surfaced-3-missile-subs-once-send-clear-warning-208924
> "Putin can simply not afford to give up his gains on the battlefields for a theatrical event."
Yes.
This is an excellent analysis. I should also mention that I appreciate the author's consistently diplomatic language, a hallmark of his work.
One could possibly go on all day with reasons why Putin would not want to accept this offer, not the least of which being that it appears disingenuous. The Europeans and the UK were frothing at the mouth about weaponing up for eternal battle with the Russians just a few short news cycles ago. Suddenly they have all formed a Vulcan mind meld with Secretary Rubio, and the world has received their divine proclamation: "The ball is in the Russians' court."
On days like this one, it is difficult to understand how the people at the Kremlin didn't lose their minds a long time ago.
But it is Mr. Korybko's most insightful #4 that I wanted to applaud in particular. Once upon a time there was another negotiation between "the Russians" and "the Americans." They call it the Caribbean Crisis and we call it the Cuban Missile Crisis. There was a meeting, a negotiation, and a peaceful resolution. A deal was cut. The public was not told all the details. I'm going off memory and I may not have it quite right, but I believe the American public was not told that we were going to withdraw missiles from two sites, not one. I believe the American public was not told who would withdraw first. And I believe the Russian missiles were either never armed in the first place or never wired up to operational level.
I would not expect to be told all of the details with respect to a transaction of this nature. There are all sorts of things that might be traded to get to a peaceful result in Ukraine. Trump and Putin have extremely extensive experience with respect to commercial deals. But there is a lot at stake, any such deals would be complex, and neither side has had the opportunity to engage in meaningful dialogue to advise the other side as to what they want and what they have to offer because they're hardly past what has been possibly the ugliest period in relations since WWII.
When it started in February of 2022, my assumption was that it would take about six months of discussions from the point at which both sides have sincere intentions with respect to a settlement. I think we may be at the beginning of that six month period. Yet the contact line could collapse like a wet paper bag before that. ☮
There is a good reason Putin, and others, call the West the “Empire of Lies”.
For details the first 70 or so pages of Scott Horton’s book, “Provoked” lays it out.
Provoked Footnotes
by Scott | Dec 3, 2024 | Fair Use Articles
The following are the 6,632 footnotes, 7,908 citations, from Scott Horton’s 2024 book Provoked: How Washington Started the New Cold War with Russia and the Catastrophe in Ukraine. If any hyperlink seems broken, first try adding the www. after the https:// or possibly deleting the s from the https:// if it’s an older one. If that does not work, try putting them in the box at https://web.archive.org. If all else fails, try contacting the author at scott at scotthorton.org or on X @scotthortonshow.
https://scotthorton.org/fairuse/provoked-footnotes/
The Russians could agree to a short ceasefire that would allow Ukraine to hold elections? It's in Russia's best interest to get rid of Zelenksy. I think Trump agrees here as well. I argue Zelensky can't afford peace because everyone would find out pretty soon how many Ukrainians have died and those numbers will be shocking.
I dont think Ukraine has anyone who wouldn't be just as bad as Zelensky.
It's not in Russia's interest to remove Zelensky. Doing that would have been easy peasy. Instead Putin gave word to Naftali Bennett that he won't do it early in 2022. And has stuck to that word given almost 3 years ago even if Bennett is currently not even a Knesset member.
Removing someone by vote is different from assassination. I agree that Zelenksy was somewhat useful for Russia because he made a lot of blunders in the war. Failed counter offensive, failed Kursk excursion etc. But he's blocking legitimate negotiations and lost all legitimacy as well. Eventually he will need to go, one way or the other.
It's a bit like the golden snitch's "I open at the close" - ie not until Russia has won completely. Russia knows that his replacement won't be any more Russia friendly. So no reason to do it. For the US all the more reason to replace him. But then, the S Vietnam's experience in the 1960s with that is not encouraging for the US either.
"Russia knows that his replacement won't be any more Russia friendly."
.
Perhaps in the years where war fatigue was not prominent or present. Chances of a "wrong" candidate winning are growing with every day. Insignificant Z was one of them, but he was an actor so he played plebs quite well. The sentiment is there.
In general, it's USA/UK tactic to remove leaders. Removing Zelensky & replacing with another puppet is in USA interest & is likely on its way.
Now that Z signed the minerals deal plus agreed to a ceasefire, that's not likely.
Chances of puppet removal are non-linearly connected with compliance. Compliance only avoids increasing chances of removal but that bit may be insignificant if the puppet is already marked for culling.