Will Russia’s Latest Buffer Zone Plan Be More Successful Than The Last?
The longer that Ukraine refuses to agree to peace on Russia’s terms, the more land that it stands to lose, which might ultimately be much more than anyone expects if the US soon abandons Ukraine in order to cut its losses.
Putin warned in March 2024 that Russia might set up a “security zone” inside Ukraine in response to cross-border strikes and raids, which it then began to do two months later that May after Russian troops made a fresh push into Kharkov Region at the time. Regrettably, the incursion didn’t penetrate too deeply, and later that summer Ukraine launched a sneak attack against Russia’s Kursk Region. It was only earlier this year that Russia finally expelled all Ukrainian troops from there with North Korean assistance.
Nevertheless, Putin just announced late last week that “a decision has been made to create a buffer security zone along the Russian border” with Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk Regions, thus meaning inside the corresponding Ukrainian regions of Kharkov (once again), Sumy, and Chernigov. Unlike last year’s attempt, this latest one might be more successful due to the very different context within which it’s being pursued, particularly as regards the conflict’s new diplomatic and military dynamics.
Regarding the first, “The Devil’s In The Details As Trump Announced ‘Immediate’ Russian-Ukrainian Ceasefire Talks” right after his latest call with Putin, the details of which readers can learn more about from the preceding hyperlinked analysis. Its relevance to Putin’s newly announced buffer zone plan is that his declaration might initially be intended as a form of pressure upon Zelensky to coerce him into having Ukraine finally comply with Russia’s demanded concessions for politically resolving the conflict.
As for the second, it was assessed in mid-March that “Russia Might Expand Its Ground Campaign Into Sumy, Dniepropetrovsk, And/Or Kharkov Regions”, with Dniepropetrovsk being mentioned instead of Chernigov since Russian forces are approaching its border from Donbass after going around Pokrovsk. Crossing that administrative frontier into a region that Russia doesn’t (yet?) claim as its own could circumvent Ukraine’s formidable defenses in central Zaporozhye and lead to that region’s swift capture.
In connection with these dynamics, RT chief Margarita Simonyan clarified that the Russian delegation in Istanbul didn’t threaten that their country would claim an additional Ukrainian region if Ukraine doesn’t withdraw from the four disputed ones, but four more for a total of eight regions (not counting Crimea). These could conceivably be all or part of Chernigov, Sumy, Kharkov, and Dniepropetrovsk Regions given Russia’s latest buffer zone plan unless Ukraine agrees to its demanded concessions before then.
With that plan in mind and seeing as how those four regions, Kiev, Cherkassy, and Poltava are either entirely or partially east of the Dnieper, Russia might add to its list of demands by calling for the creation of a totally demilitarized “Trans-Dnieper” region controlled by non-Western peacekeepers. This could either complement its original demand for demilitarizing the entirety of Ukraine or be presented as a compromise in exchange for letting Ukraine do whatever it wants on the other side of the river.
Regardless of whether that proposal is put forth, Putin’s newly announced buffer zone plan shows that Russia is expanding its goals, which makes sense considering that it’s winning and that Ukraine still refuses to comply with its demanded concessions for politically resolving the conflict. The longer that Ukraine refuses to agree to peace on Russia’s terms, the more land that it stands to lose, which might ultimately be much more than anyone expects if the US soon abandons Ukraine in order to cut its losses.
Ukraine is betting that Western support will hold indefinitely. But with U.S. election dynamics shifting and strategic fatigue setting in, that’s a dangerous assumption. If Washington pivots, whether out of economic self-interest or geopolitical realignment, Kyiv could find itself negotiating from a much weaker position, or worse, no position at all.
The “buffer zone” isn’t just a tactical move; it’s a negotiating tool. It's Russia saying, you don’t want peace on our terms? Fine, we’ll redraw the map until you do. And unlike 2022, they’re now doing it from a place of relative strength (economically, diplomatically, and militarily).
It’s not about whether this is “fair” or “just.” It’s about whether it’s effective, and so far, it is. Ukraine’s refusal to engage on new terms risks not only more territory but potentially the very coherence of the Ukrainian state if key regions fall in rapid succession.
The lesson? In great power politics, idealism won’t hold the line.
IOW, the war will end on Russian terms, and those terms must mean that Ukraine cannot become an existential security threat to Russia again.
The Russian logic on the Ukraine situation is no different from that of John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis.