Elaborating On Iran’s Continued Opposition To The Zangezur Corridor
This is no longer a small matter after the Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the Russian Ambassador to share their concerns with him about his country’s support of this project.
Iran’s continued opposition to the Zangezur Corridor was touched upon here last month, where it was concluded that it’s relying on false pretexts to advance what it regards as its national interests. Since then, the Iranian Foreign Minister implied that the project would redraw regional borders, after which his institution summoned the Russian Ambassador to share their concerns given Moscow’s support of it. Here are five observations about this policy’s motivations and consequences:
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1. Iran Has No Right To Interfere With This Issue…
What Azerbaijan calls the Zangezur Corridor was agreed to by it, Armenia, and Russia in the Moscow-mediated November 2020 ceasefire’s last clause. It’s a purely economic project which’ll be defended by the FSB’s Border Guards Service, not a territorially revisionist one that’ll threaten Iranian interests. Tehran therefore has no right to interfere with this issue, but its efforts appear to be at least partially motivated by wanting to host an alternative corridor via Northern Iran if Zangezur isn’t implemented.
2. …But It Might Be Driven By Its Competition With The West In Armenia…
From Iran’s perspective, hyping up non-existent territorial threats from Azerbaijan might make the ruling Armenian clique consider their country to be a more reliable security partner than the West, which it’s been pivoting to since the abovementioned ceasefire and with extra gusto over the past year. This could possibly decelerate the aforesaid trend, which Russia might appreciate with time if that happens, but at the cost of further complicating Iran’s already complex relations with Azerbaijan.
3. …Or Mistaken Perceptions Of A Quid Pro Quo With Russia
Another explanation is that Iran mistakenly assumed that Russia would quietly back off from its support of the Zangezur Corridor in exchange for Iran reportedly supplying more missiles and drones to Russia. Whatever military-technical agreements they may have might not have included such terms, however, with this possibly just being wishful thinking on Tehran’s part. In any case, the fact that the Russian Ambassador was summoned over this issue shows that Iran is very upset, so this is no trivial matter.
4. Russia’s Southern-Directed Pipeline Plans Might Be Endangered As A Result…
It was analyzed here late last month how Russia might be preparing to redirect its pipeline focus from the East (China) to the South (Azerbaijan, Iran, and India), but this would require resolving the Azerbaijani-Iranian security dilemma in order for Baku to then play the transit state in this arrangement. Azerbaijan might make its support contingent on Iran dropping its opposition to the Zangezur Corridor, while Iran might make its own support contingent on Azerbaijan dropping the Zangezur Corridor entirely.
5. …And Turkish-Iranian Ties Could Also Be Damaged Too
Finally, Turkiye envisages the Zangezur Corridor facilitating its trade with Central Asia and China more than the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway does, so it doesn’t appreciate Iran’s interference. Ties between them have always been complicated but still manageable, yet they could be damaged if this dispute drags on since Turkiye might consider Iran’s stance to be aimed at economically containing it. If bilateral trust deteriorates far enough, then Turkiye might enter into a rapprochement with the West to contain Iran.
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The dynamics of this dispute suggest that no breakthrough is likely anytime soon, not just in terms of implementing the Zangezur Corridor, but even regarding Iran’s public opposition to it. Iran now perceives Russia as taking Azerbaijan’s side at its expense, but Moscow won’t drop its support for the project since Putin himself ensured that it was included in the Moscow-mediated November 2020 ceasefire. Hopefully this dispute doesn’t spiral out of control and harm cooperation on the North-South Transport Corridor.
"...Turkiye might enter into a rapprochement with the West..."
???What??? Turkey is one of America's favourite jewels in its NATO crown. What kind of 'rapprochement', bearing in mind Ergodan's tolerance of the 2016 coup attempt, more could anyone, even NATO, hope for? He's rolled over to give his belly to his overlord. For how much longer would they like him to roll around on his back?
'Rapprochement'?! Maybe a definition is in order?
I must admit, the 'Trojan Horse' aspect of Turkey's aspirations at BRICS concerns me.
Now, if Turkiye were to clarify its position by withdrawing, or at least stating a goal of withdrawing, from NATO... That could change things. Otherwise... I'm afraid I may have said it too many times before: 'When you've got a vampire on the ground to drive a stake through its heart, you don't give up to offer it your had to shake and ask, 'Best two of three?'. '
Perhaps you (anyone) were hoping the Americans might have 'learnt their lesson' and abstain from manipulating and taking advantage of Türkiye's Ottoman fantasies in anything like the same way as they took advantage of the Ukrainians? I know the line between cynicism and credulity is a thin one, but...
There may be a need for a wake up call here.
Iran benefits the least among all the involved parties. Given that Iran has security concerns about Turkey and Azerbaijan and these two countries benefit the most from this corridor, I would bargain really hard if I were Iran. Russia MAY want to control the corridor to prevent an infiltration path from Armenia to Northern Iran. Actually Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan all have strong Western ties, links, or other shady deals. If the east-west corridor is partially inside Iran, then Iran can chop it off at will. But Iran can also sell the idea to Azerbaijan the southern alternative through Iran would bypass Armenia intervention.
If Russia really wants the North-South corridor to go through Azerbaijan, then I think Russia can (1) propose joint admin, even joint security patrols along the area. (2) Armenia and Azerbaijan provides all needed land for the corridor, not Iran. However, if Iran wants an additional security area south of the roads, then Iran should provide that. (3) Iran can help pay or construct this east-west corridor (which may have highways, railroads, fiber optics, even gas pipeline, etc. if Iran wants to share the roads in the future. (4) Russia to guarantee free passage ACROSS the corridor between Armenia and Iran. Spies travel both ways. (5) Alternatively, Russia can excuse herself leave the four parties to negotiate. Chances are, it will not work due to Armenia objection.
Personally, I prefer the Russian-Iran pipeline to go across the Caspian Sea. But in that case, it may be difficult to block a similar undersea pipeline from Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan then toward Turkey. If Russia does not want that pipeline to operate, then the Caspian undersea pipeline would not work.