This is no longer a small matter after the Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the Russian Ambassador to share their concerns with him about his country’s support of this project.
"...Turkiye might enter into a rapprochement with the West..."
???What??? Turkey is one of America's favourite jewels in its NATO crown. What kind of 'rapprochement', bearing in mind Ergodan's tolerance of the 2016 coup attempt, more could anyone, even NATO, hope for? He's rolled over to give his belly to his overlord. For how much longer would they like him to roll around on his back?
'Rapprochement'?! Maybe a definition is in order?
I must admit, the 'Trojan Horse' aspect of Turkey's aspirations at BRICS concerns me.
Now, if Turkiye were to clarify its position by withdrawing, or at least stating a goal of withdrawing, from NATO... That could change things. Otherwise... I'm afraid I may have said it too many times before: 'When you've got a vampire on the ground to drive a stake through its heart, you don't give up to offer it your had to shake and ask, 'Best two of three?'. '
Perhaps you (anyone) were hoping the Americans might have 'learnt their lesson' and abstain from manipulating and taking advantage of Türkiye's Ottoman fantasies in anything like the same way as they took advantage of the Ukrainians? I know the line between cynicism and credulity is a thin one, but...
I see everything very differently. In brief, that failed US-backed coup resulted in Erdogan decisively diversifying his foreign policy from its hitherto dependence on the West to a more balanced (albeit imperfect) embrace of the collective East, especially with Russia.
Despite remaining in NATO, it doesn't allow external forces to use its territory any longer for threatening Russia or Iran, which is a huge shift from the past. As regards BRICS, I published a piece last week about why membership or lack thereof isn't a big deal in my opinion:
What I described above could change though if the never-extinguished but thus far manageable security dilemma between Turkiye and Iran worsens should the Zangezur dispute escalate with harsher rhetoric and perhaps some symbolic actions (ex: military drills).
That would be an excellent opportunity for the US and Turkiye to bury the hatchet, especially if Trump returns and is influenced once again into reapplying his policy of "maximum pressure" on Iran. I hope it doesn't happen of course, but I'm closely monitoring it.
"I see everything very differently. In brief, that failed US-backed coup resulted in Erdogan decisively diversifying his foreign policy from its hitherto dependence on the West to a more balanced (albeit imperfect) embrace of the collective East, especially with Russia."
OK, you're obviously far better informed than I could ever hope to be, in all seriousness and without any sarcasm I respect that, so I bow to your better judgement and beg your pardon.
"Despite remaining in NATO, it doesn't allow external forces to use its territory any longer for threatening Russia or Iran, which is a huge shift from the past."
I take your word for it, though I'm not aware what shift, in particular, you're thinking of. But that, I understand, is because I am ignorant and could and should not waste your time and effort asking you to explain anything I could just as easily find out myself. I'm afraid I must admit I'm guilty of opening my mouth (and hitting 'Send') rather too impulsively, e.g. here.
I don't want to waste your time on it, but one of the things I'd point out now, having refrained in ignorance last time, is the 'Zoom' metaphor: "...BRICS can be compared to a Zoom conference..." I understand that but there is the element of prestige. Potentially, this could become more influential than the prestige alone, if it isn't already. I can't stand the idea of a trojan horse sneaking in on the sly, quietly, while no-one's watching. I wouldn't have thought the horse in Troy was painfully aware of the danger it carried inside itself, perhaps somewhat akin to many Ukrainians, who could never have believed some ten-twenty years ago they might ever be so masterfully and completely deceived and manipulated. I'm sure you must have good reason to believe the Turks are more aware than the Ukrainians but it's such a fresh and open wound.
"What I described above could change though if the never-extinguished but thus far manageable security dilemma between Turkiye and Iran worsens should the Zangezur dispute escalate with harsher rhetoric and perhaps some symbolic actions (ex: military drills). That would be an excellent opportunity for the US and Turkiye to bury the hatchet, especially if Trump returns and is influenced once again into reapplying his policy of "maximum pressure" on Iran. I hope it doesn't happen of course, but"
OK, I'm not informed well enough to comment, so I'll risk erring onto your side here. My reservation is the hatchet Turkiye and the US have supposedly buried: as long as they work for NATO, nothing else really matters; if a hatchet needs to be buried, it doesn't really matter as long as the US can ultimately rely on an 'ally' (or 'toadie', if you, like me, prefer).
"I'm closely monitoring it."
I'm sure you are. That's why I read your work.
I'll try a bit harder to refrain from posting poorly-informed knee-jerk-type emotive comments too quickly, too early in the morning, without really having had a chance to think them through properly. On the other hand, sometimes that works. It's a job to know: a balancing act.
Iran benefits the least among all the involved parties. Given that Iran has security concerns about Turkey and Azerbaijan and these two countries benefit the most from this corridor, I would bargain really hard if I were Iran. Russia MAY want to control the corridor to prevent an infiltration path from Armenia to Northern Iran. Actually Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan all have strong Western ties, links, or other shady deals. If the east-west corridor is partially inside Iran, then Iran can chop it off at will. But Iran can also sell the idea to Azerbaijan the southern alternative through Iran would bypass Armenia intervention.
If Russia really wants the North-South corridor to go through Azerbaijan, then I think Russia can (1) propose joint admin, even joint security patrols along the area. (2) Armenia and Azerbaijan provides all needed land for the corridor, not Iran. However, if Iran wants an additional security area south of the roads, then Iran should provide that. (3) Iran can help pay or construct this east-west corridor (which may have highways, railroads, fiber optics, even gas pipeline, etc. if Iran wants to share the roads in the future. (4) Russia to guarantee free passage ACROSS the corridor between Armenia and Iran. Spies travel both ways. (5) Alternatively, Russia can excuse herself leave the four parties to negotiate. Chances are, it will not work due to Armenia objection.
Personally, I prefer the Russian-Iran pipeline to go across the Caspian Sea. But in that case, it may be difficult to block a similar undersea pipeline from Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan then toward Turkey. If Russia does not want that pipeline to operate, then the Caspian undersea pipeline would not work.
"...Turkiye might enter into a rapprochement with the West..."
???What??? Turkey is one of America's favourite jewels in its NATO crown. What kind of 'rapprochement', bearing in mind Ergodan's tolerance of the 2016 coup attempt, more could anyone, even NATO, hope for? He's rolled over to give his belly to his overlord. For how much longer would they like him to roll around on his back?
'Rapprochement'?! Maybe a definition is in order?
I must admit, the 'Trojan Horse' aspect of Turkey's aspirations at BRICS concerns me.
Now, if Turkiye were to clarify its position by withdrawing, or at least stating a goal of withdrawing, from NATO... That could change things. Otherwise... I'm afraid I may have said it too many times before: 'When you've got a vampire on the ground to drive a stake through its heart, you don't give up to offer it your had to shake and ask, 'Best two of three?'. '
Perhaps you (anyone) were hoping the Americans might have 'learnt their lesson' and abstain from manipulating and taking advantage of Türkiye's Ottoman fantasies in anything like the same way as they took advantage of the Ukrainians? I know the line between cynicism and credulity is a thin one, but...
There may be a need for a wake up call here.
I see everything very differently. In brief, that failed US-backed coup resulted in Erdogan decisively diversifying his foreign policy from its hitherto dependence on the West to a more balanced (albeit imperfect) embrace of the collective East, especially with Russia.
Despite remaining in NATO, it doesn't allow external forces to use its territory any longer for threatening Russia or Iran, which is a huge shift from the past. As regards BRICS, I published a piece last week about why membership or lack thereof isn't a big deal in my opinion:
https://korybko.substack.com/p/brics-membership-or-lack-thereof
What I described above could change though if the never-extinguished but thus far manageable security dilemma between Turkiye and Iran worsens should the Zangezur dispute escalate with harsher rhetoric and perhaps some symbolic actions (ex: military drills).
That would be an excellent opportunity for the US and Turkiye to bury the hatchet, especially if Trump returns and is influenced once again into reapplying his policy of "maximum pressure" on Iran. I hope it doesn't happen of course, but I'm closely monitoring it.
"I see everything very differently. In brief, that failed US-backed coup resulted in Erdogan decisively diversifying his foreign policy from its hitherto dependence on the West to a more balanced (albeit imperfect) embrace of the collective East, especially with Russia."
OK, you're obviously far better informed than I could ever hope to be, in all seriousness and without any sarcasm I respect that, so I bow to your better judgement and beg your pardon.
"Despite remaining in NATO, it doesn't allow external forces to use its territory any longer for threatening Russia or Iran, which is a huge shift from the past."
I take your word for it, though I'm not aware what shift, in particular, you're thinking of. But that, I understand, is because I am ignorant and could and should not waste your time and effort asking you to explain anything I could just as easily find out myself. I'm afraid I must admit I'm guilty of opening my mouth (and hitting 'Send') rather too impulsively, e.g. here.
"As regards BRICS, I published a piece last week about why membership or lack thereof isn't a big deal in my opinion: https://korybko.substack.com/p/brics-membership-or-lack-thereof "
Yeah, I saw that. I've re-read it again now.
I don't want to waste your time on it, but one of the things I'd point out now, having refrained in ignorance last time, is the 'Zoom' metaphor: "...BRICS can be compared to a Zoom conference..." I understand that but there is the element of prestige. Potentially, this could become more influential than the prestige alone, if it isn't already. I can't stand the idea of a trojan horse sneaking in on the sly, quietly, while no-one's watching. I wouldn't have thought the horse in Troy was painfully aware of the danger it carried inside itself, perhaps somewhat akin to many Ukrainians, who could never have believed some ten-twenty years ago they might ever be so masterfully and completely deceived and manipulated. I'm sure you must have good reason to believe the Turks are more aware than the Ukrainians but it's such a fresh and open wound.
"What I described above could change though if the never-extinguished but thus far manageable security dilemma between Turkiye and Iran worsens should the Zangezur dispute escalate with harsher rhetoric and perhaps some symbolic actions (ex: military drills). That would be an excellent opportunity for the US and Turkiye to bury the hatchet, especially if Trump returns and is influenced once again into reapplying his policy of "maximum pressure" on Iran. I hope it doesn't happen of course, but"
OK, I'm not informed well enough to comment, so I'll risk erring onto your side here. My reservation is the hatchet Turkiye and the US have supposedly buried: as long as they work for NATO, nothing else really matters; if a hatchet needs to be buried, it doesn't really matter as long as the US can ultimately rely on an 'ally' (or 'toadie', if you, like me, prefer).
"I'm closely monitoring it."
I'm sure you are. That's why I read your work.
I'll try a bit harder to refrain from posting poorly-informed knee-jerk-type emotive comments too quickly, too early in the morning, without really having had a chance to think them through properly. On the other hand, sometimes that works. It's a job to know: a balancing act.
Thank you for your time and attention!
Iran benefits the least among all the involved parties. Given that Iran has security concerns about Turkey and Azerbaijan and these two countries benefit the most from this corridor, I would bargain really hard if I were Iran. Russia MAY want to control the corridor to prevent an infiltration path from Armenia to Northern Iran. Actually Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan all have strong Western ties, links, or other shady deals. If the east-west corridor is partially inside Iran, then Iran can chop it off at will. But Iran can also sell the idea to Azerbaijan the southern alternative through Iran would bypass Armenia intervention.
If Russia really wants the North-South corridor to go through Azerbaijan, then I think Russia can (1) propose joint admin, even joint security patrols along the area. (2) Armenia and Azerbaijan provides all needed land for the corridor, not Iran. However, if Iran wants an additional security area south of the roads, then Iran should provide that. (3) Iran can help pay or construct this east-west corridor (which may have highways, railroads, fiber optics, even gas pipeline, etc. if Iran wants to share the roads in the future. (4) Russia to guarantee free passage ACROSS the corridor between Armenia and Iran. Spies travel both ways. (5) Alternatively, Russia can excuse herself leave the four parties to negotiate. Chances are, it will not work due to Armenia objection.
Personally, I prefer the Russian-Iran pipeline to go across the Caspian Sea. But in that case, it may be difficult to block a similar undersea pipeline from Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan then toward Turkey. If Russia does not want that pipeline to operate, then the Caspian undersea pipeline would not work.