Myanmar’s Self-Proclaimed President Wants Ukrainian-Like Military Aid

No one can say with confidence what’ll happen other than predict that the conflict might pass a turning point later this year, though it’s unclear whether that would be in the Tatmadaw’s or the anti-government forces’ favor.

President of Myanmar’s “National Unity Government” (NUG) Duwa Lashi La requested Ukrainian-like military aid in a recent interview: “We really need effective weapons, like antiaircraft missiles. But there are many limitations to obtaining such military weapons. It’s possible if there’s a will – take Ukraine, for example. We are confident to take the whole military down within six months if we are provided with such weapons. If we could ever get support like Ukraine, this struggle would end immediately.”

His country could become the next New Cold War battleground as the US “Pivots (back) to Asia” under Trump 2.0 in order to more muscularly contain China. Readers can learn more about the latest phase of the world’s longest-running civil war here, while this analysis here elaborates on China’s interests therein. In brief, it began as something more complex than Western-backed rebels fighting a jointly Chinese- and Russian-backed military government, but it’s now finally taking on these contours.

The NUG leader also told Al Jazeera during his interview with them that he hopes to see Myanmar replicate last month’s lightning-fast regime change in Syria last month, to which end “international intervention is essential”, whether it’s political/legal and economic pressure or armed support. He then called on “the world’s superpowers, neighbouring countries and ASEAN countries” to “ensure the military’s departure from politics.”

China and Russia were alluded to when Duwa Lashi La said that the international community should stop purchasing Myanmar’s natural resources as well as to stop giving the armed forces jet fuel and arms. He elaborated more on the Chinese vector by promising to safeguard its investments and pledging better economic cooperation with the People’s Republic than the military government presently has. For that to happen, however, China must stop supporting the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces).

On the domestic front, he acknowledged that some ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) “don’t exactly recognize the NUG as a central government” despite him claiming that it functions as one, which he attributed to preexisting mistrust that’s somewhat attributable to their differing historical legacies. He hopes to organize all willing EAOs under a joint chain of command with a view towards establishing a federal armed forces in the event that military government is overthrown.

Duwa Lashi La didn’t openly say so, but his remarks about not wanting to rush amendments to the 1982 Citizenship Law that deprived the Rohingya of full citizenship rights suggest an unwillingness to worsen relations with the Arakan Army (AA), which isn’t aligned with the NUG and wants their own state. The AA is part of the “Three Brotherhood Alliance” (3BA) that led the anti-government forces’ nationwide counteroffensive from October 2023 till now and is therefore indispensable to continuing the conflict.

That group also just seized control of the Bangladeshi border, the possible consequences of which were analyzed here, and might even capture Kyaukphyu port later this year which serves as the terminal point of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor’s (CMEC) oil, gas, and logistics routes. Even though the NUG leader declared that “we are seeking the end game” to the conflict in 2025, Asia Times’ David Scott Mathieson compellingly argued that “Myanmar’s NUG cooks the books on resistance success”.

This is because “Exiled government’s military progress report takes credit for war wins and gains by armed groups it neither commands nor controls”. Its call for “international intervention” as far as Ukrainian-like military aid (including antiaircraft missiles) might accordingly not amount to anything since the NUG isn’t the one responsible for the anti-government forces’ victories over the past 15 months. If any is sent, such aid might be funneled to those that are actually doing the fighting, not to the NUG.

In pursuit of that, the media might revive last winter’s claims about nuclear smuggling in Myanmar and/or last summer’s ones about the alleged international threat posed by that country’s organized crime networks to generate public support for this policy, all with the intent of masking its anti-Chinese motives. The narrative could be manufactured that the West should arm comparatively more responsible groups against their less responsible counterparts in order to manage these threats by proxy.

Other claims could be made about the need to support the aforesaid groups’ governance in the territories under their control as a step towards further “Balkanizing” this resource-rich country. The NUG might still remain useful to the West as an umbrella group under whom most EAOs could later be pressured to assemble if the Tatmadaw is defeated in order to more easily formalize the country’s “Balkanization” through post-war federalization. That might be a prolonged political process though.

It can’t be taken for granted either since the Tatmadaw’s latest Russian fighter jet and helicopter acquisitions (six and six each) might change the tide of the conflict if the US doesn’t give EAOs the antiaircraft missiles that the NUG just demanded for its own forces. The earlier hyperlinked analysis about China’s interests in the latest phase of the world’s longest-running civil war also drew attention to reports about the possibility that it might deploy PMCs to protect BRI projects if the fighting worsens.

All of this could lead to the possibility that more Russian air support for the Tatmadaw is exploited by the hawks in Trump 2.0 as the pretext for transferring antiaircraft missiles to Myanmar’s EAOs, which could keep their offensive going and thus potentially trigger a Chinese PMC intervention. In that event, Myanmar would truly become the next New Cold War battleground, but this scenario can be averted if the US either doesn’t have enough missiles anymore to give away or Trump decides against this.

No one can say with confidence what’ll happen other than predict that the conflict might pass a turning point later this year, though it’s unclear whether that would be in the Tatmadaw’s or the anti-government forces’ favor. It also can’t be ruled out that a stalemate sets in, but that’s unlikely since both sides’ foreign backers might want to help their partners overcome that in order to finally win, with any more aid to that end worsening their security dilemma and escalating this New Cold War crisis.