Absolutely, I was relieved to see that Russia -- which traditionally lacks flexibility and takes a long time to learn lessons -- adapted to changing circumstances a lot faster than I thought.
It could have been faster in hindsight, of course, but it was still better than what I think many expected. Everything's back on the right track tho…
Absolutely, I was relieved to see that Russia -- which traditionally lacks flexibility and takes a long time to learn lessons -- adapted to changing circumstances a lot faster than I thought.
It could have been faster in hindsight, of course, but it was still better than what I think many expected. Everything's back on the right track though earlier opportunities that could have been tapped now appear forever lost.
The conflict is altogether different at this point than it was at the beginning. Whereas it might have been easier to destroy the bridges back then, now it's much harder and there might be less missiles comfortably available to expend.
After all, Ukraine has around 20 bridges over the Dnieper, and there's certainly some air defense guarding at least the main ones. I'm not so sure Russia has the excess missiles required for saturating 20 bridges simultaneously.
Yes, that's certainly true in one sense, on the surface, which tends to be about as far as most issues ever penetrate. In another sense, though, regarding matters of military necessity, when the gloves really come off, they seem flexible enough to scorch land and adaptable enough to rise afresh from the ashes. I think this is what the aggressors missed, or got wrong, in 1990-92, when they were deciding whether to expand NATO for 'full spectrum dominance', or work to find out how they could help and learn from the collapse of the USSR. Jeffery Sachs sheds some revealing light on this. (https://www.unz.com/article/how-the-neocons-chose-hegemony-over-peace-beginning-in-the-early-1990s/?utm_source=email&utm_campaign=daily)
I think this is because their wars, when the military needs to take its gloves off, are defensive — their necessity is existential. I shall refrain from commenting on aggressors' wars.
"I'm not so sure Russia has the excess missiles required for saturating 20 bridges simultaneously."
There is, of course, the solution NATO would employ, the same as they used at Kakhova: blow up just one dam to make a flood of biblical proportion. I shan't comment on morality or military ethics here. I wonder how many bridges are downstream of the dam at the top of the Dnepr? There's a difference between scorching your own and someone else's land.
This is perhaps the most reliable indication of how the Russians REALLY regard the Ukraine as a viable state — what is theirs and what is the Ukraine's — and their respect for Ukrainian sovereignty: they won't scorch the Ukrainians' earth because it's not theirs to scorch (or flood). I shan't comment on the Americans' regard for whatever the hell was downstream of Kakhovka.
Absolutely, I was relieved to see that Russia -- which traditionally lacks flexibility and takes a long time to learn lessons -- adapted to changing circumstances a lot faster than I thought.
It could have been faster in hindsight, of course, but it was still better than what I think many expected. Everything's back on the right track though earlier opportunities that could have been tapped now appear forever lost.
The conflict is altogether different at this point than it was at the beginning. Whereas it might have been easier to destroy the bridges back then, now it's much harder and there might be less missiles comfortably available to expend.
After all, Ukraine has around 20 bridges over the Dnieper, and there's certainly some air defense guarding at least the main ones. I'm not so sure Russia has the excess missiles required for saturating 20 bridges simultaneously.
"...traditionally lacks flexibility..."
Yes, that's certainly true in one sense, on the surface, which tends to be about as far as most issues ever penetrate. In another sense, though, regarding matters of military necessity, when the gloves really come off, they seem flexible enough to scorch land and adaptable enough to rise afresh from the ashes. I think this is what the aggressors missed, or got wrong, in 1990-92, when they were deciding whether to expand NATO for 'full spectrum dominance', or work to find out how they could help and learn from the collapse of the USSR. Jeffery Sachs sheds some revealing light on this. (https://www.unz.com/article/how-the-neocons-chose-hegemony-over-peace-beginning-in-the-early-1990s/?utm_source=email&utm_campaign=daily)
I think this is because their wars, when the military needs to take its gloves off, are defensive — their necessity is existential. I shall refrain from commenting on aggressors' wars.
"I'm not so sure Russia has the excess missiles required for saturating 20 bridges simultaneously."
There is, of course, the solution NATO would employ, the same as they used at Kakhova: blow up just one dam to make a flood of biblical proportion. I shan't comment on morality or military ethics here. I wonder how many bridges are downstream of the dam at the top of the Dnepr? There's a difference between scorching your own and someone else's land.
This is perhaps the most reliable indication of how the Russians REALLY regard the Ukraine as a viable state — what is theirs and what is the Ukraine's — and their respect for Ukrainian sovereignty: they won't scorch the Ukrainians' earth because it's not theirs to scorch (or flood). I shan't comment on the Americans' regard for whatever the hell was downstream of Kakhovka.