They’d only advance the political goal of speeding up the resumption of peace talks on more of Russia’s terms at major economic, financial, and reputational costs, not to mention risking World War III by miscalculation, since conventional means suffice for responding to all existing military threats.
Nothing would delight NATO more than if Russia were to resort to the use of nuclear weapons.
Russian impotence would be on full display, any sympathy Russia has in the Global South would evaporate and people would stop talking about Israeli atrocities in Palestine. There would be enormous pressure on India and China to abandon Russia, and the US and Israel would take this as a green light to use nuclear weapons on Iran.
Agreed, and well said, it should be avoided unless Russia becomes super desperate and calculates that the costs are worth the gains, which will remain unlikely except in the most extreme scenarios.
Any future Afghanistan and Iraq will be a lot costlier thanks to drones. That changed dynamics completely. I think it is the main miscalculation on the Russian part too, nobody had predicted the magnitude and influence of drones. Now everybody knows.
Just imagine the USA occupation of Afghanistan where taliban instead of home made explosive devices had drones. Unsustainable. This is why I don’t think they have the conventional power any more (not that it does not exist, just that drones require orders of magnitude more personnel, technology, and any occupation would take orders of magnitude higher losses.
Surely there were miscalculations on all sides. I’m convinced that the west was left in shock when they realized Russia is not going to fall apart from within. That was their big miscalculation.
What is going on now, IMO is finding ways for killing more Russians and inflicting as much of material damage as possible before inevitable end of the war.
To nato, dead Russians are also a success.
And a digression: an analyst (bmanalysis) made a point which made sense to me. At the beginning of smo there was a realistic chance of Ukraine peace and then fast slide under Russian influence (there is still a chance for that in the future). To nato, Ukrainians are potential Russian soldiers, so to them dead Ukrainians are almost as good as dead Russians. NATO at this point wants to reap the situation and kill as many people to reduce future adversaries potential.
I think the Weat clearly miscalculated. And they've painted themselves into a corner that they cannot get out of, but through a general war.
The difference is that Western resources and soft power allow them to make mistakes with no consequences. Too many people still think that the West are the Good Guys, in spite of abundant evidence to the contrary.
Russia doesn't have this luxury. Ot fair? Nope. But that's the way it is. Which also makes Russian soft pedaling especially foolish.
I agree, but a lot of this speculation is coming from "Non-Russian Pro-Russians" (NRPRs) in the Alt-Media Community (AMC) and even members of the Russian government itself like Medvedev, who's mostly just an ultra-nationalist bullhorn but still a high-level official.
Yes, I personally suspect that part of what's fueling this is that some faction here thinks that loudly talking about this will "deter" the West, while some NRPRs have reacted to their dog whistles to independently promote this (IMO false) perception.
What I've learned these 2,5 years is that a lot of what we see, hear, and read is either a direct or indirect message from one group of elites to another.
We average folks are easily influenced by their respective narratives and oftentimes can't make full sense of them.
Other times we suspect that more is going on behind the scenes, but "fellow travelers'" amplification of these messages can muddle the discussion.
That's what I think is happening here after reflecting on everything from February 2022 till today.
Remember how many times we heard that it would be WWIII if the West even indirectly intervened in Ukraine?
What about when Crimea was bombed for the first time? The second? The umpteenth time now? How about the Crimean Bridge?
The Kremlin? Russia's strategic airfields? Its early warning systems? The assassination of influential journalists and other figures?
How about turning Belgorod into a literal war zone? What about the scenario of Ukraine invading pre-2014 Russian land like Kursk, which now happened?
Time and again, every prior warning about WWIII pushed by officials, allied media, and "fellow travelers" didn't pan out.
That's not to say that the risk doesn't exist -- it does, and I've written about it a lot -- but I'm becoming a lot more cynical nowadays in light of recent events.
Remember, Russia to this day won't even consider bombing even a single bridge across the Dnieper.
Another commentator earlier today ridiculously implied that's because pontoons are preferable to bridges and rails for crossing rivers (LOL!).
But the truth is that perceived political goals (irrespective of how relevant they are) seem to predominate over military ones even this far down the line.
Russia could always theoretically jump up the escalation ladder, but there are still a lot of steps to climb if it wants to do so gradually as expected.
2. Russia can't actually target, let alone track, all these shipments
If you have strong defensive lines it's cheaper to let the enemy come to you rather than hit them from a distance. It's a cost benefit equation - expensive missiles vs. cheap artillery and anti-tank ordinance which can be mass produced. A side benefit is hands-on experience destroying enemy targets at close range.
One thing that escapes most people's attention is that Russia is gaining enormous battlefield experience in the most complex peer level warfare since WWII. No other nation has that experience. What this means is that the next generation of Russian military leadership, from NCOs up to the General Staff, will be battle tested personnel with a genuine understanding of what it takes to wage war on this scale.
This is the unintended consequence of picking a fight with a nation that perceives that fight as an existential threat. To quote Admiral Yamamoto, which I'd say applies equally in this context:
"I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve."
"1. Why won't Russia even attempt to destroy a single bridge across the Dnieper?"
You don't destroy what you intend to use. Retreating armies destroy bridges. Advancing armies attempt to preserve them.
Russia's aim thus far has not been to capture territory so much as to degrade Ukraine's military, which is achievable by a strong defensive position, provided your enemy is foolish enough to attack them, which thus far has been the case.
That's not what's happening. The explicitly stated objective of the SMO was to push threats as far away from Russia's border as possible not keep or bait them as close as possible, including at the further risk of civilian lives.
What you're apparently doing is trying to rationalize the sluggish pace of this conflict like a lot of top influencers have done, but the explanation doesn't align with the actual objectives.
Everything you've written is challenged by simply asking why Russia wouldn't advance to the river if it was able to and thus target these attacking units further away from its borders instead of close to them.
What you're implying, whether you intend to or not, is that Russia can indeed advance but chooses not to as part of some "master plan", even though this same "plan" has led to many civilians being killed inside Russia's pre-2014 borders.
"The explicitly stated objective of the SMO was to push threats as far away from Russia's border as possible not keep or bait them as close as possible, including at the further risk of civilian lives."
The original stated objective was demilitarization and de-nazification. Demilitarization consists of risking as few of your own guys as possible to deplete the enemy's numbers. The best way to do that is from a well prepared defensive position if you know your enemy will attack.
The alternative, which you seem to be suggesting, is to advance in force to the Dnieper, which while possible, would cost considerably more in Russian lives and equipment than what they're currently losing from Ukrainian artillery.
Neither of us knows what the Russian General Staff is planning, but if I had to guess, I'd say the basic idea was (until recently) to gradually degrade the UAF, while keeping the conflict in the east so as not to tempt a NATO occupation of western Ukraine. Better to deplete both UAF and NATO gradually than risk a sudden escalation by advancing in force.
The preferred outcome, which we're starting to see now, is collapse of the command structure and political infighting, which ideally would lead to a coup and some form of negotiations. Barring that (and I'm not giving odds) the objective would be to advance in force once the enemy is sufficiently depleted and the risks to your own guys are minimized. We're at or near that point I would say, which is why the bridges are still standing.
"What you're apparently doing is trying to rationalize the sluggish pace of this conflict like a lot of top influencers have done, but the explanation doesn't align with the actual objectives. "
What I'm doing is the same as what you're doing - using the best available sources and arriving at my own reasoned conclusions. I don't follow what you call 'top influencers' who I would characterize as impatience and lacking in actual military knowledge, so not worth paying attention to.
Demilitarization is facilitated by pushing threats as far away from the border as possible to the point where they no longer threaten, let alone harm and kill, Russians, which doesn't equate to letting them remain on the border.
Moreover, Ukrainian arms continue being replenished, although Russia is winning the "race of logistics" with NATO. Maintaining the status quo only incrementally achieves the aforementioned objective.
Russia is struggling to advance in Ukraine, but it's still trying. Your claims that it's sitting back letting the enemy strike don't align with the reality of gradual advances on the ground.
On the topic of collapsing the central command, Russia also continues eschewing attacks against command and control centers. They still to this day won't carry out large-scale targeted strikes against them.
Your understanding of everything is a reaction to the sluggish pace of this conflict, one which tries to present it as a master plan of sorts, when it's really just improvisation given serious limitations and continued self-restraint.
And that self-restraint is due to, in my view outdated and perhaps even to a degree misguided (in hindsight) factors whose influence over decisionmaking continues to linger.
Again, the most sensible thing to do is to take out those bridges, but that's not being done, and it's not because Russia wants to bait the enemy closer to its borders, but because of political calculations and some military limitations.
"Demilitarization is facilitated by pushing threats as far away from the border as possible..."
If you can. That's a very long border. To do what you suggest would require a major assembly of forces which would be vulnerable to attack. Don't forget, the line of contact was already well established before Russia entered the fight. That meant you'd be attacking fortified positions where a 3 to 1 advantage would be needed to guarantee success. Over that amount of terrain, I agree, Russia would be stretched to achieve that goal, which would be what? To capture mostly empty fields? Look at the map. It's all farmland with very little cover. Once you've advanced and captured that you then have to hold it, which requires building fortifications. It also stretches your supply lines. Why would you do that when the enemy keeps coming at your already well fortified lines, which were established years before entering the fray? That's been the plan these last 2 years and it is militarily sound, even if it doesn't satisfy the demands of people with no understanding of peer level conflict in this kind of theatre. Seems to me you're falling into the same trap as the pundits you decry. Why is it taking so long? Must be something amiss. No, it's just that in war you don't make rash decisions that costs unnecessary lives and equipment. You let the enemy do that, and thus far they've cooperated.
"Moreover, Ukrainian arms continue being replenished,..."
Sure, the part that isn't diverted to the black market. A friend of mine who fought on the Ukrainian side tells a different story. Ammunition and artillery rounds were in short supply as were other essentials. He even spent his own money to buy a van so his supposedly mobile infantry unit could get around because they didn't supply them with a vehicle. That's how bad it was on his section of the line, and that was six months ago. His description comports with that given by many captured UAF soldiers, so I'm inclined to take his word.
"Russia is struggling to advance in Ukraine, but it's still trying. Your claims that it's sitting back letting the enemy strike don't align with the reality of gradual advances on the ground."
The strategy has shifted now that the UAF is sufficiently depleted in most areas. They actually helped in that regard by diverting resources to Kirsk. I maintain, and this is from Russian sources not armchair enthusiasts, that the strategy these last two years was to minimize losses while inflicting maximum damage, and that goal has now been largely achieved, which is why you're seeing an advance now, rather than 6 months or a year ago. Time has been on Russia's side since day one, so why would you commit to a strategy that depletes your own forces when you don't have to? Up until now it has not been about capturing territory, which as I've pointed out incurs unacceptable losses, stretches supply lines and requires new fortifications. Simpler to just sit tight and let the enemy (who has no chance of overrunning you) throw himself into a meat grinder.
"On the topic of collapsing the central command, Russia also continues eschewing attacks against command and control centers. They still to this day won't carry out large-scale targeted strikes against them."
Where are you getting this from? They just hit a major concentration of NATO and UAF personnel and there have been similar attacks on command and control centres previously. You make it sound easy, but I would point out that some of these command centres date to Soviet times and are built to withstand a nuclear attack. I would also point out that you don't target a position where you have your own people on the inside supplying vital information. This would apply to the SBU as well as the military.
"Your understanding of everything is a reaction to the sluggish pace of this conflict,"
Up to this point I've tried to avoid characterizing your position as you've done to mine several times now, but this is becoming a polemic and I try to avoid those. You clearly have strong opinions on the subject, but unless you have a direct line to the Russian General Staff, you're basically in the same boat as I am. As for the bridges, those will be needed in the coming advance across the Dneiper, which will involve capturing both banks plus several kms to the west as well. The ultimate goal is Odessa which can't be approached from Kherson due to interceding rivers. That's my prediction at least, based on the historic importance of Odessa as a Russian city, plus the need to control the entire littoral to prevent attacks by sea.
Time will tell whose analysis is more grounded. In the meantime, I'll let you have the last word as I see no point in arguing any further about it.
Thanks, McDodd. I still maintain despite what that other commentator claimed that it's more difficult to rely on pontoons for river crossings than on bridges and rails.
Right now there's an absolutely unimpeded flow of troops and equipment across the river and has been for the entire duration of this conflict.
Since Russia might not be able to track and target NATO equipment in Western Ukraine, blowing up the bridges would at least slow their deployment to the front.
I'm beginning to suspect that another "gentlemen's deal" might be the reason why Russia hasn't even tried.
We can only speculate what the terms are, but the US might have threatened Russia with something serious if that's the case.
Perhaps they said they'd authorize a conventional intervention into Western Ukraine, which while partitioning it, could spike the risk of WWIII which Putin wants to avoid?
I don't know, I'm just spitballing here because we know that it would help Russia and harm Ukraine if these bridges were destroyed (again, unlike what the other guy claimed).
So it would follow that the US might threaten something greater that would harm Russia and help Ukraine even more, such as a conventional intervention by NATO.
I’ve always been of the opinion that they WANT that flow. It’s a much broader attritional war in that they’re perfectly happy to kill all the mercenaries and empty every NATO armory. Neither can be replaced.
Everyone is also underestimating or outright ignoring the developmental aspect of this war. It’s a real world laboratory wherein Russia is refining every aspect of their military, fine tuning their industrial complex, and in due course steadily nullifying every weapon the West has.
By the time NATO would get around to committing themselves they wouldn’t have any cards to play.
My personal opinion is that the "race of logistics"/"war of attrition" was an outcome of Russia being unable to wrap everything up quickly like it initially wanted to do, not a planned feature of the SMO.
As for why the bridges still aren't being destroyed, I plan to have a piece about that tomorrow or the next day, definitely by the end of the week. I've been thinking about it a lot and want to generate a discussion.
Absolutely, I was relieved to see that Russia -- which traditionally lacks flexibility and takes a long time to learn lessons -- adapted to changing circumstances a lot faster than I thought.
It could have been faster in hindsight, of course, but it was still better than what I think many expected. Everything's back on the right track though earlier opportunities that could have been tapped now appear forever lost.
The conflict is altogether different at this point than it was at the beginning. Whereas it might have been easier to destroy the bridges back then, now it's much harder and there might be less missiles comfortably available to expend.
After all, Ukraine has around 20 bridges over the Dnieper, and there's certainly some air defense guarding at least the main ones. I'm not so sure Russia has the excess missiles required for saturating 20 bridges simultaneously.
Agreed. The “Kiev Gambit” was a chance to prevent all of this plus — as many also conveniently forget — a very successful “pinning” of AFU forces that allowed them to clean house in Azovstal.
You're right, I wrote about it at the time at the now-defunct oneworld.press (you can find an Internet Archive version of my work there from February 2022-September 2022 when I fully moved to Substack once they closed down).
I hadn't thought of the bridges like that, making it impossible to track troops and supplies.
Too many armchair generals, though; all joking aside, I wouldn't like to comment on the relative efficiency or inefficiency of any particular action. I don't know.
I do, however, trust Putin and the Russians to get it right.
I think you're wise to recognise spitballing, when ya gotta...
And I reckon you're most probably right about the gentlemen's agreement.
So frustrating to force oneself to reconcile to statesmen, like Putin, particularly in a world where there are so few of them, needing to relate to [find your own word here for Biden, Sullivan, UK PMs et alia, please] as 'gentlemen', when the world is so full of such [?].
Russia, led by Putin, has been one of the savviest interdictors of Western hegemony. Syria's Assad followed suit and has kept together his country despite the hyenas of U.S., Turkey, and Israel tearing his country apart. Assad is now being welcomed throughout the Middle East. They both behaved with a restraint unknown in the capitols of the U.S., UK, and Europe.
I see no reason why Russia need nuke anything. I do believe a submarine-launched hypersonic missile (flying under radar) could take out Washington, D.C. Lord, the silence would be a blessing.
Putin has a sort of siege problem. If he just sits there, those outside the castle gates will just wear him down with loads of terrorism, sniping, missile, drone (etc) attacks and abuse. The bully never goes away unless he receives a bloody noe. Although Putin's restraint is commendable not responding makes him look weak - and that can lead to internal instability. To have these enemies outside the city gate is the real problem. Peace talks dont work because they wouldn't last with such enemies, just look at Minsk. So what's the solution?
Rusia no usaría armas nucleares táctica en este momento. El punto de cambio inquietante en este momento sería que usase sus misiles hipersónicos contra los países que pudieran proporcionar misiles de largo alcance a Ucrania. Ese escenario sería igualmente inquietante pues si UK recibiera una respuesta de este tipo en su propio territorio no tengo ni idea de cuál podría ser su respuesta, ya que Rusia estaría demás atacándoles dentro de la legalidad. De todas maneras UK dejo de fabricar misiles Storm Shadow hace tiempo y parece muy plausible que le quedan poquísimas unidades, si es que le quedan. De hecho, llevamos bastante tiempo viendo que ya tampoco los usan en Ucrania. Si eso es así, todo este teatro que se está montando ahora sería solo un farol por por parte de UK. UK no tiene prácticamente ejercito, ni tan siquiera tanques y su armada esta en un estado lamentable. Por otro lado, Alemania no parece que vaya a usar sus misiles Taurus contra Rusia y Francia ya ha dejado de hablar del tema con sus Scalps. EEUU parece que tampoco va a entregar ATACAM (de hecho, dicen que, sus almacenes andan también bastante bajos). Todo esto suena a rabietas y ganas de mantener la cara ante sus audiencias en el mundo occidental, así como su presión mediática a todos los niveles. Sabemos que incluso sus producciones de municiones andan bastante bajas con respecto a lo que se necesitaría para emprender un enfrentamiento "en serio" con Rusia. Los ejércitos europeos además no cuentan ni con el número de efectivos necesarios, ni las infraestructuras, ni la coordinación necesarias. Europa está cayendo a marchas forzadas en un abismo económico sin ninguna forma de arreglo que no sea desmontando todo el "estado único" y centralizado que están intentando montar y sin contar con la población. No hay creatividad en los campos más importantes. Malos tiempos para Europa y muy muy difícil de corregir.
The fact we are discussing whether or not Russia will nuke a country they are sending gas to is testament to how stupid this war is and incomprehensible Moscows goals are. Is there a way to nuke Ukraine without interrupting gas deliveries, without damaging dniper bridges, without damaging railroad hubs, and without critically damaging the electric infrastructure? If yes then maybe nukes are on the table. I guess reputational damage makes it unlikely but the Kremlin is sometimes quite unpredictable. Who would have thought a few years ago that Moscow would tolerate NATO giving missiles for long range missile strikes into Russia proper to Russias enemies? Hell even in the 90s NATO support to Chechnyan terrorist was covert. A country that passively allows other countries to arm it's enemies during war time is by definition not a great superpower. Even more so when sending these hostile countries raw materials. So Russia obviously doesn't care about its superpower reputation. So who knows? Maybe they also don't care about their humanitarian reputation.
Resorting to the use of nuclear weapons by any party is a point of no return: murder-suicide.
IMHO we are a long ways from that; ‘though depending on how reckless Ukraine / West gets, there a few possible scenarios where Russia would be justified to respond with nukes.
Stop 🛑 all that ridiculous talk about using nuclear ☢️ weapons in Ukraine That should not under any circumstances be even considered It will back fire in Russia and they will lose all sympathy and support from other BRICS countries and it would proof the West narrative that Putin are an evil psychopath dictator. Russian have other conventional weapons they can use. Also to bomb and destroy Kiev if it should be necessary I agree that NATO de facto are at war with Russia and have been that for a long time. So it’s legitimate that Russia attack NATO bases in other EU countries But it’s crazy to escalate the war and kill more innocent people Remove the non elected warmongering corrupt criminal psychopath Zelensky and start peace ☮️ negotiations now
1) Biden's already a done deal; would Trump (or Harris or any of the others lined up for the job) be any better?
2) The UK was dealt with on Yankee Doodle Day (Did you miss the election? There was one, as if it could make any difference.);
3) Macron just ignored his wake up call, and is busily convincing himself that's OK;
4) the Germans are working on it in a stereotypically precise manner.
If none of the above are of any real significance (And please do rest assured they are not!) how on earth could you imagine anything a clown with a penchant for cocaine, who won attention by playing a piano with his penis, is going to make any difference?
Nothing would delight NATO more than if Russia were to resort to the use of nuclear weapons.
Russian impotence would be on full display, any sympathy Russia has in the Global South would evaporate and people would stop talking about Israeli atrocities in Palestine. There would be enormous pressure on India and China to abandon Russia, and the US and Israel would take this as a green light to use nuclear weapons on Iran.
Fair? No, but fair has nothing to do with it.
Agreed, and well said, it should be avoided unless Russia becomes super desperate and calculates that the costs are worth the gains, which will remain unlikely except in the most extreme scenarios.
I strongly believe that USA has already made a decision of nuking Iran, they are just waiting for an opportunity.
USA using nuke is necessary for it as it can no longer project conventional power and it must instil fear to hold on to its supremacy.
I am not sure about the conventional power trope, much as I may wish otherwise.
Any future Afghanistan and Iraq will be a lot costlier thanks to drones. That changed dynamics completely. I think it is the main miscalculation on the Russian part too, nobody had predicted the magnitude and influence of drones. Now everybody knows.
Just imagine the USA occupation of Afghanistan where taliban instead of home made explosive devices had drones. Unsustainable. This is why I don’t think they have the conventional power any more (not that it does not exist, just that drones require orders of magnitude more personnel, technology, and any occupation would take orders of magnitude higher losses.
Russia has made miscalculation after miscalculation, much as I may wish otherwise.
Surely there were miscalculations on all sides. I’m convinced that the west was left in shock when they realized Russia is not going to fall apart from within. That was their big miscalculation.
What is going on now, IMO is finding ways for killing more Russians and inflicting as much of material damage as possible before inevitable end of the war.
To nato, dead Russians are also a success.
And a digression: an analyst (bmanalysis) made a point which made sense to me. At the beginning of smo there was a realistic chance of Ukraine peace and then fast slide under Russian influence (there is still a chance for that in the future). To nato, Ukrainians are potential Russian soldiers, so to them dead Ukrainians are almost as good as dead Russians. NATO at this point wants to reap the situation and kill as many people to reduce future adversaries potential.
I think the Weat clearly miscalculated. And they've painted themselves into a corner that they cannot get out of, but through a general war.
The difference is that Western resources and soft power allow them to make mistakes with no consequences. Too many people still think that the West are the Good Guys, in spite of abundant evidence to the contrary.
Russia doesn't have this luxury. Ot fair? Nope. But that's the way it is. Which also makes Russian soft pedaling especially foolish.
After the failed “counteroffensive” any speculation in the west about Russia using nukes has been and will continue to be pure projection.
I agree, but a lot of this speculation is coming from "Non-Russian Pro-Russians" (NRPRs) in the Alt-Media Community (AMC) and even members of the Russian government itself like Medvedev, who's mostly just an ultra-nationalist bullhorn but still a high-level official.
Psyops. 😉 Doesn’t hurt to put it out there.
Yes, I personally suspect that part of what's fueling this is that some faction here thinks that loudly talking about this will "deter" the West, while some NRPRs have reacted to their dog whistles to independently promote this (IMO false) perception.
What I've learned these 2,5 years is that a lot of what we see, hear, and read is either a direct or indirect message from one group of elites to another.
We average folks are easily influenced by their respective narratives and oftentimes can't make full sense of them.
Other times we suspect that more is going on behind the scenes, but "fellow travelers'" amplification of these messages can muddle the discussion.
That's what I think is happening here after reflecting on everything from February 2022 till today.
Remember how many times we heard that it would be WWIII if the West even indirectly intervened in Ukraine?
What about when Crimea was bombed for the first time? The second? The umpteenth time now? How about the Crimean Bridge?
The Kremlin? Russia's strategic airfields? Its early warning systems? The assassination of influential journalists and other figures?
How about turning Belgorod into a literal war zone? What about the scenario of Ukraine invading pre-2014 Russian land like Kursk, which now happened?
Time and again, every prior warning about WWIII pushed by officials, allied media, and "fellow travelers" didn't pan out.
That's not to say that the risk doesn't exist -- it does, and I've written about it a lot -- but I'm becoming a lot more cynical nowadays in light of recent events.
Remember, Russia to this day won't even consider bombing even a single bridge across the Dnieper.
Another commentator earlier today ridiculously implied that's because pontoons are preferable to bridges and rails for crossing rivers (LOL!).
But the truth is that perceived political goals (irrespective of how relevant they are) seem to predominate over military ones even this far down the line.
Russia could always theoretically jump up the escalation ladder, but there are still a lot of steps to climb if it wants to do so gradually as expected.
We need to ask ourselves several questions:
1. Why won't Russia even attempt to destroy a single bridge across the Dnieper?
2. Why do troops and equipment continue rushing to the front lines from Western Ukraine?
3. What did Russia really want to achieve by attempting in vain to revive the grain deal earlier this spring?
In my view:
1. Political goals continue to take precedence over military ones
2. Russia can't actually target, let alone track, all these shipments
3. "Goodwill gestures" are seen by the Russian elite as a means towards convincing the Western elite to get Ukraine to resume peace talks.
1. ✓
2. ✓
3. ✓
You make for a good read.
2. Russia can't actually target, let alone track, all these shipments
If you have strong defensive lines it's cheaper to let the enemy come to you rather than hit them from a distance. It's a cost benefit equation - expensive missiles vs. cheap artillery and anti-tank ordinance which can be mass produced. A side benefit is hands-on experience destroying enemy targets at close range.
One thing that escapes most people's attention is that Russia is gaining enormous battlefield experience in the most complex peer level warfare since WWII. No other nation has that experience. What this means is that the next generation of Russian military leadership, from NCOs up to the General Staff, will be battle tested personnel with a genuine understanding of what it takes to wage war on this scale.
This is the unintended consequence of picking a fight with a nation that perceives that fight as an existential threat. To quote Admiral Yamamoto, which I'd say applies equally in this context:
"I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve."
"1. Why won't Russia even attempt to destroy a single bridge across the Dnieper?"
You don't destroy what you intend to use. Retreating armies destroy bridges. Advancing armies attempt to preserve them.
Russia's aim thus far has not been to capture territory so much as to degrade Ukraine's military, which is achievable by a strong defensive position, provided your enemy is foolish enough to attack them, which thus far has been the case.
1. Political goals continue to take precedence over military ones
"War is the continuation of politics by other means." --Karl Von Clausewitz
That's not what's happening. The explicitly stated objective of the SMO was to push threats as far away from Russia's border as possible not keep or bait them as close as possible, including at the further risk of civilian lives.
What you're apparently doing is trying to rationalize the sluggish pace of this conflict like a lot of top influencers have done, but the explanation doesn't align with the actual objectives.
Everything you've written is challenged by simply asking why Russia wouldn't advance to the river if it was able to and thus target these attacking units further away from its borders instead of close to them.
What you're implying, whether you intend to or not, is that Russia can indeed advance but chooses not to as part of some "master plan", even though this same "plan" has led to many civilians being killed inside Russia's pre-2014 borders.
"The explicitly stated objective of the SMO was to push threats as far away from Russia's border as possible not keep or bait them as close as possible, including at the further risk of civilian lives."
The original stated objective was demilitarization and de-nazification. Demilitarization consists of risking as few of your own guys as possible to deplete the enemy's numbers. The best way to do that is from a well prepared defensive position if you know your enemy will attack.
The alternative, which you seem to be suggesting, is to advance in force to the Dnieper, which while possible, would cost considerably more in Russian lives and equipment than what they're currently losing from Ukrainian artillery.
Neither of us knows what the Russian General Staff is planning, but if I had to guess, I'd say the basic idea was (until recently) to gradually degrade the UAF, while keeping the conflict in the east so as not to tempt a NATO occupation of western Ukraine. Better to deplete both UAF and NATO gradually than risk a sudden escalation by advancing in force.
The preferred outcome, which we're starting to see now, is collapse of the command structure and political infighting, which ideally would lead to a coup and some form of negotiations. Barring that (and I'm not giving odds) the objective would be to advance in force once the enemy is sufficiently depleted and the risks to your own guys are minimized. We're at or near that point I would say, which is why the bridges are still standing.
"What you're apparently doing is trying to rationalize the sluggish pace of this conflict like a lot of top influencers have done, but the explanation doesn't align with the actual objectives. "
What I'm doing is the same as what you're doing - using the best available sources and arriving at my own reasoned conclusions. I don't follow what you call 'top influencers' who I would characterize as impatience and lacking in actual military knowledge, so not worth paying attention to.
Demilitarization is facilitated by pushing threats as far away from the border as possible to the point where they no longer threaten, let alone harm and kill, Russians, which doesn't equate to letting them remain on the border.
Moreover, Ukrainian arms continue being replenished, although Russia is winning the "race of logistics" with NATO. Maintaining the status quo only incrementally achieves the aforementioned objective.
Russia is struggling to advance in Ukraine, but it's still trying. Your claims that it's sitting back letting the enemy strike don't align with the reality of gradual advances on the ground.
On the topic of collapsing the central command, Russia also continues eschewing attacks against command and control centers. They still to this day won't carry out large-scale targeted strikes against them.
Your understanding of everything is a reaction to the sluggish pace of this conflict, one which tries to present it as a master plan of sorts, when it's really just improvisation given serious limitations and continued self-restraint.
And that self-restraint is due to, in my view outdated and perhaps even to a degree misguided (in hindsight) factors whose influence over decisionmaking continues to linger.
Again, the most sensible thing to do is to take out those bridges, but that's not being done, and it's not because Russia wants to bait the enemy closer to its borders, but because of political calculations and some military limitations.
"Demilitarization is facilitated by pushing threats as far away from the border as possible..."
If you can. That's a very long border. To do what you suggest would require a major assembly of forces which would be vulnerable to attack. Don't forget, the line of contact was already well established before Russia entered the fight. That meant you'd be attacking fortified positions where a 3 to 1 advantage would be needed to guarantee success. Over that amount of terrain, I agree, Russia would be stretched to achieve that goal, which would be what? To capture mostly empty fields? Look at the map. It's all farmland with very little cover. Once you've advanced and captured that you then have to hold it, which requires building fortifications. It also stretches your supply lines. Why would you do that when the enemy keeps coming at your already well fortified lines, which were established years before entering the fray? That's been the plan these last 2 years and it is militarily sound, even if it doesn't satisfy the demands of people with no understanding of peer level conflict in this kind of theatre. Seems to me you're falling into the same trap as the pundits you decry. Why is it taking so long? Must be something amiss. No, it's just that in war you don't make rash decisions that costs unnecessary lives and equipment. You let the enemy do that, and thus far they've cooperated.
"Moreover, Ukrainian arms continue being replenished,..."
Sure, the part that isn't diverted to the black market. A friend of mine who fought on the Ukrainian side tells a different story. Ammunition and artillery rounds were in short supply as were other essentials. He even spent his own money to buy a van so his supposedly mobile infantry unit could get around because they didn't supply them with a vehicle. That's how bad it was on his section of the line, and that was six months ago. His description comports with that given by many captured UAF soldiers, so I'm inclined to take his word.
"Russia is struggling to advance in Ukraine, but it's still trying. Your claims that it's sitting back letting the enemy strike don't align with the reality of gradual advances on the ground."
The strategy has shifted now that the UAF is sufficiently depleted in most areas. They actually helped in that regard by diverting resources to Kirsk. I maintain, and this is from Russian sources not armchair enthusiasts, that the strategy these last two years was to minimize losses while inflicting maximum damage, and that goal has now been largely achieved, which is why you're seeing an advance now, rather than 6 months or a year ago. Time has been on Russia's side since day one, so why would you commit to a strategy that depletes your own forces when you don't have to? Up until now it has not been about capturing territory, which as I've pointed out incurs unacceptable losses, stretches supply lines and requires new fortifications. Simpler to just sit tight and let the enemy (who has no chance of overrunning you) throw himself into a meat grinder.
"On the topic of collapsing the central command, Russia also continues eschewing attacks against command and control centers. They still to this day won't carry out large-scale targeted strikes against them."
Where are you getting this from? They just hit a major concentration of NATO and UAF personnel and there have been similar attacks on command and control centres previously. You make it sound easy, but I would point out that some of these command centres date to Soviet times and are built to withstand a nuclear attack. I would also point out that you don't target a position where you have your own people on the inside supplying vital information. This would apply to the SBU as well as the military.
"Your understanding of everything is a reaction to the sluggish pace of this conflict,"
Up to this point I've tried to avoid characterizing your position as you've done to mine several times now, but this is becoming a polemic and I try to avoid those. You clearly have strong opinions on the subject, but unless you have a direct line to the Russian General Staff, you're basically in the same boat as I am. As for the bridges, those will be needed in the coming advance across the Dneiper, which will involve capturing both banks plus several kms to the west as well. The ultimate goal is Odessa which can't be approached from Kherson due to interceding rivers. That's my prediction at least, based on the historic importance of Odessa as a Russian city, plus the need to control the entire littoral to prevent attacks by sea.
Time will tell whose analysis is more grounded. In the meantime, I'll let you have the last word as I see no point in arguing any further about it.
On the other hand, it doesn't do too much/any harm?
Thanks, McDodd. I still maintain despite what that other commentator claimed that it's more difficult to rely on pontoons for river crossings than on bridges and rails.
Right now there's an absolutely unimpeded flow of troops and equipment across the river and has been for the entire duration of this conflict.
Since Russia might not be able to track and target NATO equipment in Western Ukraine, blowing up the bridges would at least slow their deployment to the front.
I'm beginning to suspect that another "gentlemen's deal" might be the reason why Russia hasn't even tried.
We can only speculate what the terms are, but the US might have threatened Russia with something serious if that's the case.
Perhaps they said they'd authorize a conventional intervention into Western Ukraine, which while partitioning it, could spike the risk of WWIII which Putin wants to avoid?
I don't know, I'm just spitballing here because we know that it would help Russia and harm Ukraine if these bridges were destroyed (again, unlike what the other guy claimed).
So it would follow that the US might threaten something greater that would harm Russia and help Ukraine even more, such as a conventional intervention by NATO.
I’ve always been of the opinion that they WANT that flow. It’s a much broader attritional war in that they’re perfectly happy to kill all the mercenaries and empty every NATO armory. Neither can be replaced.
Everyone is also underestimating or outright ignoring the developmental aspect of this war. It’s a real world laboratory wherein Russia is refining every aspect of their military, fine tuning their industrial complex, and in due course steadily nullifying every weapon the West has.
By the time NATO would get around to committing themselves they wouldn’t have any cards to play.
Excellent points!
I do believe you, like Putin and the Russians, are quite right.
My personal opinion is that the "race of logistics"/"war of attrition" was an outcome of Russia being unable to wrap everything up quickly like it initially wanted to do, not a planned feature of the SMO.
As for why the bridges still aren't being destroyed, I plan to have a piece about that tomorrow or the next day, definitely by the end of the week. I've been thinking about it a lot and want to generate a discussion.
"...not a planned feature of the SMO."
No, it would be difficult to ignore that aspect of the SMO has not gone to plan.
Still, flexibility and adaptability being what they are, as important as they are, perhaps it's not such a bad thing (in the long run)?
"...the bridges still aren't being destroyed, I plan to have a piece about that..."
Ah-ha, I look forward to that.
Thanks for the heads-up!
Absolutely, I was relieved to see that Russia -- which traditionally lacks flexibility and takes a long time to learn lessons -- adapted to changing circumstances a lot faster than I thought.
It could have been faster in hindsight, of course, but it was still better than what I think many expected. Everything's back on the right track though earlier opportunities that could have been tapped now appear forever lost.
The conflict is altogether different at this point than it was at the beginning. Whereas it might have been easier to destroy the bridges back then, now it's much harder and there might be less missiles comfortably available to expend.
After all, Ukraine has around 20 bridges over the Dnieper, and there's certainly some air defense guarding at least the main ones. I'm not so sure Russia has the excess missiles required for saturating 20 bridges simultaneously.
Agreed. The “Kiev Gambit” was a chance to prevent all of this plus — as many also conveniently forget — a very successful “pinning” of AFU forces that allowed them to clean house in Azovstal.
You're right, I wrote about it at the time at the now-defunct oneworld.press (you can find an Internet Archive version of my work there from February 2022-September 2022 when I fully moved to Substack once they closed down).
Yeah, makes good sense.
I hadn't thought of the bridges like that, making it impossible to track troops and supplies.
Too many armchair generals, though; all joking aside, I wouldn't like to comment on the relative efficiency or inefficiency of any particular action. I don't know.
I do, however, trust Putin and the Russians to get it right.
I think you're wise to recognise spitballing, when ya gotta...
And I reckon you're most probably right about the gentlemen's agreement.
So frustrating to force oneself to reconcile to statesmen, like Putin, particularly in a world where there are so few of them, needing to relate to [find your own word here for Biden, Sullivan, UK PMs et alia, please] as 'gentlemen', when the world is so full of such [?].
Russia, led by Putin, has been one of the savviest interdictors of Western hegemony. Syria's Assad followed suit and has kept together his country despite the hyenas of U.S., Turkey, and Israel tearing his country apart. Assad is now being welcomed throughout the Middle East. They both behaved with a restraint unknown in the capitols of the U.S., UK, and Europe.
I see no reason why Russia need nuke anything. I do believe a submarine-launched hypersonic missile (flying under radar) could take out Washington, D.C. Lord, the silence would be a blessing.
Putin has a sort of siege problem. If he just sits there, those outside the castle gates will just wear him down with loads of terrorism, sniping, missile, drone (etc) attacks and abuse. The bully never goes away unless he receives a bloody noe. Although Putin's restraint is commendable not responding makes him look weak - and that can lead to internal instability. To have these enemies outside the city gate is the real problem. Peace talks dont work because they wouldn't last with such enemies, just look at Minsk. So what's the solution?
1: wait for the children to grow up;
2: wait for more grown-up children to get fed up being pushed around by immature bullies and get rid of them;
3: just wait to see how it pans out and act as, when and if appropriate.
You know, like adults do.
Rusia no usaría armas nucleares táctica en este momento. El punto de cambio inquietante en este momento sería que usase sus misiles hipersónicos contra los países que pudieran proporcionar misiles de largo alcance a Ucrania. Ese escenario sería igualmente inquietante pues si UK recibiera una respuesta de este tipo en su propio territorio no tengo ni idea de cuál podría ser su respuesta, ya que Rusia estaría demás atacándoles dentro de la legalidad. De todas maneras UK dejo de fabricar misiles Storm Shadow hace tiempo y parece muy plausible que le quedan poquísimas unidades, si es que le quedan. De hecho, llevamos bastante tiempo viendo que ya tampoco los usan en Ucrania. Si eso es así, todo este teatro que se está montando ahora sería solo un farol por por parte de UK. UK no tiene prácticamente ejercito, ni tan siquiera tanques y su armada esta en un estado lamentable. Por otro lado, Alemania no parece que vaya a usar sus misiles Taurus contra Rusia y Francia ya ha dejado de hablar del tema con sus Scalps. EEUU parece que tampoco va a entregar ATACAM (de hecho, dicen que, sus almacenes andan también bastante bajos). Todo esto suena a rabietas y ganas de mantener la cara ante sus audiencias en el mundo occidental, así como su presión mediática a todos los niveles. Sabemos que incluso sus producciones de municiones andan bastante bajas con respecto a lo que se necesitaría para emprender un enfrentamiento "en serio" con Rusia. Los ejércitos europeos además no cuentan ni con el número de efectivos necesarios, ni las infraestructuras, ni la coordinación necesarias. Europa está cayendo a marchas forzadas en un abismo económico sin ninguna forma de arreglo que no sea desmontando todo el "estado único" y centralizado que están intentando montar y sin contar con la población. No hay creatividad en los campos más importantes. Malos tiempos para Europa y muy muy difícil de corregir.
The fact we are discussing whether or not Russia will nuke a country they are sending gas to is testament to how stupid this war is and incomprehensible Moscows goals are. Is there a way to nuke Ukraine without interrupting gas deliveries, without damaging dniper bridges, without damaging railroad hubs, and without critically damaging the electric infrastructure? If yes then maybe nukes are on the table. I guess reputational damage makes it unlikely but the Kremlin is sometimes quite unpredictable. Who would have thought a few years ago that Moscow would tolerate NATO giving missiles for long range missile strikes into Russia proper to Russias enemies? Hell even in the 90s NATO support to Chechnyan terrorist was covert. A country that passively allows other countries to arm it's enemies during war time is by definition not a great superpower. Even more so when sending these hostile countries raw materials. So Russia obviously doesn't care about its superpower reputation. So who knows? Maybe they also don't care about their humanitarian reputation.
Resorting to the use of nuclear weapons by any party is a point of no return: murder-suicide.
IMHO we are a long ways from that; ‘though depending on how reckless Ukraine / West gets, there a few possible scenarios where Russia would be justified to respond with nukes.
Im sorry you had to write this one!
Well, after reading all the comments, I need to retract that comment. Obvsly more going on with this talk than i thought.
"What Would Really Be Achieved..."
Just one thing: victory for the Americans.
Stop 🛑 all that ridiculous talk about using nuclear ☢️ weapons in Ukraine That should not under any circumstances be even considered It will back fire in Russia and they will lose all sympathy and support from other BRICS countries and it would proof the West narrative that Putin are an evil psychopath dictator. Russian have other conventional weapons they can use. Also to bomb and destroy Kiev if it should be necessary I agree that NATO de facto are at war with Russia and have been that for a long time. So it’s legitimate that Russia attack NATO bases in other EU countries But it’s crazy to escalate the war and kill more innocent people Remove the non elected warmongering corrupt criminal psychopath Zelensky and start peace ☮️ negotiations now
Which one:
1) Biden's already a done deal; would Trump (or Harris or any of the others lined up for the job) be any better?
2) The UK was dealt with on Yankee Doodle Day (Did you miss the election? There was one, as if it could make any difference.);
3) Macron just ignored his wake up call, and is busily convincing himself that's OK;
4) the Germans are working on it in a stereotypically precise manner.
If none of the above are of any real significance (And please do rest assured they are not!) how on earth could you imagine anything a clown with a penchant for cocaine, who won attention by playing a piano with his penis, is going to make any difference?