A Simple Quid Pro Quo Might Explain The Incipient Russian-Azeri Rapprochement

Aliyev might respect Russia’s sensitivities in Central Asia by not allowing TRIPP to be used for military purposes, while Putin could help him counterbalance the influence of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Putin met with his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev during the CIS leaders’ summit in Dushanbe and apologized for last December’s Azerbaijan Airlines tragedy. He said that his country’s investigation has thus far determined that air defense missiles exploded in proximity to the aircraft while responding to Ukrainian drone attacks. Putin pledged to continue the investigation, pay compensation to the victims’ families, and legally assess the actions of all officials involved. All of this pleased Aliyev.

The incipient Russian-Azeri rapprochement surprised many observers on both sides after the worsening of their ties over the summer. A Russian police raid on local criminal groups that happened to be Azeri led to Azerbaijan closing its local Sputnik office and arresting some of its employees on espionage charges. Azerbaijan and Armenia then replaced Russian mediation with American and agreed to the TRIPP Corridor that’s now poised to inject Western influence into Central Asia via NATO member Turkiye.

These developments coincided with an intense campaign against both countries and their leaders in the other’s press, among their top influencers, and by average supporters on social media. Russians accused Aliyev of genociding Armenians, being a dictator, and stabbing Putin in the back, while Azeris accused Putin of imperialism, being a dictator too, and stabbing Aliyev in the back. Some advocates on each side also went further than that with crude attacks. Here are five background briefings about their tensions:

* 1 July: “The Latest Trouble In Russian-Azerbaijani Relations Might Be Part Of A Turkish-US Powerplay”

* 3 July: “Aliyev Expects To Rise To Global Stardom By Stirring Up Highly Publicized Trouble With Russia”

* 4 July: “The Kremlin Believes That ‘Certain Forces’ Want To Disrupt Russian-Azerbaijani Relations”

* 9 August: “The TRIPP Corridor Threatens To Undermine Russia’s Broader Regional Position”

* 14 August: “Russian-Azerbaijani Tensions Are Quickly Heating Up Over Ukraine”

While anything could still happen to offset their rapprochement, the signals given by Putin and Aliyev during their meeting should suffice for calming down their side’s advocates, some of whom like many top “Non-Russian Pro-Russians” went overboard with their attacks as a form of virtue signaling support. Astute observers knew that both stood to lose if their tensions worsened and that’s why some high-profile effort was inevitably going to be made, whether ultimately successful or not, to alleviate them.

As was mentioned, Russia doesn’t want NATO influencing Central Asia via Turkiye’s role in TRIPP since that could destabilize its entire southern periphery, while Azerbaijan’s energy industry upon which the economy depends is vulnerable if this leads to war. Moreover, Putin has an interest in nipping all this in the bud so as to refocus almost all of Russia’s military, intelligence, and strategic capabilities on Ukraine, while Aliyev would preemptively avert disproportionate dependence on Turkiye by agreeing to this.

These converging interests explain their incipient rapprochement, which could lead to Azerbaijan respecting Russia’s sensitivities in Central Asia by not allowing TRIPP to be used for military purposes, while Putin could help Aliyev counterbalance the influence of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. So long as this scenario remains credible, each side’s most zealous advocates are expected to curtail their attacks against their other in order to not fall from grace, which would likely happen if they refused.